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Friday May 9, 2008. In the small Dutch town of De Punt, three firefighters lost their 
lives while on duty. They were killed in a fire at a local shipyard. It was a tragedy 
with a large local impact. In the memorial book (De Haas et al., 2009) published by 
the municipality of Tynaarlo, the widow of one of the three heroes who died in the 
blaze tells her side of the story. She talks about her husband and the fire brigade, 
but also about the tensions that had arisen in the aftermath of the event, rooted in 
differences between the expectations of a society in shock and the more personal 
emotions and grief of the next of kin. She and her bereaved family felt pressured to 
share their grief in the public arena. Although she was impressed by the number of 
people who attended the commemoration, she was also left with a feeling that no 
place existed for the personal mourning of her family. Her decision not to attend 
the yearly memorial service held by the mayor and the fire brigade – along with her 
refusal to add her husband’s name to the National Firefighters Memorial in Arnhem 
in the Netherlands – resulted in long-lasting tensions in the local community. 
In tragedies such as this, mayors are supposed to assume the role of public leader. Citizens 
expect their mayor to make sense of the situation, address feelings of hope and resilience 
on a community level and simultaneously take care of the victims, bereaved and next of kin. 
These are also the situations that evoke political and psychological mechanisms with the 
power to change the way in which people, organizations, governments, polities, and media 
act and interact (Ansell, Boin, & ‘t Hart, 2014). Ultimately, mayors are challenged to prevent 
and dissipate tensions among their audiences, and guard the well-being of their citizens.
In recent years, numerous studies have been published on public leadership in 
times of crises. Nevertheless, in the academic literature, the focus of this aspect of crisis 
management tends to be on the national and international level. In particular, crisis 
management academics assess crises and disasters with disruptive impacts on the scale of 
Hurricane Katrina (2005), the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks or the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster (2011). Although this category of crises certainly brings fruitful academic insights, 
theory on the role of public leaders on smaller scale incidents seems to be lacking. Even 
though such crises lack the magnitude of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Cold War 
or the 2008 financial meltdown, they are also part of a local, social and cultural system 
that asks for public leadership.
This dissertation focuses on the role of mayors, as a special category of public 
leaders, on crises in a local setting. It draws upon prior academic research on public 
leadership in times of crises, and adds new empirical studies among Dutch mayors on 
their role as local communicators and vehicles for psychosocial intervention. It aims 
to broaden our academic understanding of crisis management and public leadership. 
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Chapter 1
The insights from this study result in general concepts that deepen our understanding 
and enable mayors in The Netherlands and other countries to be effective as local 
government representatives. 
The current chapter presents a general overview of the study design and an outline 
of the studies the dissertation contains. Before elaborating on the study design, a brief 
description is provided on the current state of research on Dutch mayors, and general 
observations of academic research in public administration, crisis communication and 
psychosocial literature.
Dutch research on mayors
Given that most of the studies included in this dissertation are based on research 
among Dutch mayors, the magnifying glass is first focused on The Netherlands. 
Several recent Ph.D. dissertations have enhanced collective understanding of Dutch 
mayors in the context of crisis. De Vries (2016) has studied the influence of context 
and personality on the leadership of the commander-in-chief, based on scenarios 
judged by 190 Dutch mayors. He has examined the role of mayor as chair of the crisis 
team, and specifically the way in which his or her modus operandi influences the crisis 
team to take either a participative or more directive means of decision making. De 
Vries (2016) ultimately determined that mayors make personal assessments in the 
decision-making process in times of crisis; moreover, agreeable mayors exhibit less 
autocratic leadership behavior and partly in consequence are perceived as being less 
effective in leading their crisis teams. Resoort (2015) has stepped outside the “war 
room” of a crisis team to research the circumstances that result in the resignation 
of a mayor in the aftermath of a crisis. He confirmed earlier findings that leadership 
and communication are important factors in times of crisis. In his analysis of 18 
case studies, he underlines the importance of leadership, crisis communication, and 
the use of legislative powers in times of crisis. Resoort (2015) has also discussed a 
so-called “negative bias,” through which unsuccessful preventive measures before 
a crisis become a contributing and negative factor in the process of accountability. 
Like Resoort, Berndsen (2015) has discussed the political aftermath and process of 
accountability on both a local and a national level. In cases where (local) government 
was held responsible, governmental organizations tended to react in a defensive 
manner through fear of liability and a lack of openness and empathy (Berndsen, 2015). 
Moreover, Broekema (2018) has researched the learning process of governmental 
organizations. One of his studies was based on a questionnaire answered by 207 Dutch 
mayors. He has concluded that mayors with high levels of public service motivation 
are more motivated to learn (in terms of communication and accountability) in the 
aftermath of crises (Broekema, 2018).
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Prins (2014) has also studied Dutch mayors, but focused on their role in terms of safety and 
security governance. Even though her study does not directly enrich our understanding 
of mayors in periods of crisis, she has shown how mayors’ policies have developed over 
time. Indeed, whereas they previously tended to be solo actors in the governmental field 
of safety and security, they have increasingly become networking actors with an evolving 
perspective on safety, security, and risks within a post-modern society (Prins, 2014). While 
Prins’ findings are not generalizable to crisis management as such, they might suggest 
that mayors are increasingly becoming network partners in times of crisis as well. Karsten 
(2013) has taken a similar policy approach, noting that mayors and aldermen struggle with 
decisions when they feel that these are not supported by their local communities. In his 
analysis, he proposes that local political executives can regain authority for their directive 
decisions by explaining and justifying to different audiences the considerations that 
motivated their decisions (Karsten, 2013). Again, this might have a degree of relevance 
for the public clarification of decisions made in times of crisis.
Defining crisis situations in a local setting
What transforms a situation into a local crisis cannot be substantially defined and written 
down on a checklist. A disturbing event such as a fatal car accident with youngsters may 
have a considerable impact on a small local community, but not in a major city. When 
considering the definition of “crisis” that is widely used in public administration, such a 
difference in impact is largely ignored. Public administration tends to refer to the classic 
definition of Rosenthal, Charles and ‘t Hart, where a crisis is deemed “a serious threat to 
the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time 
pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions” (1989: 
10). Consequently, the definition reflects public administrative researchers’ interest in 
mega-crises. 
Crisis communication literature takes the perception of a situation and the 
expectancies among stakeholders as the core theme of its definition. According to Coombs 
(2009: 100), “a crisis can be viewed as the perception of an event that threatens important 
expectancies of stakeholders and can impact the organization’s performance. Crises are 
largely perceptual. If stakeholders believe there is a crisis, the organization is in a crisis 
unless it can successfully persuade stakeholders it is not. A crisis violates expectations; 
an organization has done something stakeholders feel is inappropriate.” Although this 
definition renders perception and expectations central, it does not correspond entirely 
to the setting of local crises with a public impact. One can consider the public leadership 
required in the aftermath of a local shooting, where the shooter and not the local 
government holds direct responsibility for the crisis situation, despite the fact that the 
community expects its mayor to be present, as the aftermath of the shooting in Alphen 
aan den Rijn in The Netherlands demonstrated (Van Duin et al., 2012). 
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Psychosocial literature takes an alternative approach, emphasizing the impact of 
crises on affected individuals and groups (Dückers et al., 2017). Certainly, Hobfoll et al. 
(2007) use the frame of collective “potentially traumatic events which impact the well-
being, functioning, and health to which citizens are exposed.”
In an attempt to transform the concept of crises to the context of mayors, crises are 
related here to the impact of local social systems. Barton (1969) has defined a social 
system as a set of people with a particular degree of interaction and interdependence 
as well as a certain degree of independence from the outside world. Social systems 
may include a classroom, neighborhood, community or city, or a social unit such 
as a friendship group, family or extended kin group. In line with Barton (1969) and 
Coombs (2007), this dissertation focuses on the (perceived) impact of negative and 
unpredictable events on any of these social systems. Unlike the crises that generate 
the interest of public administration research, physical damage or fatalities are not 
conditional to labeling an event a “local crisis.” Rather, such a definition must also 
include so-called public tragedies, situations of widespread notoriety, suffering and 
collective impact (Hayes et al., 2017).
All in all, a crisis in a local setting can be described as the perception of an unpredictable 
event that threatens important expectancies of citizens, generates negative outcomes for 
a social system and asks for local public leadership. 
On the intersection of research disciplines
The difference in definitions among public administration, crisis communication and 
psychosocial support reflects different points of view on the matter. Nevertheless, each 
of these areas has aspects that can be regarded as relevant building blocks in order to 
increase our scientific knowledge of the role of mayors in local crises. In order to generate 
a complete and multidisciplinary overview of the topic, these diverse angles are discussed 
below.
Public administration
In recent years, crisis management has gained traction as a subject of academic study. 
Public administration research has tended to focus on the collective and political 
perspectives of public leadership. For instance, Boin et al. (2005) have helped stimulate 
consideration of public leadership in times of crisis, arguing that public leaders face 
several challenges: trying to prevent or at least minimize the impacts of adversity, dealing 
with the social and political consequences, accountability, and restoring public faith in the 
future. This highlights how within the context of public administration, the academic field 
of crisis management scrutinizes the relationship between citizens and their leaders on 
the one hand, and the interaction between public leaders and their democratic fora on the 
other. Regarding the former, an important task is “meaning making,” in which the broader 
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impacts of a crisis are communicated to citizens, the media and other stakeholders (Boin 
et al., 2005). Boin et al. (2005) have also linked this issue to accountability, because 
meaning making enhances credibility, which in turn increases one’s chances of political 
survival in the post-crisis phase.
Crisis communication
Even though “meaning making” undoubtedly has elements of crisis communication, 
there is scarcely any interaction between public administrative crisis research and crisis 
communication. The focus of crisis communication can be regarded as an academic field 
where crisis response strategies are defined and tested, with the purpose of protecting 
brands and reputations. The field has a “managerial bias” (Waymer & Heath, 2007), with 
a focus on American, corporate case studies (Arendt et al., 2017). Hayes et al. (2017) have 
already called for a new paradigm, as crises affect organizations outside of the corporate 
arena as well. Such a paradigm might support public leaders in their efforts to integrate 
a more resilience-oriented type of crisis communication in order to support communities 
to survive and revive in the event of a crisis (e.g., Olsson, 2014).
Psychosocial support
Whereas Van Loon (2008) has demanded a more structural integration of crisis 
management methodologies within the domain of psychosocial support, Dückers et al. 
(2017) have applied psychosocial support to the context of crisis leadership. Indeed, they 
(Dückers et al. 2017) have drawn the conclusion that there is an unexplored intersection 
of crisis leadership and psychosocial support. Giving meaning to something can have a 
positive effect on people’s resilience and recovery from stressful events (Park, 2016). 
According to Dückers et al. (2017), integrating crisis leadership with such psychosocial 
principles helps to reduce foreseeable problems in the response and recovery phases. 
Hobfoll et al. (2007) have described five so-called “essential elements” that are beneficial 
for the well-being of the affected: The promotion of a sense of safety, calmness, self- and 
community efficacy, connectedness to others, and hope. Dückers et al. (2017) argue that 
public leaders can serve as a necessary vehicle to bring these psychosocial principles 
into practice through providing social acknowledgment and contributing to a sense of 
connectedness and hope. 
The need for an interdisciplinary approach on local crisis leadership
A multidisciplinary approach is necessary, as limiting oneself to a public administrative 
background may lead to potential knowledge from the fields of crisis communication and 
psychosocial support being overlooked. Likewise, crisis communication alone might result 
in the importance of communication goals other than reputation repair being ignored. 
Furthermore, a study that takes a psychosocial approach might neglect the political reality 
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in which a mayor acts, where responsibility and accountability for the decisions made 
are “part of the job” as well. Therefore, only by integrating academic approaches is it 
possible to reveal possible knowledge gaps regarding mayors’ actions in the aftermath 
of crises. Otherwise, the risk is that situations will emerge where interests are traded off, 
either intended or unintended. One can think of a mayor who survives a heated political 
debate at the cost of the directly affected, who consequently feel ignored or used for 
political purposes. In such a case, a mayor might have followed a textbook approach to 
public administration, even though he or she turned away from the psychosocial needs 
of the directly affected. Only when all interests are balanced and when further harm to 
stakeholders is prevented can a mayor be deemed truly effective in his or her local crisis 
leadership in the eyes of all of his or her audiences. 
Study objective and research questions
Recent dissertations on the performance of mayors in the Netherlands have helped 
increase our understanding of the political aftermath, the process of accountability, 
and the performance of mayors within a crisis team. However, little is known about the 
expectations citizens have of their public leaders as soon as their community is faced with 
crises. Empirical studies on this aspect of the “meaning making” role of mayors remain 
lacking. Moreover, interdisciplinary studies using the three perspectives described are, to 
the best of our knowledge, absent. Similarly, empirical studies are lacking on what mayors 
can expect in their interactions with local citizens, the bereaved and next of kin. Nor is 
much known about how mayors are able to influence the well-being of their citizens in 
their behavior and responses to crises. The answers to such questions and topics can be 
found at the proposed intersection of psychosocial support, crisis communication, and 
public administration paths. 
This dissertation is aimed at the role of mayors during “crisis in a local setting”. Aim 
is to increase our scientific knowledge regarding several aspects of this role, varying 
from effective leadership to the expectations of affected residents as to the role of their 
mayor. Several empirical studies have provided a basis of knowledge, enabling the modus 
operandi of mayors in times of crisis to be approached in an interdisciplinary manner, as 
proposed. Together, the answers to the following sub-questions generate building blocks 
that help knowledge on crisis leadership by mayors to be developed. Specifically, the 
seven research questions of this dissertation are:
1. What is regarded as effective leadership when mayors from across the world act as 
public leaders in times of crisis? (Chapter 2)
2. What is the visible modus operandi of Dutch mayors in times of crisis, and do they 
act in the same way in all crisis situations? (Chapter 3) 
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3. What are the potential bottlenecks and challenges for Dutch mayors when dealing 
with different types of crisis? (Chapter 4)
4. What are the implications, in terms of trustworthiness and reliability, when 
accountability becomes more prominent on the mayoral radar? (Chapter 5)
5. What is the visible modus operandi of Dutch mayors when there is an apparent 
and simultaneous need for action on the societal impact of a crisis and requests for 
support to those directly affected? (Chapter 6)
6. What do those affected by a crisis, generally speaking, expect from their public 
leaders? (Chapter 7)
7. How do Dutch mayors relate their own perceptions to the expectations of those 
affected by a crisis, and what is the resulting behavior they demonstrate in times of 
crisis? (Chapter 8)
To answer these sub-questions, this investigation utilizes different methodologies, 
along the lines of a multimethod and multisource approach. Through the combination 
of a literature review, a series of interviews with mayors and those affected by crises, 
a questionnaire, a simulation study, and a media review, insights are combined and 
hypotheses thoroughly tested. 
Outline 
The following paragraph provides a brief overview of the chapters in this dissertation. 
These chapters consist of independent peer-reviewed publications and manuscripts under 
review by international crisis-related journals. Most of these peer-reviewed articles are 
co-authored, which explains why the word “we” is used in some of these chapters. As 
the first author of all of the papers, I can confirm that I took the lead in constructing the 
research questions, in choosing the appropriate methodology, and in the entire process 
of writing all of these articles. For the purpose of clarity, the “we” form is used in both 
this introduction and discussion. As the chapters are identical to the published articles, 
the reference style changes between chapters.
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 primarily look at the role of mayors in times of crisis from 
a public point of view. The chapters describe what (Dutch) mayors tend to do in 
terms of meaning making, and how they cope with dilemmas related to their role 
as public leaders in times of crisis. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 take as a central theme the 
position of citizens and individuals affected by a crisis, including their expectations 
of government and its representatives. In the overall discussion in Chapter 10, the 
two perspectives are combined and an attempt is made to answer the core research 
question.
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Chapter 2: Literature review
Based on: 
Jong, W., Dückers, M.L.A. & Van der Velden, P.G. (2016), Leadership of Mayors and 
Governors during Crises. Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 24: 46-58. 
doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12091
Method: review of 34 peer-reviewed articles; the full list contained 1,496 articles.
Given that the aim was to study the role of mayors, a literature review was undertaken 
first. The review examines peer-reviewed articles from The Netherlands and abroad to 
generate a concise perspective on the state-of-the-art view on public leadership in times 
of crisis. The purpose of a literature review is twofold. First, it maximizes the likelihood 
that the researcher will include all relevant studies on the topic at hand, and minimizes 
the chances that key articles are overlooked. Second, it provides the reader with a broad 
overview of the topic and the paths that have been taken by other researchers. In this 
case, the central theme of the literature review was public leadership in times of crisis. 
In order to avoid excluding any potential similarities between mayors and other public 
leaders, the review assesses the role of mayors, governors, and premiers in times of crisis. 
As part of the overall research question considers the effectiveness of public leadership, 
this study focuses on the effectiveness of crisis leadership. A total of 34 peer-reviewed 
articles met the criteria for inclusion in this review and enabled conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the tasks and effectiveness of mayors. The review revealed two insights: first, 
the literature on crisis management seems to be dominated by American case studies, 
mostly on 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina; second, the literature is dominated by the public 
role of mayors in the aftermath of crises, while little attention is given to the role of 
mayors in relation to victims’ families. In this way, the review confirms the relevance of 
the research question. 
Chapter 3: Toward a framework
Based on: 
Jong, W. (2017), Meaning making by public leaders in times of crisis: An assessment. Public 
Relations Review, 43, 5: 1025-1035. doi: 10.1016/j.pubrev.2017.09.003.
Presented and awarded at: International Crisis and Risk Communication Conference, 
University of Central Florida, March 15, 2017, Orlando, USA 
Method: exploratory qualitative method with semi-structured interviews. 94 interviews 
(approximately 1.5 hours each) with Dutch mayors were analyzed.
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The literature review (Chapter 2) reveals that one of the key tasks of mayors is 
meaning making, whereby communication must be effective and additionally take 
into account politically charged issues of causation, responsibility and accountability 
(Ansell, Boin, & ‘t Hart, 2014). Using the findings on meaning making from Chapter 
2 as a starting point, this chapter develops a framework to assess recent meaning 
making efforts by mayors. The study is based on 94 interviews pertaining to Dutch 
cases that occurred between 1979 and 2014. These case studies enabled the pool 
of comparative case studies to be widened, as suggested in Chapter 2. Moreover, 
the article contributes insights from Dutch cases, in contrast to examples from the 
literature review in Chapter 2 that predominantly discuss insights from the United 
States. After coding and analyzing the 94 interviews, four distinctive roles of mayors 
in times of crisis are described: “mourner-in-chief,” “orchestrator,” “advocate,” and 
“buddy.” All of these roles emphasize different elements that depend on the collective 
emotional impact of a situation as well as on the political responsibility attributed 
to the public leader. 
Chapter 4: Complexity of roles within the framework
Based on:
Jong, W., Dückers, M.L.A., van de Ven, J.G.M., Schouten, D.G.M. & Van der Velden, P.G. 
(2019), Decision making in times of crisis: A simulation study on complexity among 135 
Dutch mayors. Submitted.
Presented at: International Crisis and Risk Communication Conference, University of 
Central Florida, March 13, 2018, Orlando, USA
Method: 135 mayors participating individually in a serious 30-minute game
This study uses the framework from Chapter 3 to assess the complexity of crisis-related 
decisions. The purpose of this study was to examine whether or not different types of 
crisis generate different complexities. This chapter examines the influence of collective 
impact and political responsibility on the perceived complexity of crisis-related decisions 
by mayors. A computerized serious game simulation was set up, comprising four real-life 
crisis situations, each of which presented four dilemmas with differing levels of collective 
impact and political responsibility. Dutch mayors (n=135) rated the perceived complexity 
of these 16 dilemmas.
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Chapter 5: Dealing with perceived responsibility
Based on: 
Jong, W. (2019), Anticipating the unknown: Crisis communication while under 
investigation. Public Relations Inquiry. doi:10.1177/2046147X19862343 
Method: conceptual paper 
This commentary discusses the implications for mayors who are faced with an investigation 
in the aftermath of a crisis. This specific angle was chosen because it sheds light on 
the potential tension between meaning making in the public arena and the process of 
accountability that follows in a political setting. Given that several of the interviews from 
Chapter 3 refer to the role of investigative bodies, the article helps to build understanding 
of situations in which perceived responsibility for a crisis represents a central theme. In 
other words, the chapter discusses the implications of the horizontal axis of the framework 
from Chapter 3 and potential tensions in the upper-right corner of that framework. 
Chapter 6: Case study: Mayors during the MH17 disaster
Based on:
Jong, W., Dückers, M.L.A. & Van der Velden, P.G. (2016), Crisis leadership by mayors: A 
qualitative content analysis of newspapers and social media on the MH17 disaster. Journal 
of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 24: 286-295. doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12124. 
Presented at: International Crisis and Risk Communication Conference, University of 
Central Florida, March 15, 2017, Orlando, USA
Method: (social) media analysis of 299 media clippings and 1,698 tweets
This study uses the MH17 disaster as a case study. The Malaysian Airlines flight crashed in 
Ukraine on July 17, 2014. All passengers and crew died, including 193 people with Dutch 
nationality. Despite its devastating impact, the case study provides a unique opportunity 
to conduct a comparative study, because more than 50 Dutch mayors were confronted 
with exactly the same situation. The study is based on (social) media analysis, to which 
end 299 newspaper articles and 1,698 tweets were captured. Given that mayors could 
regard the MH17 disaster as a situation with low (crisis) responsibility and high (collective) 
impact, the circumstances facilitate a greater understanding of the role of mourner-in-
chief from the framework presented in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 7: The interests of those affected
Based on: 
Jong, W. and Dückers, M.L.A. (2019), The perspective of the affected: What people 
confronted with disasters expect from government officials and public leaders. Risk, 
Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, 10: 14-31. doi:10.1002/rhc3.12150
Method: exploratory qualitative method with semi-structured interviews. An analysis of 
eight interviews (two hours on average) with people who had experienced a major crisis 
or disaster or its aftermath. 
Given that the literature review from Chapter 2 revealed that previous scholarship on 
meaning making by public leaders is dominated by the interests of the general public, this 
chapter takes a different approach. Indeed, the perspective taken is that of the affected, 
seeking clues as to what they expect from their public leaders. The chapter describes eight 
interviews with adult residents from The Netherlands who had been affected by a crisis, 
sharing their expectations and experiences in relation to government. As the perceptions 
of those affected may differ from those of the mayors who are supposed to support them, 
the article makes a set of recommendations in order to fill this gap.
Chapter 8: Providing social support
Based on: 
Jong, W., Dückers, M.L.A. & Van der Velden, P.G. (2019), Provision of social support by 
public leaders in times of crisis: A survey among Dutch mayors. Submitted.
Method: survey of 220 Dutch mayors
Chapters 6 and 7 provide insights into the expectations of those affected by a crisis and 
the actions taken by mayors to support them. This chapter does not only look at mayors’ 
behavior, but also assesses their perceptions and motives with regard to their relationships 
with those affected in the aftermath of a crisis. For this reason, social support from a 
provider’s point of view is discussed. To this end, a survey of 220 Dutch public leaders 
was conducted to assess their role in relation to victims and their families, and to analyze 
their behavior toward the affected in the aftermath of crisis. 
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Chapter 9: Summary and general conclusion
In Chapter 9, a general conclusion and discussion are presented, based on the material 
presented in the previous chapters. The findings are integrated and a conceptual model 
outlining the main findings is offered. An attempt is made to answer the sub-questions 
and to discuss some practical implications. The chapter concludes with limitations and 
suggestions for further research. 
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The aim of this article is to provide a systematic review of peer-reviewed literature on 
leadership tasks and effectiveness of mayors and governors during drastic collective 
events. A total of 34 peer-reviewed articles met our criteria. They were analysed using the 
theoretical framework by Boin on leadership tasks, i.e., sense making, decision making, 
meaning making, terminating, and learning. Studies ranged from minor incidents like 
local riots, to the events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. The material turned out to be 
dominated by Western and American studies. Because of limitations in the empirical 
and knowledge base of the studies, it is difficult to draw general conclusions on what is 
supposed to be effective leadership by mayors and/or governors in these circumstances.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mayors and governors play a strategic role during and in the immediate aftermath of 
crises and disasters. Even though the legislative powers of mayors and governors differ 
throughout the world, they share a sustained interest in outright duties and responsibilities 
for interventions such as a mandatory evacuation to restore or enforce public order 
(Boin & Gralepois, 2006; Martinko, Breaux, Martinez, Summers, & Harvey, 2009; Prins, 
Cachet, Ponsaers, & Hughes, 2012). They also keep the public spotlight during these 
crises. Wellknown examples are mayors Giuliani of New York after 9/11 and Livingstone 
of London after the bombings in July 2005 (UK), or Mayor Nagin of New Orleans and 
Governor Blanco of Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina (USA).
Since crises and disasters continue to be part of modern life, it is important to gain 
systematic insight and knowledge as to how mayors and governors fulfil their relevant roles 
and how their interests, duties and responsibilities are related to the outcomes across 
crisis and disasters. The aim of the present study is to contribute to the development of 
this knowledge by conducting a systematic review of literature on leadership tasks and 
effectiveness of mayors and governors during and in the aftermath of crises and disasters. 
To the best of our knowledge, no such review has been undertaken to date.
The need for such a systematical approach was underscored by Boin and Gralepois 
(2006).They plead for a systematic investigation of empirical studies into crisis 
management performance. In their view, such an approach is necessary to contribute to 
a set of guiding principles for fulfilling crisis management tasks. In response to that call 
for more knowledge, we review in a systematic fashion case material related to mayors 
and governors as specifically crisis managers. This review consists of studies published in 
English in peer-reviewed journals. Accessibility to this body of literature proved difficult 
in some cases, while information from grey literature (e.g., dissertations, consultancy 
reports, unpublished manuscripts and book chapters), although much more limited in 
terms of accessibility, was not included because its quality could not be ensured (these 
publications did not always receive a blind peer review). Crisis management performance 
by mayors and governors, as we will now see, encompasses a broad category of 
behaviour. To categorize findings on the behaviour of mayors and governors during the 
different stages of crises (including disasters), our point of departure is the theoretical 
framework of Boin et al. (2005). This framework, which has been much applied in the 
field and referenced elsewhere (e.g., McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Boudes & Laroche, 
2009; Christensen, Lægreid, & Hellebø Rykkja, 2013), is relied upon as the conceptual 
framework to categorize our findings. The framework distinguishes five tasks of public 
leadership during crises and disasters: sense making, decision making, meaning making, 
terminating, and learning. To be brief and at risk of simplification, Boin et al. (2005) refer 
to sense making as the leadership task of recognizing vague and sometimes contradictory 
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signals, taking a position in a developing story, and separating the message from the 
noise. Decision making under crisis circumstances does not only require the prioritization 
of interventions, but also an ability to manage (not just cope) in the face of scarce public 
resources. Meaning making is the leadership task of communicating the broader impacts 
of a crisis to citizens, media and other stakeholders. Terminating the crisis consists of 
taking measures in order to leave the crisis mode and return to a sense of normality, 
even if it is a new normal (this includes blame games and accountability, as we will see). 
Learning is the fifth form of public leadership, which consists of evaluating the crisis on 
a political and/or organizational level and digesting the lessons learned for the future. 
Boin et al. (2005) focus their framework on the policy maker, who ‘experiences a serious 
threat to the basic structures of or the fundamental values and norms of a system, 
which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital 
decisions’. In our review, we adopt the more general version of crises commonplace 
in crisis communications. Coombs (2007) defines such a crisis as ‘the perception of an 
unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can 
seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes’. From 
this point of view, a crisis situation is not necessarily defined by law, the damage done 
or the number of fatalities, but ultimately depends on the perceptions of stakeholders. 
Using Coombs’ definition broadens our scope of potential situations and possible relevant 
studies to be reviewed. The central research question is therefore as follows: according 
to peer-reviewed research, what are the leadership tasks and behaviour of mayors and 
governors that may be regarded as effective during and after crises. 
2. METHODS
Databases and search strategy
To identify relevant empirical studies, electronic searches were performed in Scopus 
(‘single search’) and PsycINFO, MEDLINE and Communication Abstracts (‘combined 
search’). The four databases cover peer-reviewed journals in the broad fields of sociology, 
psychology, communications, political science and public management. Searches were 
conducted in the years 2013–2014, with a final check in September 2014. Date of 
publication embraced a period of 25 years (1989– 2014). The search strategy was based 
on a combination of broad search terms related to mayors, governors, public leaders as 
well as certain types of crises (Table 1). Terms were used in keyword, title or abstract and 
singular and plural form. 
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong
Processed on: 22-11-2019 PDF page: 31
 31
Leadership of mayors and governors during crises and disasters: 
a systematic review on tasks and effectiveness
2
TABLE 1 Search strategy and keywords
1 mayor* OR “public leader” OR “crisis leadership” OR “public leadership” OR “public 
management” OR governor*
AND
2 accident* OR disaster* OR crisis OR crises OR calamit* OR aircrash* OR airplane* OR fire* 
OR epidemic* OR shoot* OR kill* OR casualt* OR catastroph* OR zoonos* OR flood* OR 
pandemic* OR hurricane* OR terror* OR attack* OR explos* OR “critical incident*” OR 
emergenc*
1 AND 2
Limits date of publication: 1989-2014, abstracts available, English language
* : zero or more characters can be added in the search. For instance: a search for hurricanes
Inclusion and exclusion criteria, including screening and categorization
We focused on peer-reviewed qualitative and quantitative studies on mayors or governors 
following crises over the past quarter century (1989–2014). We did not include ‘presidents’ 
in the search, as we deliberately focus on mayors and governors as public leaders closely 
connected to citizens and oftentimes governing for a longer period of time. In several 
commonwealth countries (e.g., Canada, Australia) the head of government in a state is 
referred to as the premier, not governor. Articles about these public leaders were included 
as their role is comparable with governors. Studies on crisis management among CEOs or 
public leaders in schools were excluded as and when there was no relationship with mayors 
or governors. Studies published in other languages than English were excluded as well. In 
the final selection, studies were excluded if neither a mayor nor a governor was one of 
the study subjects. Screening took place in two stages. During the first round, all authors 
independently screened articles retrieved on title and abstract, based on the inclusion 
criteria. During the second round, the reviewers’ selections were screened on full text. 
3. RESULTS
The results of the review are presented in Table 2 (appendix to this chapter). The 
second column categorizes the study in the different leadership tasks of sense 
making, decision making, meaning making, terminating and/or learning. When an 
article discussed more than one leadership task, it was categorized accordingly. In 
the same column, we briefly described the research methodology. When there was 
no underlying data, an article was labelled as ‘discussion article’. Also, the type of 
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crisis event is mentioned, when applicable. The third column of Table 2 summarizes 
the main findings and conclusions of the study reviewed. References to specific public 
leadership behaviour or interventions by the mayor or governor, as part of his or her 
crisis management duties, are also indicated.
Number of studies found
The combined search in PsycINFO, MEDLINE and Communication Abstracts yielded 
1.084 abstracts. After ‘limit to publication date 1989–2014’ and ‘limit to journals’, 
this resulted in 266 studies (PsycINFO 198; MEDLINE 0; Communication Abstracts 
68). The search in SCOPUS yielded 1.922 articles. After ‘limit to publication date 
1989–2014’ and ‘limit to journals’, this resulted in 1.304 publications. After checking 
for duplicates, the combined set of 1.496 articles was examined using the inclusion 
criteria. Articles were excluded for various reasons. For instance: studies regarding 
public service sometimes discussed ‘disastrous policy decisions’, but did not discuss 
disasters as such. Many articles described experiences of mayors in public health 
policy, but did not have a direct relationship with crisis management and were 
excluded for that reason. 
Type of events
After abstract screening and full-text confirmation, 34 articles were found relevant 
enough to answer the research question addressing mayors and/or governors. Five 
studies focused on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (Harris, 2011;Koven, 2010; 
Lay, 2009; Littlefield & Quenette, 2007; Martinko et al., 2009). One study focused 
on the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York (Back, Küfner, & Egloff, 2010) and three 
studies established a connection between the two preceding cases (Griffin-Padgett 
& Allison, 2010; Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011;Kapucu & VanWart, 2006).Two studies 
compared crisis management of Katrina with other natural disasters (Fairhurst & 
Cooren, 2009; Gallagher, Fontenot, & Boyle, 2007). Other studies from the United 
States discussed the Houston floodings (Arceneaux & Stein, 2006), Hurricane Gustav 
(Boin, 2009) and an anthrax case in New York (Mullin, 2010). Compared with 14 
studies based on US cases, we found six studies discussing crises outside the United 
States: one Australian case on the Queensland floodings (De Bussy & Paterson, 2012), 
a volcano eruption in Montserrat (Haynes, Barclay, & Pidgeon, 2008), a comparison of 
a tornado in Birmingham, UK, with a fireworks explosion in Enschede, the Netherlands 
(Noordegraaf & Newman, 2011), and riots and crowd control at a hospital in Israel 
(Pinkert, Bloch, Schwartz, Ashkenazi, Nakhleh, Massad, & Bar-Dayan, 2007). One study 
discussed crisis management after an airplane crash in Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
(Boin & ’t Hart, 2003).Another study analysed a riot in the Dutch town of Hoek van 
Holland, which may be considered a minor incident compared with other described 
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events such as Katrina and 9/11 (Resodihardjo, van Eijk, & Carroll, 2012). Some articles 
were labelled in more than one category. In total, 17 articles discuss meaning making. 
By comparison, terminating (11), decision making (7), sense making (6) and learning 
(2) received considerably less attention. 
Methodology of identified studies
The reviewed studies consisted primarily of narrative descriptions of individual cases. 
Evidence is often based on newspaper clippings (Griffin-Padgett et al., 2010; Koven, 
2010; Littlefield et al., 2007; Martinko et al., 2009), expert opinions (Austin, Liu, & Jin, 
2014; Griffin-Padgett et al., 2010; Hadley, Pittinsky, Sommer, & Zhu, 2011; Haynes et al., 
2008), focus-group sessions with citizens (Rinchiuso-Hasselmann, Starr, McKay, Medina, 
& Raphael, 2010) or a combination of these (Noordegraaf et al., 2011). Other data came 
from 573,000 lines of pager messages (Back et al., 2010), Twitter messages (De Bussy et 
al., 2012) and voting data (Gasper & Reeves, 2011; Lay, 2009; McBride & Parker, 2008). Ten 
cases qualified as ‘discussion articles’, as they did not rely on identifiable quantitative or 
qualitative data. Just four studies (Arceneaux et al., 2006; Haynes et al., 2008; Noordegraaf 
et al., 2011; Rinchiuso-Hasselmann et al., 2010) undertook population-based empirical 
studies, assessing, for instance, the perceptions and evaluations of affected residents.
Findings on sense making
The six reviewed studies qualified as ‘sense making’ are dominated by discussion articles. 
Only Hadley et al. (2011) used expert interviews as underlying methodology. The studies 
underscore that making sense of what is going on during a developing crisis becomes 
even more difficult because of the increasing complexity of societies and stakeholders. 
According to Boin (2009) and Boin and Smith (2006), sense making in crisis management 
has become more complex because of transboundary developments. Where a traditional 
crisis, such as an airplane crash, has a clear beginning and ending, transboundary crises 
intersect with and cross functional systems and territorial borders (Boin, 2009; Boin et al., 
2006). An outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Great Britain affects all Europe within 
days (Boin & ’t Hart, 2003). In these types of crises, there is a point where it becomes 
unclear ‘who’ is in charge (Boin et al., 2006). The growing complexity of social, corporate, 
industrial, financial, infrastructural and administrative systems (Boin et al., 2006) and our 
‘increased dependence on critical infrastructures in combination with the looming threat 
of terrorism’ (Boin et al., 2006, p. 296) renders sense making ever more challenging. Only 
knowing and practising crisis response plans is no longer adequate, if it ever was (Hadley 
et al., 2011). Sense making in an operational field where every second counts differs from 
a more strategic level of operations at times far away in a crisis room (Boin & Renaud, 
2013). Sense making can even be more stressful when crisis teams have to work together 
but have a different understanding of ‘the’ crisis situation. This parallels observations 
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by Scholtens (2008) to the effect that core management involving public leaders like 
mayors or governors may lack a big-picture overview for giving centralized orders to the 
operational field. Hadley et al. (2011) developed a model to capture the efficacy of leaders 
to assess information, which is the backbone of sense making. 
Findings on decision making 
The seven studies we qualified as relevant to ‘decision making’ show that, like sense 
making, it is also hindered by the complexity of networks. Not surprisingly, actual 
networks during crises differ from those assumed in crisis response plans (Kapucu, 2008; 
Kapucu et al., 2011). Several authors conclude that decision making is positively related 
to the level of intrinsic motivation to lead and the ability to motivate others in a crisis 
(Hadley et al., 2011; VanWart & Kapucu, 2011). In their view, decision making demands 
a dominant mode of leadership – not the consultative, iterative and process-oriented 
form in undertaking transformational change. This is also what the public expects from 
decision makers; during crises, they should not be half-hearted or play by-the-rules-only 
(Kapucu et al., 2006;VanWart et al., 2011).These authors did not mention mayors or 
governors specifically, but referred to ‘decision making’ by public leaders in general. Two 
studies referred to mayors specifically. According to Boin et al. (2006), decision making 
by these local leaders can be hindered by institutions they do not lead. In France, mayors 
find other institutions with overlapping municipal police powers in their way (Boin et al., 
2006). In the Netherlands, mayors have the legal authority to enforce, but practice shows 
that centrally controlled coordination cannot be achieved (Scholtens, 2008). 
Findings on meaning making 
In general, the 17 articles addressing ‘meaning making’ put more emphasis on mayors and 
governors as a subcategory of public leaders. Two studies (Haynes et al., 2008; Rinchiuso-
Hasselmann et al., 2010) undertook population-based empirical studies. Studies reviewed 
here consider the purpose of meaning making to be one of regaining public confidence 
(Griffin-Padgett et al., 2010) and of underscoring that the government is ‘fully in charge’ 
(Boin, 2009; Pinkert et al., 2007). Of the studies on meaning making, Griffin-Padgett et 
al. (2010) referred to Mayors Giuliani and Nagin, who spoke directly to constituents and 
addressed their physical and emotional well-being. Similarly, Back et al. (2010) provided 
insights on the impact of mayor Giuliani’s words. At 2:49 pm, he refused to speculate 
about body count; he communicated that the number of casualties would be ‘more 
than any of us can bear’. According to Back et al. (2010), sadness and anger rose and 
anxiety declined immediately afterwards. In the view of Fairhurst et al. (2009), a lack 
or absence of leadership during crises can also result in a perception of indecisiveness. 
Where Governor Blanco (Louisiana) was overwhelmed by the situation in New Orleans, 
Governor Schwarzenegger was present at the scene and managed to embody the hero 
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leader in charge of overcoming Californian wildfires. Schwarzenegger had favourable 
reviews because of his tough-talking language matching his film career (Fairhurst et al., 
2009; Gasper et al., 2011). Others studies note that mayors and governors were meant 
to provide hope for the future (Noordegraaf et al., 2011; Pennebaker & Lay, 2002). In like 
fashion, Queensland Premier Anna Bligh actively called upon Queenslanders’ resilience and 
pride (De Bussy et al., 2012).This study suggested that her perceived successful leadership 
was largely due to charisma and inspiration. Mayors or governors are not the only leaders 
who speak publicly on the crisis at hand. Several studies show that scientists (Haynes et 
al., 2008) or other officials supported the public leader to gain public trust (Mullin, 2010). 
During an anthrax case in New York, Mayor Giuliani displayed ‘both empathy and mastery 
over information’ and implicitly asked the public to trust the other officials (Mullin, 2010, 
p. 16). Once the city’s mayor and health commissioner were trusted, citizens were more 
likely to listen to the directions provided by the city because they just did not feel they had 
an option not to (Rinchiuso-Hasselmann et al., 2010). Included studies suggested that in 
their meaning making role, mayors and governors seemed to be aware in advance of the 
political aftermath to follow. As blame games in the aftermath of Katrina were looming, 
government agencies, governor and mayor all tried to ‘spin’ the news during the hurricane 
and showed ‘strong leadership’ and ‘masculinity’ (Harris, 2011; Koven, 2010). As these 
images can define a political career, public authorities have to engage with media (Boin et 
al., 2006) because the media contributes to blame games as well (Littlefield et al., 2007). 
One pitfall in showing compassion and empathy was studied by Boin et al. (2003). The 
‘caring government’ philosophy of Mayor Van Thijn (Amsterdam) after an airplane crash 
in Amsterdam (1992) was meant to be compassionate to victims; it promised them long-
term care. Instead, the strict procedures necessary to provide care were inconsistent with 
the sympathetic face he had projected earlier on (Boin et al., 2003). 
Findings on terminating and learning 
Eleven studies assessed ‘terminating’, while two studies referred to ‘learning’. As they 
both focus on the aftermath of a crises, the findings are presented together. Most crises 
cast a long shadow (Boin et al., 2006). After the real-time operational demands of a 
crisis have faded, a time comes when politicians, media and victims want to determine 
how this could have happened (Boin et al., 2006). More, it becomes the time to evaluate 
and learn from the crisis in order to improve future crisis management (Stern, 2013). 
Boin, Kuipers, and Overdijk (2013) discuss what they take to be 10 executive tasks of 
crisis management that can be used to evaluate the performance of a public leader. 
In their view, the resulting evaluation is more likely to be fair and takes into account 
the difficult conditions under which crisis leaders all too often operate. With respect 
to the terminating element of leadership, Austin, Liu, and Jin (2014) conducted 20 in-
depth interviews with senior-level crisis communicators. They stressed the importance 
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of communications in the after-effects of crises in order to show ‘you are back’. According 
to their interviews, communications should be positive with a focus on the future. In 
order to engage the public effectively in the aftermath of crises, Noordegraaf et al. (2011) 
believe it is worthwhile to invest in the networks of local groups as well. Literature on 
terminating primarily focuses on political accountability and responsibility (Arceneaux et 
al., 2006; Boin et al., 2003; Gasper et al., 2011; Resodihardjo et al., 2012). From a survey 
among 792 Houston voters in a mayoral election, mayors appear to be held accountable 
for responding to natural disasters as well (Arceneaux et al., 2006). In their study, the 
attributions of responsibility for (the lack of) flood preparation were shaped by voters’ 
experience with the floods and the level of knowledge about the political system. In the 
aftermath of Katrina, voters from New Orleans blamed the federal, not local government 
for the broken levees and the (lack of) response (Lay, 2009). Arceneaux et al. (2006) 
found that the ‘attribution of blame came from a desire to maintain a sense of control’ 
(p. 48). Gasper et al. (2011) added to these observations, suggesting that victims will 
be less angry when the president grants a disaster declaration, since this acknowledges 
their situation (Gasper et al., 2011). Regarding the aftermath, a crisis is not necessarily an 
opportunity for reform (Boin et al., 2003). The requisites of crisis leadership differ from 
the qualifications needed for an effective reform. According to their study, leaders should 
formulate a crisis management philosophy in order to guide them in the aftermath of a 
crisis (Boin et al., 2003). 
4. DISCUSSION 
The systematic review of these 34 journal articles highlights what we believe to be a 
major and continuing difficulty with the peer-reviewed literature when it comes to 
understanding the role of local leaders in crisis management. On the one hand, the studies 
confirm what many readers already expect by way of effective leadership in crises, and 
not just for the cases described. Basically, local leaders – mayors and governors – also 
lead by communicating in many ways. Clearly, the impact of the increasing complexity 
of networks (Boin et al., 2006), the importance of a motivational role in crisis teams 
(Kapucu, 2008; Kapucu et al., 2011) and the benefits of crisis evaluations (Boin et al., 
2013; Stern, 2013) are not exclusively limited to mayors or governors. On the other hand, 
the review demonstrates that, when it comes to specific but major tasks (so core to the 
Boin et al., 2005 framework for effective leadership in crises), the key ones of sense 
making, decision making and learning have been examined only briefly to date. For that 
matter, only Scholtens (2008) comes to very specific conclusions on the role of mayors in 
crisis situations with regard to decision making. For her, mayors should not concentrate 
on decision making but on the important role they have to fulfil during disasters and 
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crises, being the ‘first citizen’ and public personification of the crisis management team. 
According to Scholtens, mayors (and governors) should focus instead on meaning making. 
Yet the public performance of a mayor (meaning making) and the process of political 
responsibility and accountability afterwards (terminating) seem, in comparison, to be 
closely connected (e.g., Boin et al., 2003; Gasper et al., 2011; Lay, 2009; Resodihardjo et 
al., 2012). But once more, the literature reviewed offers little by way of guidance, general 
or otherwise, on how to operationalize these tasks in effective ways. Much remains to be 
clarified in terms of how actual leadership tasks are undertaken and balanced by way of 
crisis management. We believe the common factor accounting for the gap between the 
general observations found and the lack of specifics needed by way of task elaboration 
is not the terminology of the Boin et al. (2005) framework: after all, a focus on decision 
making and learning have long been common in the relevant academic literature for 
longer than even the last quarter century. Rather, far more remains to be done by way of 
research of testing and extending the utility of the Boin et al. (2005) framework when it 
comes to mayors, governors and their counterparts – and until that happens, we are left 
to rely on, just as did the studies reviewed here, the language and lenses of newspaper 
clippings, expert opinions, voting data, focus-group discussion and social media. While 
recording first-hand accounts with respect to crises is important, what we are specifically 
calling for are more studies that enable a comparison of mayors and governors in similar 
crisis situations, as Gallagher et al. (2007), Fairhurst et al. (2009) and Griffin-Padgett et 
al. (2010) did. Comparative studies are to be particularly welcomed, as they would also 
enable the crisis management communities to explore not just the Boin et al. (2005) 
framework but also other possible frameworks and evolving effective crisis management 
interventions. It could be argued that this call for more comparative research is misplaced. 
Would the pool be wider if the review had included ‘grey literature’ on crises involving 
mayors and governors but which is by definition not peer-reviewed? After a check on 
references of all 34 journal articles retrieved, we are, however, confident that we did not 
overlook an existing ‘grey literature’ empirical study on the role of mayors or governors 
in crisis situations at least in the English-based sample, which in turn raises another 
possible objection. What if we had widened the selection pool to include non- English 
peer-reviewed articles on crises managed in non-English settings – would that have helped 
in enlarging not only the pool of crises examined but also the number of studies relevant 
to separating and clarifying crisis management tasks? Perhaps. Clearly, internationalizing 
a literature review would enable wider access to more crises for more systematic review 
when it comes to what mayors and governors (or their counterparts) do. But we must 
wonder – as authors also familiar with the Dutch literature not reviewed here – if such 
an enlarged review would lead to findings on ‘leadership’ any less generalized than the 
ones found in our review of the English material on crisis situations in Israel, Montserrat, 
Australia, United Kingdom and the Netherlands as well as the United States. We also 
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must wonder if the wider literature is any more comparative than observed here in our 
subsample. Still, readers of JCCM represent an international audience and we hope 
our review encourages some of readers to widen the pool of comparative case studies 
dramatically beyond the case material reviewed here. Comparative studies of course have 
their own limitations. Studies from other regions of the world might contribute to the 
body of knowledge, as long as the public position of mayors and governors during and 
after crises is comparable with their counterparts in the countries covered by the English 
written journals. Even more telling, widening the pool of comparative studies may well 
not entail all that many more new crises for examination. If the pool of English articles in 
our review is any guide, such studies capture only a portion of crises and disasters in the 
English-speaking world over the past 25 years. No peer-reviewed studies were found on 
the specific role of mayors or governors in several high-impact crises, such as the London 
bombings (UK), the earthquake in Christchurch (New Zealand), Hurricane Sandy (USA) or 
the bombing at the Boston Marathon (USA), to name just a few. More, no studies were 
based on interviews or surveys with individual victims in light of their demographic (e.g., 
racial) differences.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the outcomes of our systematic review demonstrate that leadership of mayors 
and governors during crisis and disasters is a young and fragmented field of research. Even 
though care and rigor were taken in their selection, the 34 studies reviewed, all published 
between 2003 and 2014, proved highly skewed. American studies were predominantly 
about crisis management during Hurricane Katrina (10 out of 14 cases from the United 
States). Regarding the crisis management tasks of sense making, decision making and 
learning, articles came to general conclusions, which pertain not only to mayors and 
governors. The articles with the most intense focus on mayors and governors during and 
after crises focused on their ‘meaning making’ and ‘termination’ role. Further research 
on these roles and identifying the deliberations and intentions of mayors and governors 
in the heat of like situations and crises are necessary to deepen our understanding of 
the effectiveness of their performance during and in the aftermath of crises. Lastly, and 
also with respect to the crisis aftermath, mayors and governors distinguish themselves 
from most public leaders in their ‘meaning making tasks’ during that period. Thus far, 
crisis communication literature has foremost focused on maintaining and repairing 
the organizational image among stakeholders, while circumstances described above 
in the case material may call for a more resilience-oriented communication that helps 
communities to survive and revive in the event of a crisis (e.g., Olsson, 2014). If the latter, 
then we are again back to the importance of ‘meaning making’, which was also closely 
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connected to the circumstances in which mayors and governors enter the public arena in 
the first place. Sharing insights and empirical case studies between public administration 
and crisis communications might provide specific guidance for these ‘meaning making’ 
situations where mayors or governors have other communication goals than image repair 
alone. 
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APPENDIX: TABLE 2 Characteristics of studies addressing mayors and/or governors during and 
after crises and disasters
Reference Type of study
a. task from framework Boin cs.;
b. method;
c. event.
Arceneaux and Stein (2006) a. terminating; 
b. survey among 792 voters in Houston area
c. floodings in Houston (USA).
Austin, Liu, and Jin (2014) a. terminating;
b. interviews with senior crisis communicators (N=20); 
c. no specific crisis.
Back, Küfner, and Egloff 
(2010)
a. meaning making;
b. analysis of 573,000 lines of pager texts during 9/11 attacks.
c. September 11 attacks (USA).
Boin (2009) a. sense making; meaning making;
b. discussion paper;
c. Hurricane Gustav (USA).
Boin and Gralepois (2006) a. sense making; decision making;
b. discussion paper;
c. no specific crisis.




c. no specific crisis.
Boin and Renaud (2013) a. sense making;
b. discussion paper;
c. no specific crisis.
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Findings and conclusions
overall findings and/or conclusions of study, with references to specific behavior or 
interventions by public leader as part of crisis management when applicable
- The attribution of blame is shaped by direct experience and levels of political information. 
- In a mayoral election following severe flooding, voters evaluated government on the 
preventive measures and individual experience with the flooding.
- Citizens attribute blame out of a desire to maintain a sense of control.
- Repairing physical and symbolic damage in the aftermath of crisis is important, because it 
communicates ‘you are back’. 
- Effective communications during recovery is transparent, honest, positive with a focus on 
the future.
- While the events further developed, people steadily became angrier.
- At 2:49 New York mayor Giuliani said the number of casualties will be “more than any of us 
can bear”. Immediately afterwards, sadness and anger rose, anxiety declined.
- The combination of geographical and functional “spread” can easily create a power vacuum 
as it is not clear who “owns” the crisis and who must deal with it. These ‘transboundary’ 
crises thus typically has multiple “owners”.
- Crisis leaders explain what is happening and what they do to manage the crisis. They must 
offer a convincing rationale, in order to generate public and political support. 
- The mayor of Baton Rouge and the governor of Louisiana were successful at this in the 
context of Hurricane Gustav, by consistently repeating “New Orleans was saved and 
everything was under control”. In two daily press conferences, governor Jindal provided a 
detailed overview of available resources and initiated activities.
- Growing complexity of social, corporate, industrial, financial, infrastructural and 
administrative structures and systems produces unforeseen disturbances. This complexity 
makes them harder for leaders to deal with.
- Authors present a framework to evaluate leadership performance before, during and after 
crises.
- The effectiveness of crisis management depends on making things happen, getting the job 
done, and fulfilling a symbolic need.
- Ten most important tasks of crisis management are early recognition, sense making, 
making critical decisions, orchestrating vertical and horizontal coordination, coupling and 
decoupling, meaning making, communication, rendering accountability, learning and 
enhancing resilience.
- Misunderstanding and an ‘appreciative gap’ between the strategic and operational level 
hinders sense making and can cause stress between the levels working on the same crisis 
event.
- Crisis leaders should explain what type of information they need and why.
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APPENDIX: TABLE 2 Continued
Reference Type of study
a. task from framework Boin cs.;
b. method;
c. event.
Boin and Smith (2006) a. sense making, meaning making, terminating;
b. discussion paper;
c. none specifically; terrorist events in general.
Boin and ‘t Hart (2003) a. meaning making, terminating;
b. discussion paper;
c. Air crash in Amsterdam (The Netherlands).
De Bussy and Paterson 
(2012)
a. meaning making;
b. content analysis of 700 tweets with #qldfloods;
c. Queensland floods (Australia).
Fairhurst and Cooren (2009) a. meaning making;
b. discussion paper;
c. hurricane Katrina (USA); California wildfires (USA).
Gallagher, Fontenot, and 
Boyle (2007)
a. meaning making;
b. non-reproducible analysis of communications strategies;
c. hurricanes Katrina and Rita (USA).
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Findings and conclusions
overall findings and/or conclusions of study, with references to specific behavior or 
interventions by public leader as part of crisis management when applicable
- There’s an increased dependence on critical infrastructures. In combination with the 
looming threat of terrorism, it brings challenges for both public and crisis management.
- Public authorities will have to engage with media and external actors to get their definition 
of the situation across to a scared or skeptical public. Public leaders’ frame of the situation 
will most likely be contested by media and public. 
- In case of a terrorist attack, public authorities must try to distil the right lessons from 
the crisis in order to ensure that it ‘won’t happen again’. At the same time, there will be 
pressure to move on and ‘return things to normal’.
- In stressful situations, people look at their ‘true leaders’. Successful performance in times of 
collective stress turns leaders into statesmen and restores confidence.
- Citizens expect to be safeguarded by their state; the idea that wholesale crisis cannot be 
prevented comes as a shock.
- In the aftermath of a crisis, leaders need some kind of policy compass; they must have a 
clear idea of what is worth preserving and what needs to be changed.
- Leaders want to provide victims with care, but they often fall prey to their own unrealistic 
promises.
- Queensland Premier Anna Bligh was perceived to have much stronger characteristics of 
transformational leadership than Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard during the 2011 
Queensland flood crisis. Bligh was perceived to be inspirational and charismatic. She 
displayed emotion and showed she was proud on the resilience of Queenslanders. In 
contrast, the Prime Minister’s communication style during the crisis was characterized as 
‘robotic and rehearsed’.
- Findings give strong support to the proposition that transformational style of leadership is 
highly effective at times of crises.
- Leaders have ‘a certain presence’. Vice versa, a lack of leadership during crises (absence) 
has an effect in itself. Governor Schwarzenegger is regarded as a good example of presence. 
Governor Blanco was widely criticized for ineffectual handling of her state’s response to 
hurricane Katrina floodings.
- Leadership also consists of mobilizing your professional network and making interventions 
and contributions visible. 
- Leadership is not only defined by the person of the leader, but also the context in which he 
or she operates.
- Crisis communications is most effective when an organization acknowledges and takes 
responsibility for its role in the crisis.
- Blaming other government organizations involved does little good. They should work 
together to help improve their crisis response strategies.
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APPENDIX: TABLE 2 Continued
Reference Type of study
a. task from framework Boin cs.;
b. method;
c. event.
Gasper and Reeves (2011) a. terminating;
b. data analysis of USA voting behavior after natural disasters 
in period 1970-2006;
c. natural disasters (USA).
Griffin-Padgett and Allison 
(2010)
a. meaning making;
b. Comparison of Giuliani and Nagin’s response to disaster, 
based on analysis of press conferences, interviews and 
speeches days, weeks and months after the disasters.
c. 9/11 and hurricane Katrina (USA).
Hadley, Pittinsky, Sommar, 
and Zhu (2011)
a. sense making; decision making;
b. literature and expert interviews (N=182)
c. public health and safety issues (USA).
Harris (2011) a. meaning making;
b. discussion paper based on discursive analysis of three 
speeches in aftermath of hurricane Katrina;
c. hurricane Katrina (USA).
Haynes, Barclay, and 
Pidgeon (2008)
a. meaning making;
b. qualitative interviews (N=61), participant observations and 
quantitative survey (N=173); during an ongoing volcanic 
crisis in Montserrat;
c. volcanic crisis Montserrat(British Overseas Territory).
Kapucu (2008) a. decision making;
b. discussion paper;
c. no specific crisis.
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overall findings and/or conclusions of study, with references to specific behavior or 
interventions by public leader as part of crisis management when applicable
- Governors are punished for natural disasters because of a lack of preventive measures. 
- When the president rejects a request for federal assistance, the president is punished 
and the governor rewarded in polls. Granting a disaster declaration boosts support for 
president, but substantially smaller than the one received by the governor.
- When a disaster declaration has been issued, victims will be less angry because it 
acknowledges their situation.
- Restorative rhetoric appears to be applicable in situations when the crisis in question is not 
a result of an organization’s unethical behavior or a grave company mistake. In those cases, 
not image restoration but regaining public confidence is the main goal. 
- Appearance of authenticity was an important factor in both responses, where hope and 
more humanistic communications helped victims to make sense of what happened.
- Both mayors spoke of the brutal hardships that citizens had to endure. They spoke directly 
to the citizens– and then to the nation – making sure that constituents understood that 
their leader was concerned about their emotional and physical well-being.
- Both mayors also maintained a genuine presence throughout their cities. Giuliani leading 
from Ground Zero, and Nagin leading from areas hardest hit by the hurricane.
- Leaders must be able to process information quickly. 
- High level of (intrinsic) motivation to lead in a crisis more generally contributes to greater 
leadership. 
- Simply knowing and practicing crisis response plans may be inadequate for crisis leader 
efficacy.
- Speeches by presidential candidate Barack Obama, president George W. Bush and Ray 
Nagin, mayor of New Orleans all reinforced a hegemonic white masculinity. Nagin implied 
that women, together with children, needed to be cared for. Nagin referred to ‘violent 
folks’ as black men, reinforcing the idea that feminine folks are not the black folks who are 
violent.
- Women are cast as those who are worthy of and evoke sympathy. Men are referred to as 
the ones who have to secure feeding, clothing, housing.
- During a volcanic crisis, friends and relatives were among the most reliable sources, 
followed by scientists. Scientists were perceived to be more competent than public leaders. 
Their trust was partly based on previous experiences.
- Healthy skepticism in government is natural and not necessarily indicative of complete 
distrust.
- Disaster management during catastrophic disasters requires intense collaboration and 
cooperation between organizations.
- Public increasingly expects better public sector leadership before, during and after 
catastrophic disasters, with adequate emergency systems.
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APPENDIX: TABLE 2 Continued
Reference Type of study
a. task from framework Boin cs.;
b. method;
c. event.
Kapucu and Demiroz (2011) a. decision making;
b. comparison of networks from content analysis (news 
reports, government documents, after-action reports) with 
networks from emergency plans;
c. 9/11 and hurricane Katrina (USA).
Kapucu and Van Wart 
(2006)
a. decision making;
b. interviews with 33 county emergency managers and 42 
semi structured interviews with directors and senior staff;
c. 9/11 and hurricane Katrina (USA).
Koven (2010) a. meaning making;
b. analysis based on 50 articles from New York Times in period 
1-2 September 2005;
c. hurricane Katrina(USA).
Lay (2009) a. terminating;
b. analysis of data from two pre-election polls (N=unknown) 
in New Orleans (USA);
c. hurricane Katrina (USA).
Littlefield and Quenette 
(2007)
a. meaning making;
b. textual analysis of 52 news articles in New York Times and 
Times-Picayune about Hurricane Katrina (August 29 to 
September 3, 2005);
c. hurricane Katrina (USA).
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Findings and conclusions
overall findings and/or conclusions of study, with references to specific behavior or 
interventions by public leader as part of crisis management when applicable
- The actual response network during 9/11 and Katrina differed from the emergency and 
disaster plans.
- During catastrophic disasters, the network management is different from disasters, which 
occur on a more frequent basis.
- In contrast with routine disasters (e.g. yearly hurricanes in Florida), state and federal 
leadership is expected during more exceptional catastrophic disasters (such as 9/11).
- The public expects professional managers and public leaders to do an excellent and 
consistent job, despite the duration of catastrophic disaster. 
- In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, media had a clear interest in attracting attention. 
Meanwhile, mayor Ray Nagin (New Orleans), the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi, 
the president and the director of FEMA were trying to “spin” the news and show ‘strong 
leadership’. All tried to create an image of strong leadership and influence existing frames. 
Nonetheless, the overall image of Katrina is a situation of incompetence, and chaos in the 
city of New Orleans.
- FEMA director and president Bush were both perceived to have shown poor leadership 
during the crisis.
- Mayor Nagin was associated with the ‘blame game’, as he attempted to shift culpability 
onto others. Governor Blanco (Louisiana) was not media savvy. Critics considered here 
indecisive and a weak leader.
- Voting behavior after hurricane Katrina was primarily based on racial group interests, 
outweighing the unacceptable way in which mayor Nagin dealt with Katrina. Nagin 
appealed to the afro-American voters. 
- Voters blamed the federal, not local government for the broken levees and (lack of) 
response.
- During the coverage of hurricane Katrina, media stepped out of their role as observer and 
became an actor in the ‘blame game’ themselves. 
- Media coverage appears to happen in phases. At first, they describe the chaos 
surrounding the situation. Once they fulfilled this role, they began to evaluate on the 
performance of the authorities. 
- Positive coverage was related to active words like ‘warned’, ‘prepared’, ‘evacuate’. Later 
on, coverage changed into ´lack of control' with words like 'overwhelmed', 'disorganized' 
and 'miscommunication'.
- The point of view of a specific authority was often inconsistent with perceptions of other 
authorities or the public.
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APPENDIX: TABLE 2 Continued
Reference Type of study
a. task from framework Boin cs.;
b. method;
c. event.
Martinko, Breaux, Martinez, 
Summers, and Harvey 
(2009)
a. terminating;
b. analysis based on newspaper items and broadcasts 
(N=unknown);
c. Hurricane Katrina (USA).
McBride and Parker (2008) a. terminating;
b. analysis of voting data in New Orleans during 2002 
(N=297,000) and 2006 (N=298,000) mayoral elections 
(USA);
c. hurricane Katrina (USA).
Mullin (2003) a. meaning making;
b. discussion paper; 
c. anthrax attack in New York (USA).
Noordegraaf and Newman 
(2011)
a. terminating; 
b. document analysis and interviews with residents and 
professionals (N=20 in Birmingham and N=12 in Enschede) 
in 2010
c. tornado in Birmingham in 2005 (UK), explosion fireworks 
factory Enschede in 2000 (The Netherlands).
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overall findings and/or conclusions of study, with references to specific behavior or 
interventions by public leader as part of crisis management when applicable
- During Katrina disaster, stakeholders had different perceptions about the need and 
responsibility for aid and rescue efforts following the hurricane. Level of blame depended 
on point of view of stakeholder.
- Governors and mayors should be aware that the public has a different perception of 
their actions. They had a tendency to attribute negative outcomes (failures) to situational 
factors (poor support of the national government, lack of money and small amount of 
busses), while the public tends to explain them with inferences about the actors’ personal 
characteristics.
- The mayor was described in the media in terms of ‘unprepared’ and ‘lack of leadership’. 
The poor relationship between the governor and the mayor added to this image.
- Governor Blanco blamed both mayor Nagin and FEMA in several circumstances. In media 
she was regarded as “unorganized and indecisive”.
- For the black community, it was more important to continue the political power, 
even though they were heavily damaged by the floodings and Nagin was blamed for 
incompetence regarding hurricane Katrina.
- His apparent disappearance in the days immediately after Katrina created a leadership 
void at the local level, leaving him open to charges of ‘abandoning ship’.
- In speeches and comments, Nagin changed the subject of the elections. It was race, not 
Katrina, which dominated the mayoral elections in 2006.
- Just after the 9/11 attacks, an NBC News employee in New York was diagnosed with skin 
anthrax. The mayor’s public confidence during 9/11 was beneficial during the anthrax 
attacks. 
- Mayor Giuliani held press conferences, flanked by other officials, which helped him to 
gain public trust. The mayor displayed both empathy and mastery over information and 
implicitly asked the public to trust the other officials.
- In Enschede, the mayor was seen as a ´hero´ and played caring and enabling roles. There 
was a stronger ethos of 'togetherness'. Preventive investments in social structures can be 
worthwhile for the aftermath of crises.
- In Birmingham, local politicians were sidelined by a public who had little trust in local 
democracy. Leadership came from within the community itself.
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Reference Type of study
a. task from framework Boin cs.;
b. method;
c. event.
Pennebaker and Lay (2002) a. meaning making;
b. language analysis of 35 speeches (1993-2001) by mayor 
Giuliani of New York;
c. several cases from New York (USA). 
Pinkert, M., Y. Bloch, D. 
Schwartz, I. Ashenazi, B. 
Nakhleh, B. Mssad, M. 
Perez, Y. Bar-Dayan (2007)
a. meaning making;
b. data collected from debriefings with hospital managers 
(N=unknown);
c. ten days of riots in Nazareth (Israel).
Resodihardjo, van Eijk, and 
Carroll, (2012)
a. terminating;
b. coded data based on analysis of 211 newspaper articles for 
period 22 August 2009 (day of the riot) until 28 February 
2010 (month in which police chief resigned).
c. riot in Hoek van Holland (The Netherlands).
Rinchiuso-Hasselmann, 
Starr, McKay, Medina, and 
Raphael (2010)
a. meaning making;
b. eight focus group discussions with 7-10 citizens;
c. no specific crisis.
Scholtens (2008) a. sense making; decision making; meaning making;
b. discussion paper;
c. no specific crisis.
Stern (2013) a. learning;
b. discussion paper;
c. no specific crisis.
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overall findings and/or conclusions of study, with references to specific behavior or 
interventions by public leader as part of crisis management when applicable
- Media noticed a change in the mayor’s style during the time of his divorce and diagnosis 
of cancer. Later on, the public at large witnessed a different mayoral personality 
immediately after the attacks of 9/11. 
- Close friends associated Giuliani with warmth throughout his administration, suggesting 
that his personality was, in fact, composed of two Giuliani’s; one public and one private.
- Over the years, Giuliani used language with more warmth in his speeches. In the wake 
of the WTC attacks, he connected linguistically with fellow New Yorkers. His use of social 
words was the highest, a mark of social connection and integration. 
- In the aftermath of 9/11, Giuliani´s language became simpler and his focus was on the 
future, not present or past
- During ten days of riots in Nazareth, the local hospitals were faced with a crowd after a 
mass-casualty incident. Crowd control was achieved only after the city mayor’s (personal) 
appearance.
- As the mayor shifted responsibility to the police chief, it was hard for the police chief to 
respond publicly. His position gave him less freedom to respond to allegations. Moreover, 
his responses were mostly internally focused on the police force.
- The police chef failed in an external blame response. His opponent (the mayor) was 
recently appointed, which worked in the mayor’s favor.
- Denying their responsibility resulted in higher blame levels for the mayor, admitting 
responsibility led to higher blame levels for the police chief.
- In a series of focus groups, the mayor was regarded as the most trusted source, along 
the city health commissioner and a local cable news channel. Some stated (percentage 
unknown) that they would follow the directions provided by the city because they just 
didn’t feel like they would have the choice not to.
- In The Netherlands, the mayor has legal authority to enforce. Incident evaluations 
show that during the acute disaster phase it is impossible to achieve central controlled 
coordination.
- Abandoning command and control gives mayors the opportunity to focus solely on being 
‘first citizen’ or ‘city father’. 
- Mayors should not hesitate to show their uncertainty in crisis situations. 
- One should take preparation seriously, in order to be ready for their next crisis.
- The responsibility of crisis leadership includes preparation for future challenges.
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Reference Type of study
a. task from framework Boin cs.;
b. method;
c. event.
van Wart and Kapucu (2011) a. decision making; terminating;
b. qualitative and quantitative research among senior 
emergency managers(N=51) in the USA;
c. no specific crisis.
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overall findings and/or conclusions of study, with references to specific behavior or 
interventions by public leader as part of crisis management when applicable
- Ability to motivate becomes more important after the first phase of a crisis, when the 
leader has to deal with a broad array of individuals.
- Strong, incisive leadership is the dominant mode during crises, not the consultative, 
iterative and process-oriented leadership often found in making transformational 
changes. The public wants them to take responsibility. They cannot be half-hearted and 
bureaucratic.
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Public leaders are expected to provide information on a crisis situation and present a plan 
to restore a state of normalcy. This study, based on interviews with Dutch mayors who 
were personally involved in crises between 1979 and 2014, assesses the various roles of 
public leaders’ meaning making. A total of 94 case studies were analyzed for this purpose. 
Responsibility and collective impact turn out to be closely intertwined phenomena, which 
influence the modus operandi as a public leader as perceived by the mayors themselves. 
The Public Meaning Making Model presented, shows four distinctive roles based on 
the meaning making by Dutch mayors: the roles of ‘mourner-in-chief’, ‘orchestrator’, 
‘advocate’ and ‘buddy’. All of these roles emphasize different elements that depend on 
the collective, emotional impact of a situation as well as on the political responsibility 
attributed to the public leader. This article discusses the characteristics and implications 
of each of the four roles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of a mass traumatic event, meaning making is a key aspect of crisis management 
when people expect their public leaders to appear on the public stage. For public leaders, 
the challenge of meaning making lies in effective communication while taking into account 
the politically charged issues of causation, responsibility and accountability (Ansell, Boin, 
& ‘t Hart, 2014). Despite the apparent relevance of meaning making for public leaders, 
empirical studies on the context of meaning making are limited. Because crises differ in 
context, the publićs expectations of their leaders might vary from one crisis to another. 
Vice versa, in order to better understand the concept of meaning making, the question 
arises whether public leaders change their meaning making behavior when the context of 
a crisis changes. A context in which stakeholders are both senders and receivers, in which 
they transact and cocreate meaning through the ongoing and simultaneous exchange of a 
variety of messages while using multiple channels (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). This empirical 
and exploratory study builds on recent research to better understand the concept of 
meaning making in relation to issues of responsibility and accountability, and addresses 
calls to examine the processes and outcomes of crisis management (Ansell et al., 2014; 
Boin & Gralepois, 2006; Jong, Dückers, & Van der Velden, 2016a). The framework used, 
analyzes 94 crisis cases dealt with by Dutch mayors that differ greatly in terms of political 
responsibility and collective impact. Subsequently similar case studies are analyzed and 
presented. Finally, an overview of overall findings can be found at the end of the article.
2. DRIVERS FOR MEANING MAKING
2.1. Public leader as communicator 
In this study, the central theme consists of the modus operandi of the public leader 
on the public stage. When compared to the rhetoric of business counterparts, the 
rhetoric of public leaders has a distinct angle. Corporate crisis communications 
literature seems to emphasize the rhetoric from a point of view focused on reputation 
and repair of image and credibility for the crises they caused (Arendt, LaFleche, & 
Limperopulos, 2017). Public leaders, on the other hand, are often confronted with the 
public impact of crises and will also be held responsible for crises caused by others. 
This public role comes with a broader set of rhetorical functions, which include 
expressing sympathy to victims, symbolically framing the meaning of the event, 
regaining public confidence, and facilitating renewal through public commitments 
(Griffin-Padgett & Allison, 2010; Jong et al., 2016a, 2016b; Littlefield & Quenette, 
2007; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). The rhetorical arena may remain open in the 
after crisis stage, generating a “crisis after the crisis” (Frandsen & Johansen, 2010; 
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Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort 2001). The rituals to re-connect to citizens and to lower 
the possible impact of blame-games in such an aftermath of crises, is part of the 
communicative repertoire (Resodihardjo, Carroll, Van Eijk, & Maris, 2016). 
People that experience a crisis, try to make sense of what happened and place it in a 
broader perspective (Stern, 2013). Public leaders support them in this process, interpret 
the situation, use rhetoric to make sense of the situation, make sure they are concerned 
about the emotional and physical well-being of citizens, and actively communicate what 
is happening and what needs to be done (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003; Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, 
Sundelius, 2005; Griffin-Padgett & Allison, 2010; Helsloot & Groenendaal, 2017; Jong, 
Dückers & Van der Velden, 2016b). Public leaders try to give an understanding of ‘what 
is going on’, to reduce uncertainty, to provide recognition, to offer hope (Jong et al., 
2016b; Noordegraaf & Newman, 2011; Pennebaker and Lay, 2002), and to actively call 
upon resilience and pride (De Bussy & Paterson, 2012). At the same time, public leaders 
will try to restore trust in government and its public leadership in order to smoothen 
the political aftermath of crises and underscore the government is fully in chargé ( 
́ Boin, 2009; Pinkert et al., 2007). This meaning making is not only visible through 
words but also through actions. Public leaders join remembrances and sometimes visit 
families and the next of kin at home, to lend them a ‘listening ear’ and support them 
with practical issues (Jong et al., 2016b). Sometimes, crises evolve into “social icons” 
(Frandsen & Johansen, 2016). Those crises create long-lasting shadows in terms of 
remembrance and recurring media attention in the years and decades after the crisis 
occurred. 
Leaders are supposed to be successful as soon as they attract support for 
processes and decisions, enhancing reputation and/or electoral prospects for leaders’ 
parties and governments (McConnell, 2011). Davis and Gardner (2012) revealed 
that President Bush’s use of charismatic rhetoric escalated following the September 
11 terrorist attacks, and that during this time period he was also perceived as an 
effective leader. One is, therefore, not only evaluated on the basis of direct political 
responsibility and actions, but also on presentation and communication (De Bussy & 
Paterson, 2012). Presentational strategies are important but, when inappropriately 
used, can backfire (Resodihardjo et al., 2016). 
Meaning making is intertwined with issues of responsibility and accountability (Boin 
& ‘t Hart, 2003; Gasper & Reeves, 2011; Lay, 2009; Resodihardjo, van Eijk, & Carroll, 
2012), since people also wonder “how could this crisis have happened?”. In general, the 
search for answers to the question “how could this have happened?” often degenerates 
into “blame games“ in relation to responsibilities, where media appoint winners and 
declare losers (Boin, Kuipers, & Overdijk, 2013). According to crisis management and 
crisis communication theories, a higher level of responsibility for the cause of the crisis 
increases the blame level a public leader can expect. In a comparative study of the rhetoric 
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of mayors Giuliani and Nagin in the aftermath of 9/11 and hurricane Katrina, Griffin-
Padgett and Allison (2010) note that when responsibility is high, image restoration rather 
than regaining public confidence becomes the main goal. As such, meaning making is 
a way to respond in the public arena to protect one’s reputation and is crucial to the 
legitimacy of public leadership (Jong et al., 2016a).
1.2 The psychosocial impact 
While reputations are certainly important for the process of political accountability, the 
purpose of public meaning making seems broader than the reputation of a governmental 
institution or public leaders alone. A public leader may be heading public rituals and 
commemorations, and has to take care of the practical and psychosocial interests of the 
bereaved individuals concerned (Jong, 2013; Jong et al., 2016b). A study on 54 mayors 
who were confronted with the aftermath of the MH17-disaster showed that these public 
leaders were expected to speak at memorials and attend community activities, even 
though they carried no direct political responsibility for this particular disaster. 
Several studies demonstrated the importance of “social acknowledgement” and 
mental health following drastic events (Maercker & Müller, 2004; Park, 2016): meaning 
making is of importance for the resilience and recovery after stressful events (Park, 2016). 
Although these studies do not extensively focus on the role of public leaders, they do 
refer to concepts like “social acknowledgment”. In other words, how does the victim 
experience the positive reactions from a society that shows understanding of his or her 
unique position, and acknowledges the victim’s current difficult situation (Maercker & 
Müller, 2004). In a study among adults who experienced the events of 9/11, findings 
suggest that meaning supported adjustment by reducing the fears of future terrorist 
attacks (Updegraff, Silver, & Holman, 2008). But whether or not Giuliani’s public leadership 
did positively or negatively influence this process of meaning making, remains unknown.
3. FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS MEANING MAKING 
In order to meet our goal and compare meaning making efforts under different crises 
circumstances, we take the stance from public leaders themselves, since they take the final 
decision to deliver on meaning making. We set up a qualitative analysis of interviews with those 
involved in crises and looked for similarities in their self-perceived meaning making efforts 
in crises that are comparable in terms of collective impact and political responsibility. This 
approach is scarce but useful in addition to existing mediated case studies and experiments 
(Coombs, 2007; Ewart, McLean, & Ames, 2016; Liu & Fraustino, 2014; Schultz, Utz, & Göritz, 
2011). The study is descriptive in terms of meaning making efforts and behavior, and does 
not explore whether or not particular behavior was either good or bad. 
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The heuristic framework we introduce consists of two dimensions. The (political) 
responsibility as the main driver from public administrative literature is used in order 
to divide crises in two sections, with either high or low political responsibility. Since 
the political responsibility is not static, the concept of “crisis responsibility” is used, 
which represents the amount of responsibility for a crisis that stakeholders attribute to 
the organization (Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015). It does not only take 
the mayor’s formal responsibility into account, but also his perceived responsibility in 
the aftermath of a crisis. The psychosocial impact on society, an important driver in 
psychosociological literature, is our second dimension and can vary between high and 
low as well. While there will always be a certain impact on the victims and their families, 
the collective psychosocial impact seems to differ greatly from one crisis to another. 
The expected collective impact of an event increases when a social system, such as a 
neighborhood or community, is emotionally more affected by the events (Barton, 1969). 
The number of fatalities can be an indication, although the collective impact of a similar 
situation in a small town versus a larger city can also differ tremendously. 
The combination of the two dimensions enables us to assess different aspects of 
public meaning making under crisis circumstances in a categorized manner, as we expect 
to find similarities in meaning making among crises with perceived similar high/low 
collective impact and/or high/low political responsibility. Of course, it is possible to plot 
crises based on the dimensions using information from a variety of stakeholders (e.g. 
media, city councils, affected citizens, independent evaluation committees). The current 
study explores crises on the basis of the perceptions of mayors themselves. 
4. METHOD 
In order to assess the different circumstances under which public leaders consider 
meaning making as a method of intervention, we analyzed 94 existing case studies. A 
total of 91 case studies is based on interviews with mayors in the Netherlands discussing 
their personal crisis experiences. Three case studies are based on secondary sources. 
The crises differ in the amount of responsibility on the side of the mayor as well as the 
collective impact. From the local impact of a brutal murder to major disasters, such as the 
explosion of a fireworks factory in Enschede (23 fatalities) or the crash of an El Al Boeing 
in an apartment complex in Amsterdam (43 fatalities). The Dutch Association of Mayors 
was in charge of conducting these interviews between 2005 and 2015. The interviews 
describe crises that occurred between 1979 and 2014. Only one mayor declined to 
participate in the project. The interviews with mayors lasted on average one and a half 
hour. Participants were asked to give their lessons on crisis management in order to share 
them with colleagues and their advisors. The interviews also included the role of the 
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media since public authorities engage with media during crises and those in authority 
should use the media to identify how their words and actions are perceived by the public 
(Littlefield & Quenette, 2007). The interviews were semi-structured and asked mayors 
about the developments of the crisis, their decisions, the way in which they publicly 
performed, their lessons in terms of crisis communications, the role of the media and how 
they managed the political aftermath. The transcripts of the interviews were edited.1 After 
a factual check by the interviewees, the interviews were published online and/or used 
for publications by the Dutch Association of Mayors (Jong, 2013; John & Johannink, 2005, 
2007, 2009; Jong & Van der Post, 2008).2 The secondary sources could be used because 
the mayors themselves spoke about their own experiences in terms of meaning making in 
these sources. One case study was based on the memoires of a mayor (Eenhoorn, 2012), 
two other studies were based on two contributions of mayors to remembrance books 
(De Haas, Vogelenzang, Jong, & Strating, 2009; Smilde, 2016). 
In their analysis, the author and a co-researcher used the public leaderś descriptions 
of the crisis situation to value the size of the collective impact on the level of the local 
society. As such, the author and co-researcher weighed the perceptions and observations 
which were shared in the various interviews. Coding was done by hand. For the size of the 
political responsibility, we valued the responsibility that according to the public leader 
was attributed to him or her regarding the cause of the crisis or the aftermath. In other 
words, the perceptions the mayor displayed were leading. A similar approach was taken 
to judge the size of the collective impact. As an example, one mayor told the story about 
two fatal fires in his community. In the first fire, two girls from the community died. A 
public memorial gathering was organized at the town square; the entire community was 
in shock and the collective impact was regarded as “high”. A few months later, in the same 
town, the 3-year-old son of a family of tourists died while on holidays. It had hardly any 
collective impact since the community did not personally know this boy. The collective 
impact was regarded as “low”. 
The author coded both dimensions in either high/low, leading to four different 
categories. Mayors did not code the crises at the time of the interview. To minimize the 
impact of changing perceptions over time, mayors were not asked to re-interpret the 
findings from their earlier interviews. 
The author and co-researcher independently rated the set of case studies on low/
high collective impact and low/high responsibility, based on the perceptions the mayors 
shared in the interviews. Cohen’s Kappa (N = 94; P < 0.001) was calculated using SPSS 20 
and found to be 0.88 for collective impact and 0.91 for political responsibility. Differences 
1 The author personally conducted the interviews for 60 case studies. He edited these 
interviews and another 24 interviews that were conducted by others, before these were 
published in print and online.
2 Interviews (in Dutch) can be retrieved from www.burgemeesters.nl/research.
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were found in cases based on five interviews. Four of these cases involved accidents in 
which no local citizens were hurt. After discussing the relative impact of the crisis on the 
local society, the researchers found full agreement in 93 cases (Cohen Kappa 0.98). 
After all 94 crisis case studies were labeled in one of four categories, an analysis was 
made in order to specify whether or not the type of meaning making of crises within one 
cluster showed similarities. 
A detailed breakdown of all interviews, including the categorization of interviews, 
can be found in the Appendix to this study. 
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1. General findings on political responsibility and collective impact 
Table 1 shows a summary of the empirical findings. In total 36 interviews dealt with crises 
with a low political responsibility and high collective impact, 27 cases describe situations 
of high political responsibility and high collective impact. A total of 20 cases describe 
situations of both low political responsibility and collective impact. Finally, 11 interviews 
describe cases with a high political responsibility and low collective impact. 
Mayors often describe their own role as “citizen-father”, a literal translation of the 
Dutch word ‘burgervader’ (or citizen-mother: ‘burgermoeder’ depending on the gender of 
the mayor). The label fits their symbolic role as a leading representative of the society in 
crisis (Jong, Dückers & Van der Velden, 2016b). In situations with high collective impact, the 
emphasis on actions by mayors are on remembrances, memorials and gatherings, to share 
their feelings, their disbelief and show they feel similar pain. Those are the situations which 
mayors themselves describe as “impressive” and often “one of the most difficult moments 
in my career”. In visiting the victims and their families, some mayors explicitly remark that 
they pay the visit on behalf of the community. “It is not about me. I represent the mourning 
and sorrow of the community”. The community aspect is, of course, an important indicator 
of the public impact. Referring to the impact of the MH17-disaster, one mayor adds: “We 
were all in dismay. But these are also the moments a community shows its strength. We 
managed to stay together, help each other and incorporate the family in our community 
and our hearts”. The interviewed mayors are aware of a possible misbalance between the 
interests of the collective emotions of society on the one hand, and the personal interests of 
the next of kin on the other. “We discontinued the annual commemorations, as the parents 
did no longer appreciate the massive scale”, one mayor says. 
When the collective impact is regarded as low, the focus shifts towards smaller 
entities within society that are directly affected by the crisis situation. Mayors support 
those in grief, but feel collective gatherings would be disproportional, as it would call upon 
citizens who have no or only a low degree of interaction with the victims. 
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In situations of electricity outages or similar disturbances of daily life, the 
situation usually asks for a different and less emotional tone of voice. In these cases, 
the sharing of factual information, the description and explanation of procedures, 
and fulfilling practical needs are far more important. Even though a local society is 
affected by the outage, interviewed mayors indicate that society does not respond in 
a highly emotional manner. In other words, when the collective psychosocial impact 
drops, the purpose of meaning making shifts to a factual explanation of the situation 
rather than finding the right words for the emotions present. 
Mayors not only pay visits to the community in crisis, but widely use the media 
to give meaning to an existing situation as well. They hold press briefings in order to 
answer the question “what is going on?” According to most mayors, this comes with 
the job of public leadership. As one mayor puts it: “When a mayor is present, you’re 
supposed to talk to the media”. That said, some mayors nevertheless believe that 
the priority should be with their citizens, not the media. As one of the interviewed 
mayors adds: “How can we approach a crisis from a human perspective, without being 
guided by the interests of the media, our own reputational interests or the threat of 
being held accountable afterwards”. Whenever mayors feel it is necessary, they ask 
the media to show restraint towards victims or their family. 
5.2. Low political responsibility, high collective impact 
In all the cases in this first category, meaning making by mayors was present, although 
it differed in content and form depending on the characteristics of the collective 
event. It is important to notice that many interviewees mention that, despite the lack 
of political responsibility in terms of accountability, they felt responsible to act and 
lead with authority, show compassion and restore trust in government. As described 
by one mayor: “It’s my duty to keep society together in times of crisis. It is all about 
confidence. These are the moments you have to show up.” Others mention that “just 
being there when needed” is of importance. As one mayor expressed “It sounds 
arrogant, but that is how it is”. 
Mayors contribute to meaning making by restoring safety and stability, and 
providing the basic needs to a local society in shock. They lead with authority and 
show compassion. Mayors see themselves as the personification of government; 
mayors set things in motion and use their proximity to society to weigh the perceived 
impact. At the same time, interviewees are aware of the possible impact of their 
appearance as a public leader and try not to make the story bigger than strictly 
necessary and “react proportionally, not overreact”. In some cases it is part of the 
communications strategy, as described by an interviewed mayor “we care, we do, we 
provide perspective”. 
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How did mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media
Defining the 
mayors role and 
considerations on 
aspects of meaning 
making








Meaning making is 
needed in order to 
stimulate a sense 
of belonging. Stay 
together, and help 
each other. Show 
that we care, we 
act and we provide 
perspective.
Attend or organize 
remembrance 
gatherings. Attend 
funerals. Lead with 
authority and show 
compassion. 
The situations hardly 
led to political debate. 
Society fully agreed 
with the steps taken. 
Visit victims and their 
families, and ask 
media and others to 
show restraint when 
needed.
Media are used to 
give meaning to the 
situation, to show 
compassion and give 
insight in ‘what is 
going on’. 
Meaning making is 
needed in order to 
channel emotions 
and explain the 
deliberations of a 
mayor during the 
crisis. 
Restoring trust in 
government is key 
in order to ‘survive’ 
blame games 
during the political 
aftermath.
Focus on the 




Focus on regaining 
trust, safety and 
commitment.
Communicate to find 
common ground and 
acceptation for the 
decisions taken by 
the public leader. 
Leaders try to put 
blame-games on 
hold until evaluation 
committees present 
their reports.
Visit victims and 
their families and ask 
media and others to 
show restraint when 
needed.
Media are used to 
give meaning to the 
situation, to show 
compassion and give 
insight in ‘what is 
going on’.
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How did mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media
Defining the 
mayors role and 
considerations on 
aspects of meaning 
making








When the incident is 




When a small part of 
society is affected, 
people expect 




on the processes of 
crisis management, 
provide instructions 
and set up sessions 
in the aftermath to 
look back, show some 
compassion with the 
situation and draw 
lessons. 
A local gathering to 
channel emotions 
can be regarded as 
an exaggeration and 
disproportional. 
Focus on the people 
who are directly or 
indirectly affected by 
the situation. 
Visit victims and 
their families and ask 
media and others to 
show restraint when 
needed.
Media are used 
to keep people 
informed about the 
instructions shared by 
the government and 
give insight in ‘what is 
going on’.
When the incident is 
regarded as nuisance, 
people primarily want 
factual information. 
When a small part of 
society is affected, 
people expect 
you to show your 
compassion with 
them.
Ask for resilience. 
Factual information 
about the measures 
taken is welcomed. 
Show how you use 
your position to put 
the pressure on other 
institutions involved.
When a small 
part of society is 
affected, show your 
compassion with 
those people.
Focus on the people 
who are directly or 
indirectly affected by 
the situation. 
Visit victims and 
their families and ask 
media and others to 
show restraint when 
needed.
Media are used 
to keep people 
informed about the 
instructions shared by 
the government and 
give insight in ‘what is 
going on’.
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Meaning making is not always regarded as the task exclusive to the public leader. 
Sometimes mayors lend support to sporting clubs, churches or schools, especially when 
these institutions are a central focal point within the crisis and the community. 
5.3. High political responsibility, high collective impact 
When both political responsibility and collective impact are high, it seems to be a core 
competence to be able to balance between the two forces. Examples of situations where 
people attribute a political responsibility to the mayor are the search for a pyromaniac, 
the harassment of a former detainee, the appearance of a local sex offender and raging 
dune fires that ask for a mandatory evacuation since they are an imminent threat to the 
local community. In those cases, the mayors decided to use elements of meaning making 
as a form of aftercare. These mayors set up town hall meetings, in which they explained 
their (political) position, discussed the emotions involved and drew lessons. 
In one interview, the mayor was confronted with the outbreak of East-Asian 
longhorned beetles. The community concerned is known for its nurseries, particularly 
woody plant and perennial nurseries, and the beetles were an imminent threat to the 
local businesses. The mayor positioned himself as a lobbyist and spokesperson on behalf 
of these local businesses. Citizens attributed more political responsibility to him than he, 
legally speaking, had. He operated as a mayor who built bridges between the ratio of the 
ministry and EU regulations on the one hand, and the emotions of the nurseries on the 
other. As he managed to negotiate the right quarantine measures, he increased his impact 
and support within the local community. 
In a case where a small fireworks factory, located in a densely populated area, 
exploded and resulted in more than twenty fatalities, the mayor was highly appreciated 
for his leadership. Even though the local government was held responsible for permitting 
the factory in the area, the meaning making of the mayor silenced the political discussion. 
He gave priority to the collective impact, showed leadership in finding the right words 
to describe the disaster, and attended funerals and memorials. The political aftermath 
− including blame games − was put on hold until the investigation committee presented 
its report one year later. In another crisis, the death of a fireman led to the community 
blaming the municipality for the insufficient training of the fire brigade. His death led 
to political turbulence and a harsh report by the investigation committee. The mayor 
kept the support of the local community, however, since people and media showed 
compassion with the fire brigade. In both cases, the mayors restored trust in government 
and public leadership. 
Again, compassion overruled the blame game. It is in line with the central themes in 
the communications of other mayors in this setting: regaining trust, restoring safety and 
commitment. In a situation of public disorder, one mayor states that she closed down 
the area in order to protect the citizens. “Hooligans from outside Utrecht came to riot. 
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We called them “riot tourists”. In order to protect the residents in the area, I felt I had 
to guarantee their safety.“ She connects with the residents and shows she cares about 
them. In the end, the feeling of togetherness results in a cleanup gathering after the 
riots. Meaning making in high impact-high responsibility cases may also focus on crisis 
management itself. In one case it became clear for the mayor that the police operation 
during a riot was disproportional. He organized a meeting, where he publicly apologized 
for the police, which had been operating under his control. The citizens accepted this 
statement. 
Most incidents in this category happened by accident. In few cases, mayors 
positioned themselves deliberately in a position of confrontation with society and used 
their legitimate powers to intervene. In one situation, a town had major problems with 
youngsters who drove drunk on scooters on the night before Queen’s Day each year. The 
mayor banned their tradition, believing the risk was too high. It resulted in riots, when the 
residents responded emotionally to the banning of their tradition. He had little support 
when the riots escalated. People listened to the informal leadership of vicars instead. A 
colleague found himself in a similar situation, when he tried to ban New Year gatherings 
that resulted in riots year after year. In the latter situation, the mayor tried to discuss 
the issue with key figures from the community, which can be seen as an act of meaning 
making, but did not succeed. In the other situation, the mayor did not mention any 
meaning making in order to reduce the risk of further escalation. 
Sometimes, mayors feel that responsibility is based on the perception of citizens. 
In those cases, people attribute the responsibility for a situation to the mayor, while 
the mayors are in fact only partly responsible. During an outbreak of foot-and-mouth-
disease, the national government took measures to contain the situation. According to 
the interviewed mayor, it was difficult to show commitment, as the national government 
urged to kill the animals and the mayor was regarded as part of the same governmental 
structure. “The focus of the national government was on the containment of the disease, 
not on the social impact and consequences.” 
5.4. Low political responsibility, low collective impact 
The cases with low political responsibility and low collective impact consisted of 
situations where the local community did not emotionally respond to a crisis, either 
because it was not affected at all (such as the stranding of a humpback whale), or the 
situation was regarded as an inconvenience. Unlike situations of high collective impact, 
their focus was not on the community as a whole, but was specifically aimed at the 
needs of the affected groups. In some situations, victims did not come from the local 
community. After a crash of a Turkish Airlines plane at Schiphol Airport, the mayor 
showed empathy towards the people from the plane. In the interview, he notes: “No 
residents were among the victims of the plane crash. We did, however, organize a 
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meeting for the people living nearby Schiphol Airport, since they were worried and felt 
unsafe. We understand their feelings were twofold. On the one hand, they were faced 
with the risk. On the other hand, they agree that Schiphol is an important economic 
power in the region.” During crises with hazardous goods, mayors focused on a select 
group of people who wanted or needed to be informed. The main focus of the meaning 
making process was on providing instructions, information leaflets and small-scale town 
hall meetings in the aftermath, during which mayors explained their actions to specific 
groups from society. 
5.5. High political responsibility, low collective impact 
Finally, the interviews labeled as “high political responsibility, low collective impact” 
showed cases which were mainly regarded as an inconvenience or “nuisance”, rather than 
a stressful crisis situation. As the level of emotions stayed relatively low, meaning making 
by mayors was limited to a request for solidarity and to show they cared, sometimes 
through actions. The situations did not ask for offering hope or a call upon resilience 
and pride. Mayors were attributed responsibility in order to solve the crisis and pressure 
others (e.g. network operators or electricity companies) on behalf of the community 
to take the necessary measures. The mayors took decisions and sometimes ordered a 
preventive evacuation, but it did not result in stressful situations among residents, since 
their houses and lives were not under direct threat. One mayor publicly spoke about the 
pressure he had put on the electricity company to solve the problem of a long-lasting 
outage. 
Furthermore, crisis communications in this part of the continuum, when the collective 
impact is low, mainly consists of factual instructions and information. “People easily find 
their way, as long as you give them time to prepare“, a mayor says. Again, aftercare was 
an aspect of meaning making which seems appropriate to end the crisis situation and 
give the signal that the situation returned more or less back to normal. After a mandatory 
evacuation because of potential flooding, the overall collective emotion was one of 
solidarity. The situation surely had impact on people, but people started to help each 
other to leave the area in a structured manner. Afterwards, the municipality arranged 
a small welcome package for every house, including a small cake. It led to a sense of 
happiness and ́ gratefulness. 
6. DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to assess the influence of perceived political responsibility 
and collective impact on meaning making behavior by mayors during a crisis. We used 
interviews with Dutch mayors as a source for this research question. 
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Findings show that the mayors’ meaning making behavior depends on perceived levels 
of collective impact and responsibility. The specific context of a crisis has an influence upon 
communication activities, and these communication activities in return influence the 
context (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). That said, these public leaders tend to be more publicly 
visible in situations of large collective impact than in situations with lower impact. Higher 
responsibility increases the need for apologia, image repair and/or restoration response 
strategies. In situations of low responsibility, leaders put an emphasis on a caring response 
aimed at the unique needs of circumstances and the individuals affected (Simola, 2003). 
Within a typology of crises (high/low responsibility, high/low collective impact), similar 
approaches can be found of public leaders’ meaning making. The clustering of crises on the 
basis of two dimensions helps to find similarities among miscellaneous crises and distinguish 
cases that at first sight look similar in terms of cause and number of fatalities. In two such 
similar cases, three firemen died while on duty. In one town 6.000 people attended a large, 
public gathering where the mayor spoke and showed compassion. All three firemen were 
well-known in the small village. In the other town, no public gathering was held and the 
impact was limited to people related to the fire brigade. The mayor visited the fire brigade 
and attended the funeral, but his public role was limited. 
When a Turkish Airlines plane crashed near Schiphol-Airport, the local impact was 
relatively low, since there were no local inhabitants among the casualties. The focus of 
the mayor in his meaning making was solely on the victims and their families. In another 
plane crash in Amsterdam, people died on the ground and, according to the interviewed 
mayor, the disaster “will never fade”. As a result, the meaning making was more intense 
and lasted longer in the second case. 
Often, mayors describe crisis situations as “the most difficult moment in my career‘, 
which leaves a personal impression on the public leader as well. It indicates that mayors 
were profoundly touched by the incidents they managed, which is a stimulus for trust in 
their leadership (Caza, Zhang, Wang, & Bai, 2015) and possibly contributes to even more 
authentic public leadership. “Being there when needed’ is of importance and implies 
that societal perceptions define when public leadership is required. When the collective 
impact is high, the interviewed mayors tend to respond in a more emotional way with a 
focus on belonging, restoring hope and trust. They are aware of the balance between the 
impact on direct victims and society as a whole, as public rituals and memorials otherwise 
may give individual bereaved the impression that ‘their’ private grief is appropriated by 
the community. Even without a local gathering or memorial, mayors feel that victims and 
their families usually seem to be touched by the interests shown. This confirms earlier 
findings on the role of Dutch mayors in the aftermath of the MH17-disaster, where they 
received distinct appreciation from victims’ families, whenever they visited them in the 
privacy of their homes to lend an ear, and to discuss their material needs (Jong, Dückers 
& Van der Velden, 2016b). 
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Regardless of the combination of collective impact and political responsibility, media 
are always present. When crises have a relatively low impact, the focus of the media shifts 
from the general public towards the victims and their families. Mayors follow similar 
paths. Under those circumstances, they focus on a more factual exchange of information 
on the crisis at hand with people who are directly affected by the crisis and put less 
emphasis on society at large. 
Audiences sometimes incorrectly attribute responsibility to a public leader. As 
a consequence, there is a grey area where leaders are held responsible, while legally 
speaking they are not. When the perceived political responsibility increases, mayors 
put more emphasis on explaining their (political) position, clarifying their decisions and 
discuss what they practically do to solve the problem. Especially when both collective 
impact and political responsibility are high, mayors believe it is difficult to lend a listening 
ear when people hold them accountable for a situation. According to these interviewees, 
the most difficult crises are the crises where the role of “citizen-father“ conflicts with 
political responsibility. 
In situations of higher responsibility, meaning making is complicated by the long 
political aftermath. While society and victims ask for meaning making during or in the 
immediate aftermath of crises, the political aftermath can last for months. Evaluation and 
investigation committees usually deliver their reports a long time after a crisis happened. 
In cases with high collective impact, political turbulence in the aftermath seems to make 
it even more difficult to return to a state of normalcy. Under those circumstances, the 
political arena becomes a prominent audience for the discussion of the responsibility 
for permits, the management of disorders and the like. It sometimes asks for another 
round of meaning making, when the political situation revives emotions among society 
and victims. This also implies that the role of a mayor towards a given audience might 
shift over time. 
7. TOWARDS A PUBLIC MEANING MAKING MODEL 
Within combinations of responsibility and public impact, we found similar approaches of 
meaning making. In the framework below (Fig. 1), we come to a set of four different roles. 
As a mourner-in-chief, mayors are expected to deliver on meaning making by attending 
public memorial services and community activities, and visit the victims and their families 
with a listening ear (Jong, Dückers & Van der Velden, 2016b). The expression of sympathy, 
one of the corner-stones of a “care response” (Coombs & Holladay, 2012), is the central 
element in this role. 
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FIGURE I. Public Meaning Making Model 
As an orchestrator, the public leader performs similar to a public affairs professional 
keeping an eye on his public, personal and political interests. Through meaning making, 
the mayor bridges competing frames and anticipates on the political aftermath. He 
gives collective meaning to the community and victims, but is simultaneously aware 
of the way his meaning making behavior influences the political aftermath, context 
and blame games. The mayors who managed to give the impression to speak on 
behalf of their own citizens, were most successful in balancing their responsibilities 
and surviving the political aftermath. It appears to be a balancing act, since the 
mayor is sometimes confronted with the rationale of the political accountability and 
the emotional impact of society. In this part of the framework, concepts of apologia, 
image repair and restoration are most suited to the public leader (Arendt et al., 2017; 
Coombs & Holladay 2012; Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2007). 
As a buddy, the focus of the public leader is not on society as a whole, but 
primarily on meaning making towards affected groups within society. The emphasis 
will be on the mayor as a listening ear for the victims and their families. The corner-
stone of the public leaders’ communication role is the expression of sympathy, which 
is similar to that of the mourner-in-chief but directed at a smaller audience. 
As an advocate, the public leader uses his meaning making to speak on behalf of 
the citizens, presents himself as their spokesperson or lobbyist and puts pressure on 
other stakeholders to solve the crisis at hand. The public leader might put himself in 
the spotlight in order to amplify media coverage and speed up crisis response. The 
situations in this section consisted of long lasting power outages and evacuation 
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anger, and other negative emotions come to surface. From that point of view, the 
aftercare can be vital to public leaders, to finalize the situation and to thank citizens 
for their patience and solidarity. 
8. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This qualitative research study is meant to be exploratory. The main limitation of this study 
is that both the collective impact and political responsibility are interpretations, based on 
interviews with mayors who shared their own perceptions of the crisis at hand. This does 
raise the possibility of self-presentation bias. Divergent perceptions, interpretations, and 
interests may cause serious trouble in crisis management (Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997), 
including in relation to meaning making. This study relies on a series of perceptions, 
shared in interviews with sometimes wide-ranging time distances between the crisis 
and when the interview was conducted. However, as an insufficient appraisal of the 
situation would most probably have had repercussions on the (political) position of the 
public leader, it decreases the potency of this concern. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to 
explore perceptions from other stakeholders as well, such as earlier mentioned media, 
city councils, and affected citizens, or secondary sources as reports from independent 
evaluation committees and the like. Such studies might not only confirm the validity of 
the Public Meaning Making Model, but also show the implications for situations where 
public leaders and their stakeholders make different estimates of the collective impact 
and/or political responsibility. 
Furthermore, all case studies are based in The Netherlands, where the mayor might 
have a very specific role compared to public leaders elsewhere. That said, we believe 
the current study gives the impression that the concept of meaning making might 
be multilayered and can be broadened to other public leaders as well, since the two 
dimensions of collective impact and political responsibility are universal. 
Based on the interviews, we only found one full apology, which can be regarded as 
a specific form of meaning making. It is likely that more mayors apologized, although 
this has not been mentioned in the interviews. Earlier studies showed that after crises, 
politicians are more likely to offer partial apologies than full apologies, since partial 
apologies give politicians the opportunity to allude to their responsibility without going 
as far as giving a formal apology (Liu, 2007). Even when the leader is convinced that he 
or she is not to blame, an apology may be necessary depending on public perceptions 
(Yang & Bentley, 2017). Further study on the consequences of a public apology on the 
well-being of victims and their families is welcomed since it might shift their perceptions 
of a given crisis situation. 
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Because this methodological approach is based on case studies described in interviews 
with mayors, we still sail in the waters of public administration and crisis communication. 
In future research, taking the relevance for the wellbeing of affected citizens and the social 
acknowledgement into account will help to improve our understanding of the concept of 
meaning making by public leaders even further (Dückers, Yzermans, Jong, Boin, 2017). 
This might be done with research among victims and their families, in order to look for 
the benefits and drawbacks of the appearance of public leaders in times of sorrow and 
grief, but also in situations where the perceived collective impact is low. 
When we assess our public leaders during crisis, it seems relevant to embed the crisis 
leadership in the broader context of leadership studies. Based on the cases described, 
we have an indication that the mourner-in-chief appeals to concepts of hope, trust, 
togetherness and social connectedness. These are elements that ask for empowerment 
and leadership from the school of transformational leadership. The elements on the 
lower right side of our framework, however, seem to emphasize a call for more directive 
leadership. In those situations, the leader is asked to arrange things in a more rational 
way. Further study might give us more insights in the difficulties for the specific role of 
the public leader as an ‘orchestrator’ in the upper-right corner, where these two types 
of leadership seem to collide. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The results contribute to our knowledge of crisis communications and meaning making 
by public leaders. The main conclusion of this paper is that meaning making by public 
leaders, i.e. mayors, depends on their (perceived) responsibility of public leaders on the 
one hand, and their perceptions of the collective impact on society on the other. Meaning 
making by public leaders appears not to be a one-size-fits-all concept. The analysis of 
94 case studies, which were based on interviews with mayors who were personally 
involved in crises that occurred between 1979 and 2014, resulted in four different roles 
of meaning making. A public leader can either emphasize his or her role as mourner-
in-chief, orchestrator, advocate or buddy. It helps public leaders to proportionally give 
meaning to a given situation, either towards victims, their families or the public as a 
whole. It also helps public leaders to recognize the characteristics of a crisis and anticipate 
on appropriate meaning making in relation to the scale of the political aftermath. The 
presented Public Meaning Making Model provides more depth to the concept of meaning 
making and builds on existing studies in public leadership literature. 
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
19790915
Ouwerkerk





Crash of an 
El Al 747 cargo 
Boeing in 
Amsterdam1
Yes (43) Low High
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Al_Flight_1862
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“We just tried to deal 
with the situation. But 
the people had to leave 
their houses. It took 




“I turned into the 
personification of the 
local government. People 
expected that I would 
solve all problems.“
“The Queen visited the 
residents. It worked like 
medicine.“
“We tried to be as 
transparent as possible 
towards the media.“
Discovery of severe soil 
pollution at Lekkerkerk. 
Chemical waste was used 
as building material to 
level the soil for a newly 
developed suburb. The 
dumping of the waste, 
causing the area to be 
uninhabitable, resulted in 
an unprecedented scandal.
”As a mayor, you know: ‘I 
am supposed to lead this 
crisis situation’.” 
”I used ‘caring 
government’ as an 
overall theme. We set up 
care centers, organized 
alternative housing, set 
up social care.”
”I visited the disaster 
scene the same night. I 
wanted to see the chaos 
with my own eyes and to 
hearten the emergency 
workers. I will never 
forget what I saw.”
Later on, I also visited 
the DVI (disaster victim 
identification) team. It 
was terrible to see all 
these victims.”
”One week later, we 
organized a memorial 
meeting. I spoke, though 
for a brief moment only. 
With just one sentence: 
‘We are all one in our 
sorrow, even though 
everyone pays respect in 
his own way’.”
A memorial march is 
joined by 15.000 people. 
Along the route, music 
groups and choirs pay 
tribute to the different 
ethnical backgrounds of 
the people who died in 
the crash.
Next day, I visited the 
disaster scene with 
ministers, the Queen and 
crown prince. Afterwards, 
the Queen spoke with 
survivors in our care 
center, which was highly 
appreciated.
The mayor pays attention 
to a long-term after care 
plan. His motto is: “No 
one should say: I was all 
by myself when I cried”.
”The essence of after 
care is that it may take 
several years.” 
”For most people, the 
disaster will never fade. 
It may take years before 
people show stress 
effects.”
“I met survivors. I realized 
I was quite unemotional 
and professional. 
Even though I am 
quite emotional under 
different circumstances. 
It surprised me that I 
was able to respond less 
emotionally.”
We held press 
conferences twice a day.
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of risk of flooding in 
Culemborg






of risk of flooding 
in Tiel
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“To us, it was hard to 
imagine what would 
happen when the dike 
would breach. It was, 
therefore, difficult to 
answer the residents´ 
questions.”
“At the time the 
people were allowed 
to come back home, 
we arranged a small 
´welcome package´ for 
every house, including 
a small pie. It led to a 
sense of happiness and 
gratefulness.”
We used our local radio 
station Stad Radio 
Culemborg.
Threat of flooding. In the 
end, the dikes did not 
breach.
Even before the 
evacuation becomes 
mandatory, 64% of the 
people had already left 
the area.
There was a sense of 
belonging. According 
to the mayor, people 
were helping each other 
formidably. 
“Trust is one of the 
cornerstones in crisis 
management.”
“Looking back, I was too 
much involved in crisis 
management procedures 
and should have paid 
more attention to my role 
as citizen father. I was too 
much of a technocrat. 
I could have visited 
an elderly home, for 
instance. As a mayor, you 
are supposed to show 
you care.” 
“I wanted to prepare 
people for the possible 
upcoming evacuation 
order. In that way, it 
enabled them to think 
about alternative places 
to stay, what they wanted 
to take with them and 
how they were going to 
organize themselves.”
“Some people regarded 
this approach as 
‘stimulating panic’, but 
we just wanted to enable 
people to prepare.”
“In reality, people easily 
find their way, as long as 
you give them time to 
prepare.”
“People are self-
sufficient. You can use 
that capacity.”
“In a survey, people 
showed they were 
satisfied with the 
information provided.”
“Evacuated people stayed 
with friends and families 
all over the Netherlands. 
They checked the media 
for updates.”
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
19960715 Welschen Military plane crash 
in Eindhoven2
Yes (34) High (for fire brigade 










two fatalities in 
Gorinchem
Yes (2) Low High
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Belgian_Air_Force_Hercules_accident
3 A so-called ‘silent march’ (stille tocht) is a custom way to remember the people who died. 
 Usually, residents walk silently through the city’s streets in memory of the victims.
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“I wanted fulfill my role 
as citizen father to the 
rescue team as well.”
“It is difficult to be a 
listening ear, when 
people hold you 
responsible for the 
situation as well.”
Contact with the next 
of kin was of personal 
importance to the 
mayor as well, as he was 
touched by the incident.
Generally speaking, the 
mayor had a positive 
relationship with 
the victims’ families. 
However, some pointed 
out their grief towards 
the mayor.
Over the years, the 
group of victims’ families 
divided into two different 
groups. One blaming 
government, others just 
got on with their lives.
Media were looking for 
answers to questions 
about the slow response 
time of the fire brigade. 
The disaster let to 
an intense political 
aftermath. The fire 
brigade started too 
late with their rescue 
operations, since they 
presumed the cargo flight 
had no passengers on 
board. 
Apparently the main 
focus of the mayor was 
on the political debate 
and the process of 
accountability in the 
city council rather than 
on contact with the 
residents themselves.
Riots took place in the 
Oosterpark district in 
Groningen. It eventually 
led to the resignation of 
mayor Hans Ouwerkerk.
“In the end, it is all 
about taking your 
responsibility as a mayor. 
At crucial moments, the 
mayor is the authority 
with leadership. As a 
positive note, everyone 
appreciates it when a 
mayor takes the lead.”
The municipality 
organized a gathering, 
where people were able 
to share emotions. It 
enabled the mayor to 
prevent further tensions 
among groups of 
youngsters in the city.
“A silent march3 is a 
useful tool to share 
emotions collectively.” 
“I learnt that you can 
show your own emotions 
in these kinds of 
gatherings. In essence, 
the challenge lies in using 
the emotions from the 
local society and yourself 
for something useful 
and positive. It enables 
society to go forward.”
“We involved the parents 
in our decision to 
organize a silent march. 
I did the same with the 
Turkish mosque.” 
“We had hardly any 
contact with the family of 
the shooter. His Turkish 
family felt ashamed 
and was not very 
cooperative.”
“We discontinued the 
annual commemorations, 
as the parents no longer 
appreciated the massive 
scale.” 
“On behalf of the 
parents, we asked the 
media not to attend the 
funeral.”
“I believe it was our duty 
to support the parents 
and keep media out of 
sight. They did not ask 
to be at the center of 
attention. People from 
the Communications 
Department behaved as 
a kind of ‘spokesperson 
bodyguard’.”
Two girls die when they 
leave a club in Gorinchem 
after being shot by a 
man who was denied 
entrance.
The shooter is from 
a Dutch-Turkish 
background. As a result, 
the killing has impact on 
the Turkish community in 
the town. 
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Yes (32) High. The mayor was also 
the chairman of the flower 
exhibition foundation, which 
organized the exhibition where 
the outbreak took place. He 
received full support for this 




The deputy supported 
mayor Mans in this 
disaster. That said, the 
main tasks regarding 
remembering and 
meaning making were 




Yes (23) High. The municipality 
permitted the fireworks factory 
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3
How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“Look for a role which 
suits you. There’s 
nothing wrong with 
showing compassion 
and emotions. Just live 
up to the expectations 
people have. I was their 
companion.”
The mayor makes a 





The mayor organized a 
press conference in order 
to reach possible victims 
who lived elsewhere, 
since the visitors came 
from all over the country. 
The director, the mayor 
and a lung specialist 
spoke at the press 
conference, given at the 
local hospital. 
The mayor was also the 
chairman of the flower 
exhibition foundation, 
organizer of one of the 
largest indoor flower 
exhibitions in the world. 
In total, 32 people died 
because of legionellosis.
The mayor remarks 
that blame games are 
an essential part of the 
aftermath; usually an 
expression of disbelieve 
and uncertainty. He 
advises to not take it too 
personal.
“A disaster like the 
fireworks disaster of 
Enschede puts a lot 
of pressure on the 
shoulders of the mayor. 
More than a single 
person can take. For me, 
as a deputy, I took some 
of the tasks in order to 
relieve mayor Mans.”
“I spoke at two funerals. 
I made clear that I spoke 
on behalf of the entire 
population of Enschede. 
There was a lot of 
solidarity. There was also 
a lot of support from the 
colleagues from the fire 
brigade. You’re supposed 
to do anything in the 
interest of the victims’ 
families. The institutional 
interests are secondary.”
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20000513 Mans Explosion fireworks 
factory Enschede6
Yes (23) High. The municipality 
permitted the fireworks factory 
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“To calm a situation.”
“Important to show that 
you’re in the lead.”
“Sometimes, being a 
mayor is a lonesome job.” 
“The task is incisively. 
I underestimated the 
impact of being a 
citizen-father. Everything 
is framed from that 
perspective.”
“People who did not 
witness the disaster, are 
getting tired of it over 
time.”
“How often you should 
organize a memorial, 
when and with whom. 
Those are all valid 
questions to ask.”
“Whenever needed, 
I visited them or they 
visited me. We had 
dinner together, with 
the wives of the firemen 
who died in the incident. 
But there will always be 
sensitivities.”
“I hope the victims 
felt the support they 
expected from the 
government.”
“Use the media to 
show that you care. 
People should trust the 
government for doing the 
right things in a disaster 
situation.”
“Facilitate the press 
whenever possible.”
“Be clear. Don’t try to 
polish the story. State 
what you know, but also: 
express what you do not 
know.”
“Every year, 13 May 13 is 
a day of remembrance, 
but also a day of press 
attention and a day on 
which old conspiracy 
theories receive a new 
yearly impulse.”
A fire at a fireworks 
factory led to an 
enormous explosion 
which killed 23 people 
including four firefighters. 
It was one of the biggest 
post-WWII disasters in 
the Netherlands.
“During riots, it is usually 
best not to be visible. 
Otherwise, you’ll become 
part of the problem.”
“In the aftermath, 
inform people and try to 
connect.”
“Everything depends 
on context and the 
situation.”
“Just do whatever you 
believe is valuable to 
the city. In the end, the 
mayor is the one and 
only person who takes 
responsibility for public 
order management. But 
you became a mayor 
in order to take tough 
decisions, your are not 
there for just the pretty 
stuff.” 
“Even though the man 
was killed by a police 
bullet, I visited the family. 
It was a situation with 
respect towards each 
other.”
“Be available to the 
media and regularly 
provide them with facts 
and figures.”
A police bullet killed 
a man. 
Informal leadership in the 
neighborhood played an 
important role in easing 
the situation after days 
of riots.
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No High, even though the crisis 
was mainly managed by 
national government, the 
mayor was regarded as the 
representative of national 
government by his local 
citizens.
High
20010430 Plomp Riots in Genemuiden No High, as the mayor decided 
to ban a tradition, because he 








Yes (3) High. But only for crisis 
management and distribution 
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“You can only fulfill the 
role of a citizen father 
when you are supported 
by other governmental 
institutions. In this case, 
the institutions had 
different goals.”
“Since the national 
government urged to 
kill the animals and the 
mayor was regarded 
as part of the same 
governmental structure, 
the role of the citizen 
father was a complex 
one. The focus of the 
national government 
was on the containment 
of the disease, not on 
the social impact and 
consequences.”
The mayor tried to be 
in contact with all parts 
of the community. 
This turned out to 
be an unfortunate 
undertaking. The town 
of Kootwijkerbroek is a 
largely orthodox Calvinist 
and closed community. 
People express their 
solidarity and direct 
their frustration to the 
government and to the 
farmer where the disease 
was detected.
“A mayor is not only a 
citizen father, but can 
easily turn into a laughing 
stock when society turns 
against him.”
The people from the 
national government 
visited the emotional 
farmers unprepared. 
According to the mayor, 
this part of government 
had no clue about the 
underlying emotions in 
his community.
The mayor was 
threatened during and 
in the aftermath of the 
crisis.
“I attended the press 
conferences twice a 
day. I tried to emphasize 
my local position, in 
contrast to the national 
government which tried 
to contain the disease.”
Farmers from 
Kootwijkerbroek did 
not believe there was a 
case of Foot and Mouth 
disease in their village. 
They started riots to 
prevent their cattle from 
being destroyed. 
As the mayors 
interventions were 
seen as the cause of 
the riots, the mayor 




The town had major 
problems with youngsters 
who drove drunk on 
scooters on the night 
before Queens Day each 
year. The mayor banned 
their tradition. He had 
little support when the 
riots escalated. People 
listened to the informal 
leadership of vicars 
instead.
“When three children 
die because of an 
infectious disease in a 
small community, people 
expect you to take 
action.” 
“Explaining the necessary 
measures, as well as 
the decision not to 
take certain measures. 
Even though people 
understand the decisions, 
one hesitates to accept it 
because of the emotions 
when children are hit by 
an infectious disease.”
Mayor is in direct contact 
with the affected families 
who lost their child. 
Strangely enough, the 
mayor says, unlike the 
rest of the community, 
they díd understand the 
decisions the mayor took.
Political responsibility for 
the crisis management 
itself. Mayor seen as 
responsible for the 
cooperation with the 
national public health 
service.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20020306
Bruinsma





WWII torpedo at 
beach of Egmond
No High (decision to detonate) Low
20020506 Opstelten Murder of political 
candidate Pim 
Fortuyn in Hilversum7
Yes (1) Low High
7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Pim_Fortuyn
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
It is the media that 
mainly defines the image 
of the mayor.
Vessel catches fire 
while in a dry dock in 
Vlaardingen. 
Apparently, the 
emphasis is put on crisis 
communications and 
instructions, not so much 
on the management of 
emotions.
The torpedo was pointed 
at the beach. There 
were no houses in the 
surrounding area, which 
minimized the potential 
impact.
A WWII torpedo needs 
to be detonated. The 
torpedo is pointed at the 
beach of Egmond.
No real role for mayor as 
a citizen-father
“It was not a personal 
loss to me personally. But 
I was certainly shocked.”
“Under these 
circumstances, people 
look for leadership. Just 
be there when needed. 
It sounds arrogant, but 
that’s how it is. People 
will follow you more 
easily. “
“Most decisions are 
taken intuitively. Intuition 
is a combination of 
personality, character 
and experience. “
“The city of Rotterdam 
was in shock. Everyone 
was stunned. We needed 
to do something. We 
opened city hall. People 
lined up to offer their 
condolences.“
“Fortuyn was the 
leader of the largest 
local political party. It 
made it a crisis for all of 
Rotterdam. “
City hall and his own 
residence were the two 
places where people left 
flowers.
“You want to express 
solidarity. Government 
is there to calm people, 
inform them and take 
action. You must know 
when you are needed.“
Heading a march through 
the city was a way to 
publicly let off steam.
Focus of the interview 
lies on the public impact 
of the death of the leader 
of the largest political 
party in the city council. 
Contact with the family 
of Fortuyn was primarily 




Assassination of Dutch 
right-wing politician Pim 
Fortuyn, who led his 
anti-immigration party to 
a position of prominence 
in the Netherlands. 
Fortuyn was the leader of 
the largest local political 
party in Rotterdam and 
leader of one of the 
national parties.
He was assassinated in 
Hilversum, nine days 
before the National 
Elections. 
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong











Description of event People died? Y/N 
20020820
Brink (deputy)
Rail accident with 
hazardous goods 
near station of 
Amersfoort
No Low Low
20021022 Schrijen Senseless violence in 
Venlo8
Yes (1) Low High
20030323
Pop
Fatal fire with 
casualties among 
firemen in Haarlem
Yes (3) High Low
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Rene_Steegmans
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3
How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
”I did not want to take 
any risk. Whatever 
happens. it’s your own 
city. Your own people. 
And your own [political] 
future.
If communications 
become confusing, the 
credibility of the mayor is 
at stake.”
”I gave priority to 
informing the general 
public. To my surprise, 
the members of the city 
council felt they were 
ignored.”
”We held press 
conferences with short 
statements every hour.”
“A member of parliament 
made statements in the 
press which undermined 
the credibility of the crisis 
team.
Later that evening, I gave 
an interview which was 
broadcasted live. The rain 
pouring down on me did 
not help to show a sense 
of control.”
A train with hazardous 
goods starts to leak 
at Amersfoort Central 
Station. The focus is on 
the accountability and 
the role of the media 
in ‘setting the stage’, 
and much less on the 
interaction with citizens.
“You are a citizen father, 
representing the city and 
there to give words to 
the emotions.”
“Apparently, I did 
something which felt 
close to the peoples’ 
emotions. I engaged, 
but kept a professional 
distance.”
“I used the authority 
of a mayor, asking for 
solidarity and unity.” 
“We had to do something 
with the collective 
emotions after the brutal 
death of the victim.”
“I visited the family at 
home. And I kept visiting 
them in the months after 
the incident.”
“We were not involved 
in the funeral, other than 
making it possible.” 
One of the directors was 
in contact with the family 
of the offender. The 
mayor’s focus was on the 
family of the victim.
The mayor updated 
the media with regular 
intervals. 
“I was invited by 
(national) media in 
Amsterdam, but decided 
to stay close to my 
citizens.”
Mr Steegmans addressed 
two youngsters for 
driving recklessly. While 
driving on their scooter, 
they almost hit an 
older lady. According 
to witnesses he asked 
for some respect for 
the elderly. They then 
attacked Mr Steegmans, 
kicking and beating him 
several times. He died.
“Visiting the fire brigade 
is appreciated after such 
a shock.” 
“We organized a meeting 
with all firemen, to 
mourn together.”
The mayor is in contact 
with the family members.
“The family could 
choose for a funeral with 
honors, or a more private 
funeral.”
The mayor speaks at the 
funeral, with words of 
solidarity, compassion 
and mutual trust among 
the firemen.
“We were involved until 
the commemoration, one 
year later.”
“We set up a press 
conference, which was 
a mix of emotions and 
ratio. We gave the facts 
on what had happened. 
Emotionally, we were 
deeply involved with 
the fire brigade and the 
families.”
Three firefighters 
die while fighting a 
church fire. A church 
wall collapsed on five 
firefighters, killing the 
three and seriously 
injuring two others.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
200304 (Spring 2003)
Majoor
Bird flu in Weert9 No High, as the mayor was 





Collapse of a balcony 
in Maastricht
Yes (2) High High
20030714
Mittendorff (deputy)
LNG truck on fire in 
Eindhoven
Yes (1) Low Low
20030826
Burgman
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3
How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“You are expected to 
follow the national 
guidelines. At the same 
time, you try to respect 
local circumstances.”
“One of the farmers 
denied accepting the 
killing of his animals. 
I could have fulfilled a 
role as a citizen father, 
but I was not allowed 
to do so [by national 
government].”
“Considering the 
emotional stress and the 
disappointment among 
the farmers, I prefer to 
take a different action in 
the future.”
The national government 
did not match the public 
perception.
“We underestimated 
the emotional impact of 
the killing of animals on 
hobby farmers.”
“As I had hardly any 
influence on the way 
in which the crisis was 
managed, my role as a 
mayor and citizen father 
was undermined.”
“People face fear and 
have concerns. It’s your 
duty to take the concerns 
away. Share the emotions 
with victims whenever 
possible. That’s what 
people expect.”
“Management of 
emotions is more 
important than ever 
before. One expects 
decisiveness from a 
mayor.” 
“You’re supposed 
to know when the 
time is right to show 
compassion.”
Two residents of a brand 
new apartment complex 
in Maastricht die when 
their balcony collapses.
”An area had been 
evacuated. I visited 
the people who were 
sheltered.”
”I gave a press 
conference later that 
day, to put things in 
perspective.”
Later on, the mayor 
says, the media were 
used in order to get 
the point across to 
stop the transport of 
hazardous goods through 
the municipality. The 
crisis was used as an 
opportunity.
An LNG truck is on fire 
on the main highway. An 
area is evacuated and 
people are brought to 
care centers. No reason 
given why the mayor 
decided to visit the care 
center.
“It took some time before 
I was able to visit the rest 
center. I felt the need to 
answer the questions 
people had.”
“People blamed me for 
giving more attention to 
the media compared to 
the affected people.”
“In the care centers I met 
the people who had to 
leave their homes. I felt 
compassion with them. 
During press conferences, 
I did not show the 
emotions I showed at the 
care center.” 
Gave press conferences 
and joined the media in a 
tour around the disaster 
area.
She felt left on her 
own and missed direct 
contact with other 
mayors in order to share 
experiences.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20030927 Meijer Amercentrale power 
plant boiler accident 
in Geertruidenberg
Yes (5) Low Low
20031231
Buijserd
New Year riots in 
Veen
No High, as the mayor was 
responsible for public order 





Car accident with 
youngsters Zeewolde
Yes (2) Low High
20041017
Lodders (deputy)
Car accident with 
youngsters in Almelo
Yes (5) Low High
20041102
Cohen
Murder on columnist 
Theo van Gogh in 
Amsterdam10
Yes (1) Low High
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theo_van_Gogh_(film_director)
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3
How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
Not. “I promised them to 
inform them personally, 
as soon as I could.”
”Informing press through 
press conferences, to 
update them on the 
rescue operation. ” 
”The media were 
depending on us, [as 
they had no access to the 
disaster scene].”
Incident at a power 
station. Five victims 
were employees who 
lived elsewhere. Mayor 
and his team were in 
close contact with their 
families. No general 
impact.
Mayor tried to discuss 
the issue with key figures 
from the community. 




threatened the mayor, 
because of the measures 
he wanted to take in 
order to minimize the 
disturbances during the 
New Year celebrations. 
Only after New Year, he 
managed to involve part 
of the community, as 
they were ashamed for 
what had happened.
According to the mayor, 
the media fuelled the 
situation.
Year after year, Veen 
is a trouble hotspot 
during the New Year 
celebrations. Setting 
car wrecks on fire has 
become somewhat of a 
tradition. The ban by the 
new mayor of Veen led to 
an uproar.
The mayor did not 
participate in a 
remembrance gathering 
organized by the victims´ 
school in a neighboring 
community. 
Police first asks family if 
they appreciate a visit by 
the mayor. Mayor visits 
the mother of one of 
the boys who died in the 
accident.
Two youngsters died in an 
accident. The gatherings 
were concentrated in and 
around the school.
“It had a large impact 
on the local community. 
It was the only subject 
people talked about 
those days. To me, it 
was an indication that 
there was a role for the 
municipality and mayor 
as well. We facilitated 
a memorial meeting, 
organized by friends and 
the churches.”
Friends of the victims 
gathered in the local 
church. The mayor visited 
them over there.
The mayor contacted the 
families of the victims, 
to check whether or not 
they appreciated a silent 
march by friends.
“Media will find you 
under these kind of 
circumstances.”
Five youngsters died in a 
car accident, two weeks 
after another incident 
where two young 
people died. Mayor 
coordinates all kind of 
different initiatives in 
the local community and 
supports the church in its 
activities.
“It is my duty to keep 
society together in times 
of crisis. The mayor is 
the personification of 
government; it is all 
about confidence. These 
are the moments you 
have to show up.”
The municipality 
organized a gathering 
in the center of the city. 
The mayor consulted the 
family about it.
“Having contact with the 
parents of Theo van Gogh 
is part of my job. Not 
necessarily in front of the 
cameras, but of course 
you get in touch.”
Citizens look for 
confidence in 
government. A mayor 
is the personification of 
government. You have 
to express confidence 
towards victims, citizen 
and media.”
Well-known columnist 
stabbed to death by a 
Muslim terrorist.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20041203
Weerwind
Large fire at local 
cheese factory with 





Family tragedy in 
Zoetermeer
Yes (3) Low High
20050404
Waals
Local tensions at the 
mosque in Venray
No High High
11 Interview by Ruud van Bennekom.
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong
Processed on: 22-11-2019 PDF page: 105
 105
Meaning making by public leaders in times of crisis: An assessment
3
How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
”Visited the school, 
because of the impact 
on the children who had 
been evacuated. ”
”Also lending an ear to 
the factory workers, who 
were afraid to lose their 
job. ”
According to the mayor, 
the fire did not have an 
emotional impact. It 
was rather seen as an 
inconvenience. 
Mayor held gatherings for 
the residents and visited 
schools, the factory and 
farmers after a large fire 
in a local factory.
“As a mayor, you double 
check whether or not 
everyone who needs 
to be informed is in 
fact informed; the local 
school, for example.” 
“Everywhere, you just ask 
if there is anything you 
can do.” 
“We informed the 
neighborhood and set up 
a meeting for the people 
nearby.”
“I met the father, who 
did not live with the 
mother at the time of the 
murders. I gave him my 
deepest condolences on 
behalf of the community 
of Zoetermeer. You 
represent the community. 
There is not much more 
you can do than ask if 
there is anything you 
can do.” 
“I was asked to join a 
gathering with family 
members and, on 
his request, I joined 
the father at the 
identification of his 
children.”
“We were able to keep 
the media at a certain 
distance.”
Mother and father 
did not live together 
anymore. Mother 
committed suicide, after 
killing both of their 
children. 
“Important to let them 
feel safe. ‘You are my 
fellow citizens, we are 
here to protect you. 
When you are harmed, I 
feel similar pain’.”
The mayor talked to 
people, in order to 
channel the public 
emotions.
“Local tensions were 
exaggerated by the 
media. The crisis mainly 
existed in the media, 
more than in the local 
community itself.”
According to the mayor, 
he is both citizen father 
and spokesperson.
Quote by mayor: “As 
a mayor, you are not 
prepared for every 
situation.”
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20050406
Waaijer12
Family tragedy after 
mother and children 
went missing in 
Zoetermeer
Yes (3) Low High
20050801 Fellinger 
(deputy)
Family tragedy in 
Tolbert
Yes (2) Low High
12 Interview by Ruud van Bennekom.
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“At the time it became 
clear that the father 
was a suspect, I urged 
the Public Prosecutor to 
inform the neighborhood, 
since they participated in 
the search operation.”
“We sent a door-to-
door letter to ask the 
people to join us at the 
police station, where 
we informed them. I 
was asked to tell the sad 
news.”
“Your own ego should not 
be leading. Be restrained. 
Be there when needed, 
but don’t push it.”
“I contacted the director 
of the school; the same 
school had had a tragedy 
in January of that year, 
when a mother killed 
herself and her two 
children.” 
The municipality opened 
a book of condolences.
At the day of the funeral, 
the children at the school 
launched white balloons. 
“Those are emotional 
moments, for me as 
well.” 
The mayor attended the 
funeral.
Later on, he visited the 
parents of the mother 
to offer the book of 
condolences. 
“Later on, I also 
contacted the parents 
of the father. In the 
end, they lost their 
grandchildren as well, 
regardless of what their 
son had done.” 
After the mother and 
her two children went 
missing, it turned out 
that the father had killed 
them. A search operation, 
in which people from 
the neighborhood 
participated, changed 
into a murder case.
The mayor adds: “In 
my role, you have to 
take your decisions step 
by step. In a smaller 
community, the role of a 
mayor will be different.” 
“You realize that it 
is about something 
important. It is easier to 
chair a crisis team during 
a large fire, than a family 
murder with all emotions 
involved.”
“In a gathering for our 
citizens, I became a 
kind of ‘pater familias’, 
the citizen father. 
People want to talk 
to you. Under those 
circumstances, you 
represent the local 
government. I believe 
it is correct that people 
expect such a role of a 
mayor.”
“It was the most 
emotional situation in my 
professional career as a 
deputy mayor.”
“There was solidarity 
among the people who 
came to help us at the 
city hall.”
“I also visited the 
policemen who had been 
at the scene. People 
sometimes forget the 
impact these kind of 
situations have on first 
responders.”
The municipality 
organized a gathering for 
their citizens, to share 
emotions. 
We opened a condolence 
registry at the city hall. 
We collected teddy bears, 
which were left as a 
remembrance.
“I did not attend the 
funeral, as I believe it is 
something which belongs 
to the family.” 
“I never had direct 
contact with the parents. 
I sent a letter to both 
parents.”
“We set up a press 
conference. The press 
was not allowed to the 
gathering we organized 
for people in the 
neighborhood.”
The mayor tells a 
journalist that citizens are 
disappointed in the way 
in which he described the 
situation.
Two children were killed 
by their mother’s new 
boyfriend. The mother 
survived.
The mayor was asked to 
do an interview later on. 
He rejected the request, 
as he did not want to 
give the suggestion 
he wanted to gain an 
electoral benefit from the 
situation. 
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong











Description of event People died? Y/N 
20050920
Mulder





The first day after the 
fire, mayor Hertog was 
abroad. Bezuijen was 
in charge as the first 
deputy mayor. Later 
on, Hertog became 
chairman.
Fire in prison 
Schiphol-Oost13





The first day after the 
fire, mayor Hertog was 
abroad. Bezuijen was 
in charge as the first 
deputy mayor. Later 
on, Hertog became 
chairman.




(Shared responsibility with 
minister, as ministry of Justice 
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
In media, the mayor is 
more a spokesperson 
than citizen father. 
As long as there is 
a lot of uncertainty 
about the risks, the 
mayor is regarded as 
the spokesperson who 
updates the outside 
world. 
Container vessel 
Forwairet stranded on a 
ridge close to the town 
of Hulst. 
The vessel hogged 
severely as the tide fell. 
Threat of possible spill of 
hazardous goods towards 
the city of Hulst.
“In the role of a mayor, 
everything comes 
together. From empathy 
towards victims, focus 
on the media, political 
responsibility and the 
aftermath.”
The mayor visits the site 
of the disaster.
“I was touched by the 
memorial, when I saw 
the next of kin.”
“I also visited the first 
responders at the local 
fire brigade, who had a 
hard time as well.”
“Even CNN International 
reported on the fire. At 
that point you realize this 
is getting large.
We organized press 
conferences in order to 
lessen the pressure of 
media at the site of the 
disaster. We answered 
truthfully to all questions 
regarding the crisis.”
The 11 victims did not 
come from his own 
municipality. His focus 
is on other circles with 
emotional need, such 
as the people at the fire 
brigade.
“I wanted to behave as 
a “caring government” 
from the beginning.”
Apart from the 
independent inquiry into 
what had happened, 
the mayor organizes a 
remembrance gathering 
for survivors and their 
families.
“I met the father of an 
asylum seeker who died 
in the fire. Those are 
terrible things. I was 
deeply touched.”
“All in all, even media 
discussed my resignation 
as truthful and with 
integrity.”
Fire in detention center 
where asylum seekers 
were detained. Both 
ministers of Justice 
and Spatial Planning 
and Housing resigned, 
together with the mayor 
who felt responsible for 
the building instructions 
on the premises.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20051125
Loohuis
Power outage after 
extreme snowfall in 
Haaksbergen
No High, as the mayor is attributed 
responsibility for managing the 






No High, as the mayor is attributed 
responsibility for managing the 






No High, as the mayor took the 
final decision to allow the 
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“I believe it is important 
to show that you care. I 
visited the care center, 
and paid a visit to the 
local supermarket and 
the farmers outside the 
village. We showed we 
cared and asked how 
things were going.”
“People expect and hope 
you will be there for 
them. I tried as much as I 
could to cope with those 
expectations.”
“We set up care centers, 
where people could ask 
their questions and get 
the information they 
needed.” 
“I was proud of the 
citizens, as they cared for 
each other and showed 
neighborliness.”
The mayor showed 
publicly that he put 
pressure on the 
electricity company, to 
solve the problem. 
“The visits [to the 
farmers] also gave me 
feedback. People told 
me they had heard me 
on the radio and said I 
explained clearly what 
we had been doing.”
“Every crisis has its own 
emotions.”
“We had a good 
understanding with 
our regional television 
station.”
“The media enabled me 
to show that I cared and 
what we did to solve the 
crisis.”
Outage of three days in 
village of Haaksbergen in 
winter time.
“We cared about the 
people who depend on 
electricity.”
“We gave press briefings 
with updates on the 
situation.”
Outage lasts for two days 
in wintertime.
“Government is 
supposed to get in 
through the front door. 
We’re supposed to be 
transparent.” 
As the mayor supports 
the felling of the trees, 
the local community 
turns against him.
Residents joined the 
environmental activists, 
as the residents did not 
like the AWACS airplanes 
either. Residents 
provided the activists 
with food and drinks. 
The mayor says he should 
have organized a debate 
with local residents, to 
discuss the situation. 
Press conferences were 
held. The activists were 
enabled to speak with 
the media as well. 
A journalist of the 
regional newspaper 
Limburgs Dagblad was 
embedded at the crisis 
team for a week. 
NATO requested the 
cutting of a local forest, 
as the trees were “in the 
way” of certain low level 
flight take off and landing 
practices of AWACS 
airplanes on a nearby 
airfield.
Approximately ten 
children felt ill. Six 
ambulances and an 
emergency helicopter 
came to the scene. 
“To me, it is obviously 
a situation where it 
is important to show 
your compassion at the 
scene. When children 
are involved, you’re not 
supposed to wait for 
updates from the town 
hall.”
“The next day, we set 
up a meeting with the 
school and the parents 
of the children involved. 
Our purpose was to take 
away existing tensions 
and emotions.”
“During the town hall 
meeting the next day, I 
started with asking the 
children how they felt.” 
“I spoke to media on 
the scene. Under these 
circumstances, when a 
mayor is present, you’re 
supposed to talk to the 
media.” 
Mass hysteria among ten 
schoolchildren.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20060506
Buddenberg
Riots in Pijnacker No High, as the mayor is head of 





Removing a WW II 
bomb in Purmerend
No High, as the mayor took the 





Collapse of the canal 
stairs in Utrecht
Yes (1) High. You realize you have quite 
some responsibility (in the 
crisis phase)
You realize you will be held 
accountable, since the 
municipality owned the stairs.
High
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
The riot police did 
not really get the 
right tone of voice in 
their approach of the 
youngsters from the 
little town of Pijnacker. 
The improper treatment 
caused an escalation 
of the tense situation. 
According to the mayor, 
he was misinformed 
by the police and was 
unaware of what had 
really happened during 
the riots.
“It became clear to me 
that the police operation 
had been disproportional. 
I decided to organize a 
meeting, where I publicly 
apologized. The citizens 
accepted this statement.”
“It was hard to behave as 
a citizen father, as I had 
been responsible for the 
police operation as well. 
I could not let the police 
down, as long as there 
had not been done any 
investigation.”
Thousands of people 
attend the festival week 
in Pijnacker. 
One night, riots start as 
the people come back 
from one of the concerts. 
The appearance of the 
police fuels the riots, 
instead of easing the 
situation. 
“People understood 
why it was necessary to 
evacuate. “
“We set up a care center. 
Media were not allowed 
inside.”
A second world war 
bomb needs to be 
detonated. A mandatory 
evacuation order is 
issued.
Residents receive all 
necessary information. 
No real role for mayor as 
a citizen-father.
“I knew instantly that this 
was something ‘bigger’.”
“We wanted to hearten 
the victims.”
The mayor visits the site 
of the disaster.
City hall is opened, in 
order to comfort people 
and offer coffee to 
bystanders.
“When you meet 
victims, you do not 
think about the political 
accountability process.”
“I visited the victims in 
the hospital.”
“We supported the 
victims’ family in 
organizing the funeral.”
“We attached a 
commemorative plaque 
on the site where the 
incident happened.”
“We gave regular 
updates to the media 
and we organized 
press conferences. We 
communicated whatever 
we knew.”
“We kept the media away 
from the funeral.”
The mayor realizes 
that she’ll be held 
accountable, but also 
notes that it does not 
influence her role 
towards victims.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20060825 Aalderink People die by 
lightning in Vorden
Yes (2) Low High
20061201
Fränzel
Murder of 8-year 
old at school in 
Hoogerheide 
Yes (1) Low High
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“In a broader context, 
government should 
facilitate society, in order 
to enable people to meet 
up and support each 
other.”
“The informal part of 
a gathering is more 
important than the 
formal part.”
“As a governmental 
organization, you’re 
supposed to facilitate.” 
The mayor organized 
a gathering, where 
people were able to 
share their feelings and 
emotions. People were 
told that they showed 
normal reactions to an 
exceptional event. 
The church organized a 
gathering as well. 
“When you can trust 
the experts in their 
psychosocial support, it 
gives you room to pick 
up the role as a citizen 
father. Everyone has its 
own responsibility under 
these circumstances.” 
“We held a press 
conference. I wanted 
to show the mayor 
was present. It was an 
opportunity to present 
myself as a citizen father.”
“We had a good 
understanding with the 
media. We provided 
them information, but 
also asked them not to 
record the gatherings and 
funerals.” 
Lightning struck during a 
funeral in a small town. 
Two people died.
“The public was shocked. 
Both in The Netherlands 
and abroad. To prevent 
unrest and fear, we 
decided to inform all 
parents [from the school] 
that same day.” 
“I feel it is my duty to 
restore calm, safety 
and stability. It was not 
in the interest of the 
community for me to 
talk about it on national 
television. I chose to 
stay at home and put 
my focus on the town of 
Hoogerheide.”
“We held a remembrance 
service in the church later 
that weekend. I spoke, 
trying to find words 
on behalf of a shocked 
community.”
“We also decided to 
organize a silent march. 
The parents would not 
join, but supported the 
initiative.”
“We announced the 
silent march as late as 
possible, to prevent it 
from becoming a national 
event. We were hoping 
that primarily people 
from our own community 
would join.”
“Our focus was on the 
school. We forgot the 
impact in other circles, 
such as the scouting 
group of the boy.”
“I visited the parents of 
the boy the same day. 
It was one of the most 
difficult moments in my 
career. It was comforting 
to see that there were so 
many people to support 
them.”
Later, the mayor visits the 
family, together with his 
wife. ”We handed over 
a book of condolences 
from the City Hall and 
some of the teddy bears 
which were put in front 
of the school.”
Four months later, the 
mayor visits the parents 
of the man who killed the 
boy. “They are victims 
as well, although in a 
completely different 
way.”
Media from all over the 
Netherlands and abroad 
were interested in the 
story.
“A funeral is an intimate 
moment for the family 
and friends. I rejected the 
request to broadcast it on 
television. We facilitated 
the funeral.”
A young boy was killed, 
stabbed by an unknown 
man at a primary school 
in Hoogerheide.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20061212
Slagman-Bootsma
Brutal murder of a 
girl in Valthermond
Yes (1) Low High
20070112
Hoornstra
Fatal car accident 
with youngsters in 
Wapenveld
Yes (4) Low High
20070130
Cammaert
Large fire on stern 
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“As a mayor, I wanted 
to share my feelings of 
disbelief and care with 
the community. I felt 
it was time to express 
my commitment, even 
though the investigation 
was not finished yet.” 
“I tried to keep the 
community together, 
with respect towards 
each other.” 
When it becomes clear 
that the perpetrator 
comes from a 
neighboring village, the 
mayor says she is proud 
of how the people in the 
other village manage 
their emotions. 
The mayor visited the 
school of the murdered 
girl and talked with 
classmates. “I wanted 
to talk with the children 
about Suzanne, who she 
was and what she liked’. 
We also discussed the 
fears the children had.”
Even though there was 
not much information 
to share, as the 
investigation into the 
murder continued, 
the mayor decided to 
organize a meeting 
where people were able 
to share their emotions: 
“The main purpose was 
to have a session where 
people could share their 
sorrow.” 
The mayor asked if she 
was welcome to visit the 
mother of the murdered 
girl. “I visited her and we 
discussed the funeral. 
We decided to use the 
sporting facilities as a 
location for the funeral. 
We facilitated it as a 
municipality.”
We lowered the media 
pressure by enabling 
them to take a picture of 
a corner of remembrance 
that was set up in the 
school.
Psychosocial experts 
advised parents in the 
community.
There were tensions 
among youngsters in 
the community. When 
the accident happened, 
the mayor realizes the 
victims of this week were 
the perpetrators of last 
week. He adds: “I wanted 
to contain the situation, 
without choosing one 
of the parties. In the 
end, you are everyone’s 
mayor.”
Friends of the youngsters 
who died organized a 
silent march. 
“To me, remembrance 
is something private for 
intimi. I chose not to join 
the silent march.”
Mayor says: when I look 
back on my career, of 
which I have been a 
mayor for more than 20 
years, I realize that you 
never forget these kinds 
of crises. I doubt if it 
will be different for my 
colleagues. 
”I became spokesperson 
for the fire.”
“We communicated that 
there were no problems, 
but people did not 
believe it.”
“In the aftermath, we 
received criticism that we 
did not inform a wider 
group of people.”
Next time, we should 
be better prepared for 
all the questions people 
could have.”
A ship is on fire. Large 
clouds of smoke in the 
surrounding areas. 
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
200703 (March 2007)
Brouwer-Korf
Riots in Ondiep 
district in Utrecht
Yes (1) High, as the mayor is head of 
the police and responsible for 
restoring the public order.
High
20070306 Aalderink Family tragedy in 
Hengelo (Gld)




from refinery in 
Spijkenisse
No Low Low
15 In Dutch: Slachtofferhulp Nederland
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“I feel it as my obligation 
to care for the people 
who are affected by the 
threat of riots.” 
“Hooligans from outside 
Utrecht came to riot. 
We called them ´riot 
tourists´. In order to 
protect the residents in 
the area, I felt I had to 
guarantee their safety.”
“At one moment, I 
chaired the crisis team. 
At another moment I 
wanted to connect with 
the people in the area. 
And at the same time, I 
had to answer questions 
from the media.”
“The mayor shows she 
cares for her residents. 
She asked the residents 
to participate, to clean up 
after the riots.”
“In the weeks after 
the riots, we had six 
meetings with residents 
to discuss the future of 
the neighborhood.”
The mayor regularly gives 
press conferences, to 
update the media on the 
situation.
A man was killed by a 
police bullet. Afterwards, 
riots started. Most of 
the people involved in 
the riots came from 
elsewhere.
“We supported the 
school professionally. 
Our focus was on the 
neighborhood, which was 
shocked by the events.“ 
“As a government, we 
wanted to facilitate the 
people. Victim Support 
Netherlands15 was 
involved.“
“I asked the public 
prosecutor to share more 
facts with the general 
public, in order to enable 
myself to pick up my 
role as a citizen father. 
It was impossible for 
me to share emotions, 
when the most relevant 
questions by the public 
could not be answered. “
“I got in touch with the 
families from both sides. 
Even though I realized 
the father was the 
perpetrator. Both families 
were in shock.“
Father and mother 
decided to commit 
suicide; father survived. 
Grandparents from 
both sides lived in same 
village.
“There was a lot of 
uncertainty. We tried to 
inform the people as best 
as we could. We wrote 
information leaflets and 
handed them out door-
to-door.”
“All parties involved 
came to the City Council, 
to explain what had 
happened and what they 
had done to contain the 
situation.”
“The hardest thing is to 
keep up to speed with 
the media”.
Remark by mayor: An 
incident never asks if it 
fits in your diary.
People were informed 
and in the aftermath 
a gathering was held 
at the City Hall, to 
update people on what 
happened.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20070415
Jacobs











Two young women 
die in an accident 
with a raft in Berkel
Yes (2) Low High
16 Interview by Roy Johannink
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“I believe it is the duty 
of a mayor to reduce the 
uncertainty and impact 
of an incident and not 
fuel it.”
“It is a mayor’s duty to 
contain the unrest. That 
is only possible when 
your information position 
is right.”
“During the crisis, you 
should already think 
about the impact an 
incident might have on 
citizens and victims.”
“It is a difficult task to be 
informed with the same 
speed as the media.”
“I decided to take the 
lead in a complicated 
scenario, with children 
coming from three 
different municipalities, 
and the parents, children 
and schools which were 
involved.“ 
“Later that day, I started 
to realize the impact 
the incident had on the 
teachers at the school 
where the children were 
heading to.“ 
“We placed an 
advertisement in the 
local newspaper in 
which we thanked the 
emergency workers and 
bystanders for their 
help.“
“I went to the scene 
of the disaster. It is the 
choice between either 
going to City Hall and 
wait for information, or 
go to the scene and show 
your compassion. “ 
“Informing the families 
was my first priority. 
We set up a gathering 
to inform everyone else 
later that day. “
“Later on, we had a 
meeting where the 
Prosecution Officer 
explained the court 
case against the driver. 
In this way the children 
were informed before 
reading about it in the 
newspapers.“ 
“Media were alarmed by 
the police. We organized 
a press conference in 
the afternoon. They kept 
asking for interviews, but 
we thought the priority 
should be with the 
children, the schools and 
their parents.“
A group of teenagers 
bikes to school. They 
are hit by a car from 
the opposite direction. 
Thirteen teens are 
severely hurt. 
“I went to the scene of 
the incident. We brought 
the survivors to the 
local fire brigade. I felt 
it was my duty to tell 
the women that their 
colleagues had died in 
the incident.”
“As a mayor, you must 
realize that others are 
affected as well. I decided 
to visit the farmers near 
the weir, and the rental 
company where the 
women had rented the 
raft. The employees were 
truly distressed.”
Since the women 
came from another 
municipality, the mayor 
contacts his colleague to 
guarantee some sort of 
aftercare for the women 
involved. 
Two young women died 
at an accident with a raft 
on the Dutch stream “de 
Berkel”. A big raft with 
18 women on board 
descended the Berkel 
and capsized at one of 
the weirs. 
Psychosocial care was 
arranged for.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 





The mayor is regarded as 
the one who is ultimately 
responsible for solving the 
quest for the pyromaniac, of 
course while working closely 
together with police forces, 





Fire in museum 
Amersfoort18
No Low Low
17 Interview by Roy Johannink
18 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armando_(artist)
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“I wanted to show my 
commitment. Since it 
took time to find the 
pyromaniac, the unrest 
among the population 
increased. Children slept 
badly, because they were 
scared new fires would 
appear.” 
“We organized several 
meetings to discuss 
the situation [with the 
public].”
“I expected the tolerance 
of people would decline, 
but they saw the police 
and military did their 
utmost to find the 
pyromaniac.” 
After the arrest of the 
pyromaniac, the mayor 
asked the community 
to support the parents 
of the pyromaniac, who 
lived in the same town 
where the fires occurred. 
“At the New Year’s 
Reception, people 
thanked me for my role 
as a mayor under these 
difficult circumstances.”
“When the man was 
arrested, the mood 
among policemen was 
euphoric. I realized the 
position of the man and 
his family and the drama 
they were facing. As such, 
I did not say we were 
‘happy’. I chose to say we 
were relieved instead.”
“I have been in touch 
with the family of the 
pyromaniac. I asked the 
community to support 
them.”
From time to time, we 
updated the press. 
Police arrested a man in 
connection with a spate 
of arson attacks in the 
village of ‘t Zandt. At 
least 17 fires were set in 
the village since August 
2007, mainly in empty 
houses and barns.
“I met the people of the 
area around the museum 
in our City Hall. Meeting 
them gave me quite a 
good impression of what 
was happening among 
the residents.”
The mayor visits the area 
where the fire hit the 
museum. He speaks with 
residents.
”A meeting with local 
residents was held. It is 
more emotional than 
the press conference. 
Residents appreciated 
that I informed them 
directly. They appreciated 
the mutual contacts, trust 
and our involvement. ”
The facts on the 
approach of the local fire 
brigade are given in a 
press conference.
Mayor speaks with 
residents. The fire hit 
the museum. He does 
not emphasize his role 
as a citizen father; he 
just talked to people 
and wanted to get an 
impression of what 
happened.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20071105
Urlings
Possible case of mass 
hysteria at a pet shop 
in Hoogeveen
No High. The mayor takes the 





Power outage in 
Zaltbommel
No High, The mayor is seen as 
responsible for managing the 
impact of the crisis.
Low
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“People were brought 
to hospitals after they 
were decontaminated. 
As a mayor, you have 
to realize that there are 
more pleasant things in 
one’s life than shower in 
the freezing cold on the 
order of a mayor.”
“As part of our aftercare, 
we set up a meeting to 
inform the people who 
had been in quarantine. 
It gave us the opportunity 
to explain what we 
did and answer their 
questions.“
Media were alerted 
by the developments 
in the pet shop. When 
the pet shop was put 
in quarantine, one of 
the journalists was not 
allowed to get out either. 
He gave a live report from 
within the quarantined 
area.
“It does not really 
matter whether you do 
an interview with one 
journalist, or many.”
“When you respect the 
media, it is no problem to 
deal with them.”
A young pet caiman 
was found dead in its 
terrarium in a pet shop 
in Hoogeveen. Shortly 
afterwards, 23 people fall 
ill. The most likely cause 
is mass hysteria.
The mayor wants to be 
a citizen father and to 
lend a listening ear to 
his population. He feels 
constrained by the fact 
that he is supposed to 
join the regional crisis 
team, which consumes 
a lot of time. The 
regional focus is on crisis 
management whereas 
the local focus lies on the 
management of emotions 
and compassion. 
“People were looking 
after each other. There 
was a strong sense of 
neighborliness and 
togetherness.”
“We wanted to facilitate 
people in the aftermath, 
in order to help them to 
get compensation for the 
outage.”
“I wanted to put the 
priority on visiting the 
families and companies 
which were hurt by the 
outage.” 
On December 12, a Royal 
Netherlands Air Force 
AH-64 Apache Attack 
helicopter, crashes into 
High Voltage power lines. 
It results in a blackout 
affecting over 50,000 
households. Zaltbommel 
and surrounding areas 
have no electricity for 
three days.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20071224
Schouwenaar
Four children die in a 
fire in Arnemuiden
Yes (4) Low High
20080112
Reitsma
Death of a soldier 
from IJlst while on 
duty in Afghanistan
Yes (1) Low High
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“As a mayor, you do not 
visit victims and their 
families as a person, but 
as a representative of the 
community. I represent 
their mourning and 
sorrow.”
“In the aftermath, I 
became more practical. 
The community 
collected money for 
the family. I checked 
whether or not the 
family had to pay taxes 
for this contribution. 
Furthermore, we 
discussed what to do 
with all the bears and 
flowers in front of the 
restaurant. You should 
not decide on those kind 
of things out of emotion.” 
“Always inform the 
people as fast as possible. 
Such as the bystanders, 
for example. When you 
provide information, you 
prevent rumors from 
spreading.“
“We also informed the 
school and the parents 
of classmates of the 
girls. The school was 
supported by Victim 
Support Netherlands.“
“All people in the village 
were affected.”
“You cannot channel the 
collective emotions right 
away, but if you look for 
the needs, it is possible 
to deliver.”
“I also asked the 
churches to speak about 
the incident.”
“I visited the parents 
on the evening of the 
fire. We could hardly 
talk. It’s not important, 
when you realize the 
situation you are in. I 
showed compassion and 
lend a listening ear. But 
professional help is more 
important at that time. 
You come very close to 
the family; under those 
circumstances, it is better 
to return later.”
“I believe a mayor is 
supposed to join a 
funeral. Always. I just 
join a funeral, but 
usually they’ll ask me. 
The Chinese family 
explicitly asked me to 
speak at the funeral and 
asked me to give words 
to the emotions of the 
community.” 
“As long as you are 
genuine and sincere, 
you usually have a good 
understanding with the 
media.” 
Four girls aged between 
one and eight died in 
a fire in their parents’ 
Chinese restaurant 
in Arnemuiden on 
Christmas Eve. The 
family lived above the 
restaurant, which was 
open at the time of the 
blaze. All the guests were 
evacuated safely.
“The death of the soldier 
had an enormous impact 
on his family and our 
community.”
“Visiting the next of kin 
is one of the duties for a 
mayor under these kind 
of circumstances.”
“We opened a book of 
condolences.” 
The municipality 
supported the youth 
center, where all the 
friends of the soldier 
gathered. Those friends 
organized a silent march 
as well. The mayor visits 
the center. “All you need 
to do is listen and show 
compassion.”
In the City Council 
meeting, the mayor 
asked for a minute of 
silence in memory of the 
soldier.
“I visited the parents, 
even though the church 
and family are more 
important under these 
kind of circumstances.” 
“You are confronted with 
all the emotions and the 
anger about the fact their 
son died. You can lend a 
listening ear.” 
“In my visit to the 
parents, the main 
question was: what 
can we do to relief the 
situation for you.”
“Together with the 
family, we discussed their 
wishes and the way in 
which we could facilitate 
the funeral. They decided 
what they wanted. 
It was not up to the 
municipality to decide.”
Media maintained a 
cautious attitude.
“We asked media not to 
visit the neighborhood 
where his parents 
lived. They could ask 
the communications 
departments whenever 
they had a question.”
The mayor was 100% 
available for the media, 
which – according to him 
- lowered the pressure on 
the family.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20080314
Lonink
Fatal incident with 
a diver from the fire 
brigade Terneuzen19





Senseless violence in 
Zaamslag
Yes (1) Low High
20080509
Kosmeijer (deputy)
The first day after the 
fire, mayor Rijpstra was 
abroad. Kosmeijer was 
in charge as the first 
deputy mayor.
Fire with casualties 
among firemen in 
De Punt




20 The structure of Dutch fire brigades changed from municipal to regional fire brigades in 
 January 2014.
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“People and media 
showed compassion with 
the fire brigade.” 
“The evaluations and 
investigations afterwards 
were harsh. It takes a 
long time before the 
reports are presented.”
A diver of the local fire 
brigade died during a 
mission.
“In my press statement, I 
said that apart from grief 
and support we should 
not condemn each 
other, as the friends and 
family of both victim and 
perpetrator live in the 
same village.” 
According to the mayor, 
his contact with the 
widow was crucial. She 
played an important 
role in preventing 
an escalation of the 
situation.
“The sole appearance 
of a mayor has its 
immediate effect. 
Just ‘being there’ is of 
importance.”
“We enabled the 
community to share their 
emotions. You should 
realize that there are 
subcategories within a 
larger community. No 
one should feel excluded. 
You have to make it 
possible for everyone to 
share their sorrows and 
emotions, for example by 
organizing a gathering.” 
The mayor was in contact 
with the widow, who 
asked others not to 
condemn. 
At the Queens Day party, 
a man from Zaamslag, 
a small community 
in the municipality of 
Terneuzen, is killed in a 
fight. The perpetrator 
lives in Zaamslag as well.
“Even though I was the 
deputy, I do not believe 
people regarded me as a 
substitute citizen father.”
“Under these kind of 
circumstances, the most 
important thing is to find 
the words which touch 
the families in their 
hearts.”
“Investigation reports 
cause turbulence in the 
community, as it revives 
all the memories of the 
terrible events.” 
The mayor spoke during 
the silent march, a 
memorial gathering with 
6.000 participants. 
“We felt proud that so 
many people showed 
solidarity with the 
victims’ families.”
“We confirmed that three 
people died, without 
mentioning their names. 
Nonetheless, the families 
did not believe this was 
appropriate. They should 
have been informed 
first.” 
“We visited the victims’ 
families. It was a difficult 
task.”
“On the one hand, 
your priority is with the 
families and informing 
them. On the other hand, 
you have to inform the 
press as well.”
The way in which the 
families are being 
informed by the 
authorities is part of the 
deliberations of the crisis 
team as well.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20080509
Rijpstra21
The first day after the 
fire, mayor Rijpstra was 
abroad. Kosmeijer was 
in charge as the first 
deputy mayor.
Fire with casualties 
among firemen in 
De Punt





Unrest in Gouda No High High
20081101
Mikkers22
Sex offender in 
Veldhoven
No High High
21 Based on his contribution to remembrance book ‘De Punt 9 mei 2008’, Municipality of 
 Tynaarlo. Vries, 2009.
22 Interview by Roy Johannink
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“I was abroad [in 
Switzerland]. But under 
these circumstances, you 
just want one thing: get 
back home.”
“As a mayor, I joined the 
fire brigade when they 
won prizes. I frequently 
visited the fire brigade, 
just because we were 
proud of them.” 
“We visited the fire 
brigade. It was my duty 
to visit them.”
“We wanted to give the 
three firemen respect 
with a funeral with 
honors.” 
“A silent march was 
organized. Almost 6.000 
people attended. It 
was impressive. People 
showed compassion. 
With each other, with the 
widows and families.” 
“Together with our 
deputy, I visited the 
families. The most 
important thing is just 
to ‘be there’. Nothing 
more and nothing less. 
Everyone understands 
you hardly have anything 
to offer. But you share 
you condolences on 
behalf of the family. You 
try to offer support.”
The mayor explains that 
he feels it as his duty to 
support the fire brigade 
both in good times, when 
they win prizes, as well as 
in bad times like these.
“Gouda became a vehicle 
for a wider problem. 
Colleagues, at work, at 
birthday parties and 
the like, asked people 
about the riots in our 
town. All because of 
the disproportional 
attention by media and 
members of parliament. I 
rebalanced the discussion 
and rebuilt commitment 
and trust.”
After a series of incidents, 
bus drivers do not 
drive through a specific 
neighborhood in Gouda 
for a while. According to 
bus drivers, they were 
being spit on, threatened 
and robbed by mainly 
Moroccan youth. It gave 
the impression that there 
was an intense problem 
with Moroccan youth in 
Gouda.
“I understood the 
emotions, but could 
not accept the paint 
bomb and anonymous 
letters. I wanted to show 
support towards both 
the community and the 
man’s girlfriend, who 
lived in the same house.”
“I did not want to make 
the story bigger than 
strictly necessary.”
“We organized a town 
hall meeting, to enable 
people to discuss the 
situation.”
At the end of the town 
hall meeting, someone 
summarizes the situation 
and compliments the 
municipality for its 
communications.
The mayor is in contact 
with the girlfriend of 
the pedophile. She feels 
supported.
The mayor reads out a 
letter by the pedophile 
during the gathering, 
giving voice to the 
suspects side of the story 
as well. 
The mayor does not 
actively seek the media, 
but they contact him. He 
gives an interview, but 
does not allow media to 
attend the gathering.
Local press was subtler 
than national press, 
according to the mayor.
Looking backwards, the 
mayor says they should 
have supported the 
residents in their contacts 
with the media. 
Paint bomb attack on 
home of a pedophile. 
Delivery of anonymous 
letters in neighborhood. 
Man was sentenced, 
but sentence did not 
yet come into effect.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20081214 Boekhoven Fire with two 
casualties in Workum
Yes (2) Low High
20090209
Horseling





Plane crash of Turkish 
Airlines at Schiphol 
Airport23
Yes (9) Low Low
23 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Airlines_Flight_1951
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
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Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“It is my duty, but do 
not underestimate the 
impact on a mayor 
himself.”
“Even though you cannot 
do a lot, it is valuable to 
be present [as a mayor].” 
“We opened a book of 
condolences. It gives 
people a place to visit in 
remembrance.” 
“We organized a 
gathering. Not only 
to mourn, but also to 
answer questions.”
“I contacted the school 
and asked if they needed 
any help. It is valuable 
when your support helps 
them to cope with the 
incident.”
“I kept in touch with the 
parents involved. One 
and a half year later, 
they arranged a concert 
in our village, to thank 
the community for their 
support.” 
Two children died in a 
fatal fire. Parents left the 
community, but returned 
after rebuilding the 
house.
After police informs the 
mayor about the threat 
of a school shooting, the 
mayor wants to inform 
the schools. ‘I want to 
prevent the threat to 
cause any commotion.’ 
The mayor wants to keep 
it low profile.
I wanted to be comforting 
towards the parents of 
the school. But I could 
not give too many details, 
as the investigation was 
still going on.
Media is alerted after a 
press release is issued. It 
becomes a media hype.
Pupils make a mass 
school shooting threat. 
They are arrested shortly 
afterwards.
“No residents were 
among the victims of 
the plane crash. We did, 
however, organize a 
meeting for the people 
living nearby Schiphol 
Airport, as they were 
worried and felt unsafe. 
We understand their 
feelings were twofold. 
On the one hand, they 
were faced with the risk. 
On the other hand, they 
agree that Schiphol is 
an important economic 
power in the region.”
”It takes time before 
the Disaster Victim 
Identification knows who 
died. I tried to clarify this 
to the Turkish wife of a 
man who was still not 
identified. I told her she 
should take into account 
that her husband had 
died in the accident, even 
though we could not 
formally confirm it yet.” 
“Some hospitals do not 
want to share victim 
information, based on 
privacy regulations. I 
believe the privacy of 
patients is not more 
important than the 
principle that you should 
be able to inform their 
families as fast but 
adequately as possible.”
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20090226
Bezuijen (deputy)
Plane crash of Turkish 
Airlines at Schiphol 
Airport 24
Yes (9) Low Low




Yes (1) High 
(Attributed responsibility for 
solving the crisis, together with 




Attack on royal family 
in Apeldoorn25
Yes (8) Low High
24 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Airlines_Flight_1951
25 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_attack_on_the_Dutch_Royal_Family
26 See 20090225 Weterings
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operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
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The crisis team 
mainly focused on 
the international and 
diplomatic contacts 
and trying to obtain 
the passenger list of 
the Turkish Airlines 
flight. The mayor was 
chairman of the crisis 
team. In the aftermath, 
he connected with local 
citizen to discuss their 
fears of living close to an 
international airport.
“In my statement, I 
directed some words to 
the nearby residents, 
who were frightened 
as a plane had crashed 
in their immediate 
surroundings.
We organized town hall 
meetings with residents 
in the aftermath of the 
crisis, to discuss their 
fears.”
“We organized a press 
conference, not only to 
provide the necessary 
information, but also in 
order to decrease the 
media pressure at the 
site of the disaster”
The nine victims in the 
crash did not come from 
his own municipality. His 
focus is on the impact 
on the citizens who live 
nearby the airport and 
are shocked about the 
plane crash.
“The man stabbed people 
randomly. A public alarm 
was generated by this 
situation. I tried to react 
proportionally and to not 
overreact.”
“Friends and family 
organized a silent march. 
I did not join. As an 
alternative, I chose to 
visit the next of kin at 
their home.” 
“I involved the city 
council as well, to update 
them during the time 
we had not captured the 
man who stabbed people 
in our community.” 
“I showed the family of 
the victim who died that 
I cared.” 
Four people were 
stabbed with a knife 
by a mystery attacker 
in Lelystad. One victim 
died. The perpetrator 
is arrested in February 
2010.
“Intuitively, I chose 
to give priority to the 
victims and their families. 
We needed to be able to 
give an overview of the 
people who were hurt 
and to which hospitals 
they were transferred as 
soon as possible.”
“We organized a 
memorial session later 
that week. The royal 
family attended as well. 
They were placed on 
the balcony, so that they 
would not attract all 
attention.”
“Emergency workers 
and victims met each 
other after the memorial 
gathering . I was touched 
to see how they re-
united.”
“We informed our 
colleagues when we 
knew people from other 
municipalities were 
involved. It was a lesson 
we learnt from the 
Poldercrash26”
“We pledged to present 
all evaluations and 
investigations on one and 
the same day. According 
to us, it was the least 
thing we could do for the 
victims.”
In press conferences, 
the mayor shows his 
empathy. “In regular 
exercises, journalists 
usually ask you nasty 
questions. In this case, 
all journalists at the 
press conferences had 
been at the scene when 
the attack happened. 
There was mutual 
understanding between 
us and the journalists.”
“I did not want to do any 
1-on-1 interviews, as it 
might suggest that I gave 
priority to my own ego 
instead of to the victims.” 
A man drives his car at 
high speed into a parade, 
which included Queen 
Beatrix, Prince Willem-
Alexander and other 
members of the Royal 
Family. 
The vehicle drove 
through people lining 
the street watching the 
parade. No members of 
the Royal Family were 
harmed. It was the first 
attack on the Dutch Royal 
Family in modern times
Eight people, including 
the driver, die.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20090928 Boekhoven Fire with one casualty 
in Workum 
Yes (1) Low Low
20091003
Hoekema
Fatal car accident in 
Wassenaar
Yes (2) Low High
20091012
Van Eijk
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How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
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“A 3-year old boy who 
was on holidays in our 
community died. There 
was hardly any impact on 
the community. I tried to 
support the parents.”
“I supported the parents 
and the fire brigade. But 
compared to the fire 
where two children from 
our community died, 
the collective impact 
was low.”
A three year old German 
boy dies in a fatal fire, 
while on holidays in the 
community of Workum. 
“You should not make 
mourning too collective, 
and bypass the 
individuals.”
“I asked if it was 
necessary to come to the 
scene of the incident, but 
I was not needed over 
there.”
“Two youngsters from 
my city died. I am sure 
the case would have 
been different if the two 
youngsters had been 
from elsewhere. There 
was a close connection 
with our town and I knew 
the social context.”
“I took decisions 
intuitively.”
“The youngsters had 
graduated from school 
just a couple of months 
before the accident. 
Their former high 
school fulfilled a central 
role in the aftermath. 
Otherwise, the local 
government might have 
done more.” 
“People put flowers 
and little teddy bears. I 
discussed this with the 
parents and we decided 
to bring some of the 
flowers to the graves on 
the day of the funeral.” 
“I attended both 
funerals. You attend as 
a representative of the 
community in mourning.”
“A mayor should weigh 
the collective impact of 
emotions.”
“I visited the parents 
at home. They were 
in shock. There is 
no manual for these 
circumstances. You show 
sympathy and share the 
bewilderment. It is an 
essential part of our job. 
You just have to be there 
as a citizen father.”
“From time to time, I am 
still in touch with the 
parents.”
No remarks made on 
his relationship with the 
media.
A group of five 
youngsters gets involved 
in a car crash. Two of 
them die. The group 
comes from the town of 
Wassenaar, where they 
grew up. They all left high 
school just four months 
before. As such, their 
former school is still a 
focal point in the process 
of mourning during the 
aftermath. 
The mayor asked rescue 
services whether or not it 
was necessary to visit the 
scene of the accident. It 
was not needed.
Later on, he visited the 
local fire brigade, to show 
his sympathy towards 
them as well. 
“I cared for the people 
after the bankruptcy 
of the DSB Bank. The 
community was thrown 
into an emotional crisis.”
“I wanted to lend a 
listening ear to the entire 
community, since it was 
affected at large by the 
bankruptcy.” 
“We set up a meeting, in 
order to share emotions, 
but also to take a step 
forward and inform 
people on what could be 
next in terms of jobs and 
personal impact.” 
A regional but large 
bank went bankrupt 
in 2009 in the middle 
of the economic crisis. 
This resulted in the loss 
of hundreds of jobs at 
the head office. Other 
employers who were 
dependent on the bank, 
got into trouble as well. 
Together with other 
mayors from the area, 
the mayor starts to lobby 
to find alternatives for 
the employees.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20091029
Barske











longhorned beetle in 
Boskoop
No High, even though the main 
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(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
The cause of the fire 
was possibly arson. 
The mayor says: “The 
outside world does not 
always make a clear 
distinction between the 
public prosecutor and 
the mayor. For many 
people, these are more 
or less part of the same 
authority’.
Focus primarily on 
residents and the way in 
which the municipality 
was able to help them in 
a practical manner.
The municipality opened 
a care center. The 
municipality supported 
the people in their 
practical needs.
Fire in the middle of the 
night. Flat with elderly 
people needs to be 
evacuated.
People informed each 
other instantly, even 
before the public warning 
pole alarmed the 
residents.
“We set up a meeting for 
the residents of Dronrijp. 
I did not make the story 
prettier than it was. I 
said I could imagine the 
people were shocked 
since I was also shocked 
myself.”
“We were able to answer 
many questions the 
people had. The cloud 
had no consequences 
for the people in the 
community.”
Due to a failure at the 
local milk factory, a cloud 
of nitric acid is released. 
The people of Dronrijp 
receive the alarm of this 
hazardous cloud too late.
The beetle had an 
enormous impact on the 
businesses in Boskoop. 
As the mayor says: 
“There is a history of 600 
years with plants in this 
community”.
The mayor becomes a 
spokesperson on behalf 
of his local businesses 
and lobbies with the 
ministry of Agriculture 
for the right quarantine 
measures. 
“I have always been a 
mayor with a local focus. 
The Ministry explained 
what needed to be done. 
I supported them, but 
they told their part of 
the story.”
“I operated as a mayor 
who builds bridges 
between the ratio 
of the ministry and 
EU regulations, and 
the emotion of the 
nurseries.”
“I visited a lot of 
nurseries. To lend a 
listening ear. But also 
with ordinary people, 
who also had to remove 
trees and plants. When 
you have to remove 
the birth tree that was 
planted on the day you 
were born, it sets off a lot 
of emotions in the family. 
I had never realized this 
before.”
An outbreak of a 
beetle in an area full of 
nurseries. The Dutch 
Plant Health Association 
implements a 2 km 
quarantine zone.
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earthquake in Haiti 
on community of 
Niedorp
Yes (3) Low High
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operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“The couple was 
actively involved in the 
local community. We 
decided, together with 
the family, to organize a 
remembrance ceremony. 
Almost 600 people 
attended.”
“People expect 
‘something’ from their 
mayor, especially when 




look at their mayor. They 
wait for the mayor’s 
response.”
“There are two sides. The 
emotional impact and 
the more practical needs. 
We can support people 
with both.” 
“As a mayor, you can get 
things in motion. They 
will follow you, after 
you take the first step. 
As a mayor, you have 
to anticipate on such 
actions.” 
“We organized the 
gathering on behalf of 
the family.”
A remembrance 
gathering was preferred 
to a silent march. 
“In the remembrance 
gathering, close friends 
and families were 
surrounded by a wider 
circle of people from 
our town. That little 
detail made sure it was 
manageable for the 
family.”
“I spoke during the 
remembrance gathering. 
I referred to the many 
friends the couple had 
made during the three 
years they lived in our 
community.” 
“I visited the 
grandparents of the 
couple who died. We 
supported them in their 
material needs. We also 
discussed what was 
collectively needed.” 
“Many people find it 
difficult to be in the 
center of all collective 
attention. We managed 
to create a combination 
of collective mourning 
and their personal more 
intimate mourning as 
a family. It is our duty 
to take care of that 
process.”
No remarks on the role of 
the media.
A family from Niedorp 
visits Haiti to adopt 
a child, when the 
earthquake strikes. They 
died in the disaster.
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20100308
Meijerman
Fire with casualties 
among firemen in 
Veendam





Fatal shooting in a 
shopping mall Alphen 
aan den Rijn28
Yes (7) Low High
27 Based on his own memoires in Eenhoorn, Herman Bastiaan. ´Drie minuten...:
 een persoonlijk relaas over het schietdrama in Alphen aan den Rijn´. Kluwer, 
 Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011.
28 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alphen_aan_den_Rijn_shopping_mall_shooting
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operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
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Based on earlier 
experiences in De Punt 
(Kosmeijer/Rijpstra), the 
municipality involves the 
family in the organization 
of the remembrance. In 
the memorial service, 
the mayor explicitly pays 
attention to the position 
of the family members.
“I wanted to keep the 
situation as small as 
possible and as large as 
needed.”
“People expect you to 
take the lead. Show who 
takes the decisions and 
who is in charge.”
Mayor visits fire brigade 
to join them in mourning. 
In the aftermath, the 
mayor emphasizes the 
need to coordinate 
evaluations and 
investigations, in order 
to lighten the pressure 
of research committees 
on the firemen who were 
at the scene when their 
colleague died.
“Advisors emphasize the 
role of ‘citizen father’, 
although it is not the only 
role. In the end, a mayor 
is chairing a crisis team 
as well, with all his own 
legal responsibilities. 
In other words, being a 
mayor is more than being 
a citizen father alone.”
Mayor joins the fire 
fighter’s wife to jointly 
tell the terrible news 
of his death to their 
children. 
“It was a funeral with full 
honors, but in line with 
the preferences of the 
family.”
A press conference was 
set up in the morning, 
where news about 
the fatal incident is 
confirmed. 
A fire fighter is killed in a 
fire caused by arson. 
“During crises, crisis 
communication is even 
more important than 
crisis management.”
“People responded 
by saying that they 
regained their trust in 
government.” 
”Even when you are 
emotional yourself, 
people expect you to take 
the lead.” 
”I tried to balance taking 
care, caring for the 
families and supporting 
them in their grief.”
“We had a national 
memorial. I believe it was 
a good thing to do, as it 
showed that many, many 
people supported the 
victims.”
“I attended several 
funerals.”
“Our communications 
strategy consisted of: 
we care, we act and we 
provide perspective.”
“I visited the parents of 
the gunman. In a certain 
way, they were victimized 
as well. I understand 
that people got angry 
with the parents of the 
gunman. In the end, it 
was them who raised 
him. But they have done 
as much as they could. 
They could not prevent 
the shooting.” 
“We also facilitated 
talks with the people 
from the neighborhood 
and the parents [of the 
shooter]. Just to ease the 
situation.”
Shooting by a young 
gunman who lived in 
Alphen aan den Rijn. 
Parents live in the same 
town. 
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20100414
Hafkamp





Murder case in 
Ruinen
Yes (1) Low High
20100702
Verhoeven
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operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
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“We had to evacuate 
the area, because it was 
unclear how the fire 
would develop. In my 
role as a mayor, I needed 
to convince people to 
leave their houses and 
that the area would be 
protected.”
”Many people were really 
concerned about the 
impact on the nature of 
the dunes. ”
”We organized a meeting 
a couple of days after 
the fire. It enabled us 
to explain the measures 
we had taken and why it 
had been necessary to 
evacuate. We were able 




because we tend to 
believe that it is a case of 
arson. ”
A fire in the sand dune 
area near Schoorl and 
Bergen destroys 150 
hectares of typical dune 
landscape.
The fire is an eminent 
threat on the village.
“We assessed how the 
village would react to the 
fact that the murder case 
appeared to be solved 
after 17 years”. 
“We decided to organize 
a meeting. People were 
relieved the case was 
finally solved.”
“Everyone was in 
solidarity with the 
parents. We realized 
we were relieved on 
the one hand, but were 
in tears as well. That is 
what I shared with the 
community during the 
meeting we had.”
“I contacted the parents 
of Andrea, the girl who 
was murdered in 1993, 
just before the general 
meeting. I asked for their 
permission to organize 
this session and they 
believed it was the right 
thing to do, indeed.”
“During those 
conversations, you realize 
what it means to be 
a mayor. You not only 
express your personal 
emotions, but represent 
an entire community.”
“In our press conference, 
the Public Prosecutor 
explained what had 
happened. I focused 
primarily on the impact 
on the community.” 
Man was arrested on 
suspicion of the murder 
of a well-known local girl 
in 1993.
“I should have talked to 
the news station earlier 
on, in order to inform the 
residents on what was 
going on and what the 
emergency workers and 
crisis team were doing.”
No evacuation order for 
citizens, which resulted 
in relatively small impact 
on society.
The people were mostly 
curious and wanted to 
see the damage with 
their own eyes. 
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20100806
Ravestein
Death of several 
babies in 
Nij Beets
Yes (4) Low High
201010 (October 2010) 
Broertjes
Preventive measures 
for outbreak of 
Q-fever in Beilen
No Low Low
201109 (Autumn 2011) 
Slinkman
Martens in Tolkamer No Low Low
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making towards 
individuals (victims and 
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“I had similar questions 
as the residents, mainly 
“what had happened?”
“We wanted to enable 
residents to ask 
questions. How was this 
possible? Why did no 
one notice? People were 
just astonished that this 
had happened. People 
were saddened, but not 
angry. Disbelieve was the 
overwhelming emotion. 
People were just 
supportive to both the 
mother and her family.”
“We organized a 
gathering and delivered a 
leaflet door-to-door. The 
gathering enabled people 
to ask their questions and 
share emotions. Victim 
Support Netherlands 
attended the meeting 
as well.”
“We made posters with 
the phone numbers 
people could call for 
psychosocial care and 
displayed them in public 
places.”
Neighbors and the 
community helped to 
dispose the flowers in 
front of the house where 
the babies were found.
“I was in contact with 
the family of the mother 
involved, knowing their 
amazing circumstances. 
When people appreciate 
my company, I’ll be there 
for them.”
Media came to the small 
town of Nij Beets. News 
stations interviewed 
the mayor on what 
had happened and her 
experiences with the 
community gathering.
“I could have chosen to 
join national television 
shows, but I felt my 
support was needed 
in the community. The 
community was my first 
priority.”
A woman has been 
arrested on suspicion of 
killing four of her babies 
and hiding them in 
suitcases in the attic. 
Schools and residents 
were supported with 
psychosocial care.
“I wanted to be there 
for the people, lend a 
listening ear. People are 
not only angry and full 
of grief, but have many 
questions as well.”
“As long as there was no 
fear among the general 
public, there was no need 
to organize a gathering.”
“I visited the farmers 
who were hurt by the 
outbreak of Q-fever.”
“I was a farmer myself. 
As a mayor, however, I 
also had to comply with 
the guidelines from the 
national government. 
The farmers accepted my 
difficult position.”
“Media wanted to take 
pictures at the affected 
farms. We managed 
to keep them away 
whenever farmers were 
against this.” 
Disease among goats. 
Apart from the farms 
involved, the general 
impact in this area was 
small.
“Martens built their nests 
in a primary school. The 
pupils had to move to 
an alternative location. 
I supported the school 
at the meeting they 
organized for the parents. 
It was clear there was no 
alternative.”
“I supported the 
population in their quest 
against the martens. It is 
a difficult situation, since 
martens are a protected 
species. But they become 
s nuisance. I became the 
spokesperson for the 
population and tried to 
solve the situation.”
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Description of event People died? Y/N 
20120313
Van de Vondervoort
Fatal bus incident 
with children in 
Switzerland29
Yes (28) Low High
201205 (May 2008) 
Kompier
Protest in a camp 
of approximately 
300 asylum 
seekers outside Ter 
Apel refugee centre
No High. The mayor was 
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“The Belgian government 
was involved, but almost 
silently. They did what 
was needed to do, in the 
interest of the parents, 
brothers and sisters. 
It is something we can 
learn from our Belgian 
colleagues: 
How can we approach 
a crisis from a human 
perspective, without 
being guided by the 
interests of the media, 
our own reputational 
interests nor the threat 
of being held accountable 
afterwards.”
“The municipality of 
Lommel organized a 
collective remembrance 
gathering. The Dutch 
crown prince attended 
the gathering as well. 
They managed to balance 
the collective aspect with 
the human dimension. It 
was tailored to people’s 
needs.”
“I was in contact with 
the family of the girl who 
was most likely killed in 
the accident. I also was in 
contact with the school, 
fire brigade, police and 
the embassy.”
“Due to the international 
dimension of the crisis, 
we tried to solve any 
bureaucratic issues as 
smoothly as possible.”
“In my visit to the parents 
and grandparents, I 
shared my condolences 
on behalf of the 
community.”
Dutch press attended 
the press conference in 
Belgium. According to 
the mayor, they behaved 
differently from their 
Belgian counterparts. 
Less emotion, and 
chasing for accountability 
and responsibility.
A bus carrying school 
teachers and pupils 
crashed into a wall 
in the Sierre Tunnel 
in Switzerland. Most 
children were from 
a school in Lommel 
(Belgium), close to the 
Dutch border. One girl 
lived in The Netherlands 
in the community of 
Bergeijk.
Mayor was in contact 
with spokespersons of 
group of Iranian and 
Somali refugees. Visited 
camp site several times, 
but mostly from a public 
order perspective.
Media came to camp site, 
interviewed refugees and 
recorded the dismantling 
of the camp.
Iranian and Somali 
asylum seekers wanted 
immigration minister 
Leers to re-examine their 
cases.
People from own 
community were not 
affected; took many 
decisions, but hardly any 
as citizen mother.
The mayor was not so 
much the citizen mother, 
but rather a ‘figure 
head’ or spokesperson 
on behalf of the crisis 
operation. 
The crisis had no impact 
on the citizens of her own 
community.
People organized a silent 
march in remembrance 
of the humpback whale, 
which had ultimately 
died. 
Media wanted to report 
on the whale, but they 
were not allowed to film. 
Only one camera team 
was allowed to record 
the event. It led to some 
uproar among journalists.
A humpback whale 
strands on a sand bank 
near Texel. The beach 
is cordoned off. The 
mayor was responsible 
for managing the 















Description of event People died? Y/N 
20130101
Waanders
Fatal accident at New 
Year bonfire in Raard
Yes (1) Low High
20140521
Gerbrandy
Death of a girl during 
sporting event Twijzel





Impact of MH17 
on community of 
Neerkant
Yes (6) Low High
30 Based on his contribution to remembrance book by Slachtofferhulp Nederland, Smilde, Miek. 
‘Er is geen draaiboek voor verdriet – de ramp met vlucht MH17´. 
Slachtofferhulp Nederland, Utrecht, 2016.
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How mayors deliver on meaning making Role of media [General remarks by 
author]
Defining the mayor’s 
role and considerations 
on aspects of meaning 
making
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards the 
collective audience 
(public speaking & 
remembrance)
How did the mayor 
operationalize meaning 
making towards 
individuals (victims and 
their families)
“The community showed 
its resilience. Everyone 
was trying to help. We 
set up a meeting, in order 
to share emotions and 
answer the questions 
people had. Most of them 
were just shocked about 
what had happened.”
“We took the initiative to 
set up a plan for aftercare. 
Together with the school, 
psychosocial care, and the 
police we discussed what 
was needed. We provided 
aftercare, without insisting 
people should use it.”
“We set up an e-mail 
correspondence, in order 
to update everyone when 
necessary.”
“The community realized 
that it was not the car 
driver´s fault either. She 
had not taken any alcohol. 
She was just blinded by 
the fire. On behalf of the 
community, I contacted 
her and expressed 
the feelings of the 
community.”
“We had several press 
conferences. We also 
politely asked the media 
to keep distance from the 
church, where we had 
a memorial service one 
week after the accident. 
They respected our 
request.” 
“The press did not chase 
people who were not 
willing to talk to the 
media.”
Around 40 people were 
watching the New Year 
bonfire when the car 
drove into them. One 
man dies.
”In every [crisis] training 
they teach you to stay 
away from the scene of 
the disaster. But I went 
there, because I wanted to 
show my compassion. In 
as far as possible, I wanted 
to help them.”
”The mayor visits the 
sporting facilities, but also 
the schools involved.”
”I did not realize during 
the day, but the crisis had 
a tremendous impact on 
our own people. They 
were parents and many 
of them volunteered at 
the sporting event when 
the roof collapsed. Many 
people at the City Hall 
are part of the same local 
community. It leaves its 
mark on them.”
The mayor visits the 
parents several times. 
According to the mayor, 
the relationship between 
him and the family is 
difficult from time to time, 
as the municipality is the 
owner of the dug out 
and is responsible for its 
maintenance.
”We organized a 
press conference to 
update them on the 
developments. ”
A 10-year old girl passed 
away after the roof of 
a dug out on a sports 
field collapsed. The girl 
dies from her injuries in 
hospital.
“We were all in dismay. 
But those are also the 
moments a community 
shows its strength. The 
people in the entire 
country shared their 
sorrow after we had had 
our first shock to what had 
happened.”
“As a mayor, I look 
back with pride and am 
satisfied with the way in 
which we managed to 
cope with the tragedy. We 
managed to stay together, 
help each other and 
incorporate the family in 
our community and our 
hearts.
“We shared our sorrow 
and listened to each 
other.” 
A committee of residents 
took the initiative for a 
remembrance meeting.
Furthermore, the 
community set up a 
monument in our town. 
Consisting of six benches, 
representing the six 
members of the Wals 
family who had died in the 
incident. 
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This study assesses the complexity experienced by public leaders in times of crisis. We 
examined the influence of collective impact and political responsibility on the perceived 
complexity of crisis-related decisions. For this purpose, we used a computerized vignette 
study. The simulation contained four real-life crisis situations, each presenting four 
dilemmas with differing levels of collective impact and political responsibility. Dutch 
mayors (n=135) rated the perceived complexity of these 16 dilemmas. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, perceived complexity was neither associated with collective impact and 
political responsibility levels, nor with age, gender or time in office. Instead, the results 
showed that as soon as it became more difficult to take the interests of all citizens, 
network partners and other stakeholders into account, mayoral decision making became 
increasingly complicated as well. Thus, what mayors consider complex appears to be 
related to challenges in crisis communication. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Existing research on decision making in public environments tends to focus on the 
context of policy decisions (Avellanda 2013). In response, this study seeks to attain a 
better understanding of the complexity of public leadership during a crisis, a type of 
event that occurs in complex contexts under extreme conditions. The overall objective 
is to uncover key phenomena and relations that threaten stakeholders’ expectancies 
(Coombs 2015) but that might not otherwise be revealed (Haerem et al. 2011). When 
crises such as airplane crashes, hurricanes, terrorist acts or floods occur, public leaders 
must make decisions on issues that they do not encounter on a daily basis (Boin, ‘t Hart, 
Stern, and Sundelius 2016), and do so within a context of time pressure, uncertainty, and 
necessary coordination with other actors (Ansell, Boin, and ‘t Hart 2014). Meanwhile, 
context requires public leaders to “read” the situation in order to adapt their standard 
or preferred leadership style to one appropriate to the specific crisis (De Vries 2016).
According to Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997), complexity is defined by contradictions 
both within and beyond the crisis team, where advisors and stakeholders share divergent 
perceptions, interpretations, and interests, which may create difficulties given the need for 
resolute and effective responses to a severe threat (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1997). Christensen 
et al. (2016) present this as a mixed order within and between partly conflicting capacity 
dimensions, such as between horizontal and vertical coordination; between delivery capacity 
and analytical capacity; between various legitimacy dimensions such as input (resources), 
throughput (procedures), and output (results); and between capacity and legitimacy. Although 
complexity research is evolving in promising directions, current insights tend to focus on the 
organizational level, and research on complexity is fragmented with regard to public leadership 
specifically (Crosby 2018). The organizational level poses unique challenges, yet complexity is 
not restricted to the government agencies involved. Rather, public leaders also face particular 
challenges, as they may need to overcome institutional dilemmas on a personal level. Their 
decisions may depend on personal preferences, as decision-making styles can be related to 
specific differences in social orientation (Geisler and Allwood 2018). 
Ultimately, a public leader’s personal deliberations in times of crisis are close to 
what United States President Truman once popularized: “The buck stops here.” This 
study is guided by Truman’s remark about dealing with dilemmas and accepting ultimate 
responsibility for the decisions that need to be made. The term “dilemma” refers to a 
“tension such as that each competing alternative [of the dilemma] poses clear advantages 
and disadvantages” (Smith and Lewis, 2011, 396). 
Given that public leaders are supposed to make strategic decisions, and the study 
of public administration in general should aim to analyze how public administrators 
make decisions in the face of dilemmas (O’Kelly and Dubnick 2006), this study takes the 
complexity of crisis-related dilemmas on a personal level as the central perspective. It 
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seeks to provide an insight into the ways in which public leadership changes when the 
context moves from simplicity to complexity (Vogel and Masal 2015). As it is likely that 
some decisions are perceived as less complex than others, the following research question 
is posed in order to tackle the complexity associated with Truman’s statement about 
responsibility during a crisis: Under what crisis-related circumstances do public leaders 
value their ultimate and personal responsibility for decisions as complex?
2. HYPOTHESES
Whereas a relatively simple context may require only a straightforward response, a more 
complicated context like a crisis requires expertise to judge the potential effects of choices 
(Snowden and Boone 2007). Expertise can be built throughout a career, bringing us to 
our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): When confronted with crisis-related decisions, public leaders 
who are older, have spent more years in office and govern a relatively large municipality 
perceive their decisions in crisis situations as less complex compared to their counterparts.
Earlier studies have demonstrated that public leaders are subject to conflicting 
interests across the people and stakeholders they serve (Jong and Dückers 2018; 
Resodihardjo and Carroll 2018). Indeed, public leaders may find themselves in conflicting 
situations such as the European migration crisis or public order issues in Charlottesville 
and Ferguson, as well as in everyday small-scale incidents that receive less media attention 
but necessitate similar forms of leadership. As an example, following a crisis, a group of 
citizens may seek to hold a memorial gathering without the support of the next of kin or 
other groups within the municipality. One of the tasks of public leaders is to balance such 
needs on a societal level on the one hand, and the expectations of the people involved 
on the other (Jong and Duckers 2018). This brings us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Public leaders consider decision making in a context of high 
collective impact more complex than decisions with low collective impact, as the potential 
for conflicting interests within society increases.
Crises challenge the competence of the institutional guardians of security, i.e., the 
state and its political-administrative leadership (‘t Hart and Boin, 2001). Various case 
studies demonstrate that the aftermath of a crisis typically presents leaders with new 
and complex challenges that may threaten their political survival (Ansell, Boin, and ‘t 
Hart 2014; Schmidt 2019). When taking potential political accountability into account, 
this brings us to our third and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Public leaders consider decision making in a context of high political 
responsibility more complex than decisions with low political responsibility.
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3. METHOD
In order to assess the perceived complexity of decision making, we use the Public 
Meaning-Making Model developed by Jong (2017). This model defines four different roles 
in meaning making, contingent on the collective impact of a crisis (H2) and the political 
responsibility of the public leader (H3). These dimensions are potentially important 
drivers of complexity, as described in the hypothesis. 
In his model, Jong (2017) defines the roles of the public leader as a mourner-in-chief, 
buddy, advocate or orchestrator. As a mourner-in-chief, mayors are expected to deliver 
on meaning making by attending public memorial services and community activities. As 
a buddy, the role of the mayor is similar, but (s)he primarily focuses on meaning making 
toward affected groups rather than on society as a whole. The advocate uses meaning 
making to speak on behalf of citizens, presents him/herself as their spokesperson or 
lobbyist, and puts pressure on other stakeholders to solve the crisis at hand. Finally, the 
orchestrator is faced with a high collective display of emotions, while his/her perceived 
responsibility for the (cause of the) crisis is considerable as well. 
When applied to the framework presented (Jong 2017), one might expect that in 
situations in which the perceived, collective and emotional impact of a situation (H2) 
and/or the perceived political responsibility attributed to the public leader are high (H3), 
crisis-related decisions will be experienced as more complex. This is particularly true in 
the case of the orchestrator, as the public leader must negotiate both a high collective 
impact and substantial attributed (political) responsibility.
Vignette study
A computerized vignette study with four crisis-related scenarios was used to test our 
hypotheses. The study made use of the Mayor’s Game (Burgemeestersgame), a Dutch 
game that provides online strategic dilemma training for crisis management scenarios 
using a serious game format (van de Ven, Stubbé and Hrehovcsik 2014). Dilemmas for 
this simulation and previous scenarios are based or founded on real crisis situations in the 
Netherlands, which were shared by mayors in interviews and meetings with the Dutch 
Association of Mayors. This context is highly pertinent, as experimental studies are most 
compelling when they are tested in relevant environments (Druckman et al. 2006). In 
one of the early tests of the game with an actual target audience, participants indicated 
that the game afforded them the opportunity to practice responding to dilemmas and 
scenarios that they perceived as being true to their role and experience as policy makers 
(van de Ven, Stubbé and Hrehovcsik 2014).
In this experiment, scenarios and dilemmas were presented in a context in which one 
of the four meaning-making roles (mourner-in-chief, buddy, advocate, or orchestrator) is 
applicable. As an example, the mourner-in-chief scenario provides four dilemmas that are 
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all presented within a context of high collective impact and low political responsibility. 
In this particular case, the dilemmas were presented in a context in which the public 
leader had to make crisis-related decisions in the aftermath of a fatal car accident that 
was affecting his/her community. Participants played the game individually after logging 
in using a personal code. The game was played in Dutch, and approximately 30 minutes 
were required to complete the 16 dilemmas. Table 1 summarizes the roles, scenarios 
and dilemmas (for a complete overview of the 16 dilemmas we refer to table 4 and the 
translated scenario in appendix I). 
Within each scenario, participants received valuable but conflicting information and 
argumentations from virtual advisory team members (the crisis management advisor, 
the town clerk, the head of communications, and the police, as explained in figure 1) 
in order to simulate the varied perceptions of stakeholders, as mentioned by Rosenthal 
and Kouzmin (1997). Participants were free to ignore such input. Within each scenario, 
participants had to decide how to handle four dilemmas in a critical timeframe (with a 
total of 16 dilemmas). 
For the purpose of the present study, participants were recruited from among Dutch 
mayors to ensure that all respondents had personal experience in public leadership. 
Each participant played the same scenarios but in a random order. In order to answer 
hypothesis 1, data regarding age, gender, time spent in office and size of municipality 
were gathered from each participant. In terms of days in office, one’s entire career as 
mayor was considered, including service in previous municipalities. All mayors gave their 
informed consent.
Participants
All Dutch mayors (395) were invited to play the game online during the holiday period, 
between 13 July and 7 September 2017. Given that some mayors were in transition 
during this period, the number of mayors (395) exceeded the number of municipalities 
in the Netherlands (388). A total of 135 mayors participated in the game (34.2%). In the 
introduction to the scenarios, the participants were asked to pretend to be a mayor of a 
town of approximately 20,000 inhabitants, because most mayors began their careers in 
small towns and would therefore be able to relate to a settlement of this size. It should be 
acknowledged that experiences with the Mayor’s Game over the past 10 years indicate 
that all mayors find it rather easy to imagine that the decisions they are required to make 
are applicable to their current situation, even when their own municipality is larger than 
the town used in the gaming environment.
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TABLE 1: Roles, scenarios and dilemmas
Role Scenario Dilemmas in scenario
Mourner-in-chief (where 
public leaders attend 
public memorial services, 
community activities, 
and visit victims and their 
families). Contains dilemmas 
hockey 1 – 4.
Scenario hockey
Two youngsters die in a car 
accident. They are well-
known members of the local 
hockey club. The club holds a 
memorial to commemorate 
them. 
Dilemmas are based on the 
stance a mayor takes toward 
the sporting club. Does (s)he 
set up a public memorial or 
does (s)he just support the 
sporting club in their own 
grief. Also, the mayor is asked 
to what degree (s)he supports 
the youngster who caused 
the car crash. 
Orchestrator (bridging 
public, personal and political 
interests, anticipating the 
political aftermath).
Contains dilemmas riots 1 – 4.
Scenario riots
A thirty-year-old man from St 
Paul is killed by a police bullet. 
A demonstration against police 
violence is organized. According 
to protesters, policemen have a 
short fuse and shoot whenever 
there is the slightest criticism. 
Some protesters come from 
the neighborhood, while others 
join them from other parts of 
the country.
Dilemmas are based on 
the stance a mayor takes 
toward the family of the 
man killed by the police. 
Also, questions arise about 
the communicative impact 
of curfews and cancelling a 
friendly football match under 
these tense circumstances.
Buddy (meaning making 
towards affected sub-groups 
within society, as the impact 
of a crisis is only felt by a 
smaller community).
Contains dilemmas train 
1 – 4.
Scenario train
A local train crashes into a 
car with two German tourists 
and their three-year-old son. 
The son dies instantly. You 
are shocked when you hear 
the news from the police. It is 
the second deadly accident in 
three years.
Dilemmas are based on the 
involvement toward the 
tourist family and the owner 
of the camping site. Also, 
mayors are asked whether 
or not they would close 
down the dangerous railway 
crossing.
Advocate (public leader uses 
meaning making to speak 
on behalf of the citizens, 
presents himself as their 
spokesperson or lobbyist 
and puts pressure on other 
stakeholders).
Contains dilemmas power 
failure 1 – 4.
Scenario power failure
During winter, your town is hit 
by a major power failure. Due 
to a transformer explosion 
at a utility switching station, 
St Paul is expected to be left 
without power for a number 
of days. The failure occurs at a 
time when temperatures are 
close to freezing point during 
the day.
Dilemmas are based on 
media exposure and whether 
the mayor would appear 
on a television talk show, or 
alternatively stay at home and 
join his/her community. Also, 
the mayor is asked whether 
or not (s)he publicly expresses 
his/her disappointment in 
the director of the electricity 
company. 
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FIGURE 1. Translated example of dilemma ‘contact board’ in the scenario of mourner-in-chief
Measures
Once participants had solved a dilemma, they were asked to rate its complexity on a 
three-point scale (simple=-1, neutral=0, complex=1). 
Analysis
We first computed the complexity scores of the 16 dilemmas. Based on the results 
of the Shapiro-Francia test of normality, we concluded that the assumption of normality 
concerning the complexity score had not been violated. 
A series of regression analysis was conducted to assess the associations between 
collective impact and political responsibility on the one hand, and reported complexities 
on the other. In model 1 we first assessed the extent to which the characteristics of the 
mayors predicted reported complexity (Model 1). 
In model 2 we added predictor variables reflecting the y-axis (low vs. high collective 
impact) and x-axis (low vs. high political responsibility) of the Public Meaning-Making 
Model to test hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. To this end, a dummy variable was created 
to compare the average complexity of the eight high collective impact dilemmas with the 
eight low collective impact dilemmas. Similarly, a dummy was computed to compare the 
average complexity of the eight high political responsibility dilemmas with the eight low 
political responsibility dilemmas. 
In model 3, we combined model 1 with three dummy variables to compare the 
complexity scores of the dilemmas belonging to the buddy, the orchestrator and the 
advocate to the mourner-in-chief. This model enabled us to test hypothesis 3 and to 
ascertain whether certain contexts were deemed more complex than others. 
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The mourner-in-chief was randomly selected as a reference for the other three 
contexts. As an extra check in case a particular scenario turned out to be more 
complex, we decided to compare the four dilemma scores of that scenario with 
the other 12 dilemmas. Akin to the previous models, this was performed in a new 
model containing the characteristics of the mayors and a dummy for each of the 
four dilemmas belonging to the more complex scenario. This was because we did 
not want to misinterpret one or two dilemma effects for a scenario effect (model 4, 
if applicable). 
Finally, given that mayors’ reports on the complexity of the 16 dilemmas did 
not constitute independent responses, it was important to apply multilevel analysis. 
The 16x135=2160 dilemma complexity scores were nested in 135 mayors, rendering 
it meaningful and even necessary to verify whether differences in complexity were 
attributable to differences between mayors that were not directly measured. In the 
final model we took the multilevel structure of the data into account. 
A deviance test was used to compare each model with its predecessor; deviance can 
be regarded as a measure of lack of fit between model and data, with the larger the 
deviance (-2 loglikelihood; IGLS), the poorer the fit to the data. It is a tool to assess 
whether each subsequent model leads to a substantial reduction in deviance. All 
analyses were performed in Stata version 13 (StataCorp LP).
4. RESULTS
Participants
In our experiment, the average age of participants is 56 years (compared to 57 years 
for Dutch mayors in general), while 21% of participants are female (compared to 23% 
in general). Although age can be deemed an indication of personal life experience, 
experience of a participant as mayor (days in office) says more about the extent to 
which the respondents were familiar with a mayor’s role and institutional and social 
work setting. The size of a municipality can be connected to perceptions of complexity, 
because it is likely that mayors of larger municipalities are more regularly confronted 
with the dilemmas incorporated within the scenarios than are their colleagues in 
smaller communities. Furthermore, mayors in larger cities might have to deal more 
often with complex problems linked to every aspect of public life (including education, 
health care, infrastructure, economic development, livelihoods, and safety) than their 
colleagues from smaller municipalities.
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The average complexity score assigned by the mayors to the 16 dilemmas is -0.20 
(simple=-1, neutral=0, complex=1; IQR: 1; N = 2160). The characteristics of the mayors 
and intercorrelations are presented in table 2. Most of the participants are male 
(80%), and females have a lower number of days in office. The strongest association 
between variables is a negative correlation between year of birth and days in office 
(r=-.48; p<0.001).
Model testing
The results of the regression analyses are presented in table 3. According to model 
1, gender, age, days in office and number of inhabitants did not explain the reported 
complexity of the 16 dilemmas, and this effect remained the same in the four other 
models tested. 
The results of model 2 show that neither the distinction in political responsibility 
nor the distinction in collective impact affected mayors’ perceptions of complexity. 
Based on the deviance, test model 2 therefore does not appear to be a better model 
than model 1. 
The third model compares the complexity of the four scenarios. The buddy 
scenario seems to be perceived as more complex than the mourner-in-chief scenario, 
which is the scenario with the lowest average complexity score by far. The other 
scenarios are not significantly different in terms of complexity. However, model 3 
does not exhibit a better fit than model 2. 
TABLE 2. Distributional Information and Correlations 
Distributional information
N Mean Min-Max
Age (Year of birth) 135 1962 1981-1949
Gender (0 = men; 1 = women) 135 .21 0-1
Days in office 135 2766.82 22-10442
Inhabitants 135 30747.24 941-182304
Note. N = Number of responses, Min-Max = Minimum and maximum value, 
IQR = Inter-quartile range.
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001.
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Distributional information Correlations
IQR Age Gender Days in office Inhabitants
13 1
0 .03 1
3254 -.47*** -.22*** 1
19984 -0.02 0.12*** .19*** 1
Model 4 shows that the higher complexity of the buddy scenario is caused by dilemma 
7 [dilemma: closing the railroad crossing immediately]. This model has a significantly 
better model fit than the previous one (p < 0.001). The final model includes the 
hierarchical nesting of the data. The intra-class correlation of 12% indicates that 
some mayors, regardless of the nature of the dilemmas, consider them more complex 
than their colleagues. The variation at the mayor level is significant (p < 0.001). 
The multilevel model, or model 5 (2,160 dilemma complexity scores nested in 135 
mayors), is an improvement compared to the single-level version (p < 0.001). 
Table 4 presents the specific complexity scores of each dilemma, arranged according 
to their means (from high to low). On average, the complexity of the dilemmas 
ranges between -.44 and .10. Indeed, the mayors considered some of the dilemmas 
more complex than others. The columns on the right-hand side of table 4 show that 
participants’ decisions on what to do with the most complex dilemmas in terms of 
“YES” or “NO” ranged between 36% and 64% (dilemma 7), and 39% and 61% (dilemma 
15). In less complex dilemmas, the division between “YES” and “NO” answers varied 
between 97% and 3% (dilemma 12), and 42% and 58% (dilemmas 14 and 2). Thus, 
even in situations in which the participants deemed the dilemma less complex, the 
group was still divided on the most appropriate decision to make.
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TABLE 3. Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Perceived Complexity by Mayors 
Participating in Vignette Study
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
Average (intercept) 4.24 (4.58) 4.25 (4.58)
Age (year of birth) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Gender (women vs. men) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04)
Days in office <0.0001 (<0.0001) <0.0001 (<0.0001)
Inhabitants <0.0001 (<0.0001)) <0.0001 (<0.0001)
High (vs. low) responsibility - 0.01 (0.03)
High (vs. low) impact - -0.04 (0.03)
Scenario 2 (vs. 1) - -
Scenario 3 (vs. 1) - -
Scenario 4 (vs. 1) - -
Dilemma 5 (dummy) - -
Dilemma 6 (dummy) - -
Dilemma 7 (dummy) - -
Dilemma 8 (dummy) - -
Log likelihood -2421.3929 -2420.6525
Deviance test Reference p = 0.48
Notes: SE = Standard error 
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001.
Note: Five models are tested in sequential steps. The complexity of each dilemma as perceived by 
mayors is estimated: (1) with gender, age, days in office, and number of inhabitants as predictors, 
(2) model 1, while also considering the difference between high and low responsibility scenarios, 
and between high and low impact scenarios, (3) model 1, while also considering differences in 
complexity between the four scenarios (3 dummy variables; scenario 1 is point of reference), (4) 
model 1, while also considering differences between the dilemmas of the buddy scenario and 
the other dilemmas (4 dummy variables), and (5) model 4, including the multilevel structure in 
the data: 2,160 dilemma complexity scores are nested in 135 mayors.
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Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
4.19 (4.58) 4.22 (4.56) 4.22 (7.71)
-0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0,01 (0.07)
<0.0001 (<0.0001) <0.0001 (<0.0001) <0.0001 (<0.0001)






- -0.04 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06)
- 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.06)
- 0.30 (0.07)*** 0.30 (0.06)***
- -0.07 (0.07) -0.07 (0.06)
-2419.5587 -2409.5791 -2346.3992
p = 0.14 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
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TABLE 4. Mean Complexity Score and Percentage of Responses per Dilemma
Dilemma
7. Sub-scenario train (role: buddy). Close the railroad crossing immediately.
15. Sub-scenario riots (role: orchestrator). Cancel a planned soccer game.
11. Sub-scenario power (role: advocate). Express dissatisfaction with national news concerning 
the power provider’s broken promise to restore power supply on the same day. 
3. Sub-scenario hockey (role: mourner-in-chief). Continue with the commemoration on Friday 
despite a request from next of kin to postpone it by one day. 
4. Sub-scenario hockey (role: mourner-in-chief). Increase the municipality’s financial 
commemoration contribution. 
6. Sub-scenario train (role: buddy). Take measures to keep media away.
12. Sub-scenario power (role: advocate). Approve the safety region’s request to evaluate the 
crisis response. 
5. Sub-scenario train (role: buddy). Go to campsite on the same day to meet German family.
14. Sub-scenario riots (role: orchestrator). Order a ban on assembly to prevent potential riots.
16. Sub-scenario Riots (role: orchestrator). Participate in public clean-up activities initiated by 
local inhabitants.
9. Sub-scenario power (role: advocate). Accept invitation for late-night talk show on national 
television.
8. Sub-scenario train (role: buddy). Attend funeral in Germany on behalf of the community.
13. Sub-scenario riots (role: orchestrator). Visit family of victim on the same day.
10. Sub-scenario power (role: advocate). Visit agricultural companies in the neighborhood.
2. Sub-scenario hockey (role: mourner-in-chief). Invite hockey club to speak at commemoration 
ceremony.
1. Sub-scenario hockey (role: mourner-in-chief). Meet driver of fatal car crash in which two 
adolescents died.
Total
a ANOVA with Bonferroni Post Hoc Test * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. 
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Mean % Simple % Neutral % Complex Different from dilemmaa % Yes % No
0.10 22 45 33 1** 2** 5* 6* 8** 9** 10** 
12* 13** 14** 16**
36 64
0.09 24 44 33 1** 2** 5* 8** 9** 12* 
13** 14* 16*
39 61
0.04 28 39 33 1** 2* 10* 13* 57 43
-0.01 27 47 26 1** 21 79
-0.18 36 45 19 - 52 48
-0.20 37 46 17 - 29 71
-0.24 40 44 16 7* 15* 97 3
-0.24 47 30 23 7* 15* 88 12
-0.26 39 47 13 7** 15* 42 58
-0,26 42 41 16 7** 15* 67 33
-0.27 47 33 20 7** 15** 12 88 
-0.27 41 44 15 7** 15** 36 64
-0.29 47 34 19 7* 11* 15* 64 36
-0.30 46 38 16 7** 11* 15** 90 10
-0.30 41 47 11 7** 11* 15** 42 58
-0.44 55 35 10 3** 7**11** 15** 76 24
-0.20 39 41 20 52.97 47.03
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Complexity linked to age, years in office, gender or size of municipality (H1)?
Our multilevel study (model 5) shows that regardless of the nature of the dilemmas, 
as well as respondents’ age, years in office, gender or size of municipality, mayors had 
wide-ranging perceptions of the complexity of crisis-related dilemmas. Further study is 
necessary to clarify these findings, which may be explained by factors not included in our 
study, such as personal traits or political orientation.
The overall non-existence of a gender effect corroborates the findings of a previous 
study on American mayors under non-crisis-related circumstances (Ferreira and Gyourko 
2014). In contrast to most research on the influence of female leadership, Ferreira and 
Gyourko (2014) found no gender effect among American mayors on policy outcomes 
related to the size of local government, composition of municipal spending, (un)
employment, or crime rates. 
The fact that neither age nor days in office were related to the attributed complexity 
of dilemmas may seem counterintuitive. Again and again, mayors feel the burden to solve 
a crisis in a complex setting in which politicians, media, the public and other stakeholders 
exert pressure on the crisis team. Apparently, the public leaders in our experiment feel that 
“the buck stops here”. Even with more time in office, this perception does not fade away. 
Complexity linked to collective impact and responsibility (H2 and H3)?
Reflecting differences in collective impact and mayors’ responsibilities, our empirical study 
did not find significant relationships between the contexts in which crisis-related dilemmas 
were presented and the complexity of such dilemmas. Unlike hypotheses 2 and 3, complex 
dilemmas were not bound to one of the roles from the Public Meaning-Making Model. The 
scenario of the orchestrator was no more complex than the other three scenarios in our 
vignette study. As such, the current operationalization of dilemmas per scenario did not 
result in support for hypotheses 2 and 3. Generally speaking, scenarios with high collective 
impact are not necessarily experienced as more complex than scenarios with low collective 
impact, and an increase in (perceived) political responsibility does not axiomatically lead 
to an increase in perceived complexity. The meaning-making role of a public leader does 
not correlate with complexity of a dilemma as such. We also found that complexity is not 
equally distributed across the 16 dilemmas. Table 4 shows that the top three dilemmas in 
terms of complexity (dilemmas 7, 15 and 11) come from three different scenarios. 
Given that both hypotheses 2 and 3 are rejected, we can only conclude that complexity 
in decision making is not bound to specific circumstances in which the public leader 
presents him- or herself in the role of mourner-in-chief, buddy, advocate or orchestrator 
(Jong 2017). Rather, the findings merely show that any dilemma in any scenario can 
potentially be perceived as complex, regardless of the role, gender, days in office and 
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age of the public leader involved. In terms of citizens’ expectations, this might sound like 
a leadership paradox: contrary to the expectations of citizens concerning experienced 
leaders and their abilities to manage complexity, assessment of the experienced mayors 
did not differ from their more junior colleagues. In order to find a sound explanation for 
differences in complexity across the 16 dilemmas tested, the next paragraph discusses 
our findings regarding the single dilemmas from table 4.
Complexity linked to the nature of individual dilemmas? 
As the objective of our study was to understand under what crisis-related circumstances do 
public leaders perceive as complex their ultimate and personal responsibility for decision 
making, our final step is to analyze the findings presented in table 4. This table shows 
that the nature of the individual dilemmas matters in terms of complexity, regardless of 
the overall scenario to which they belong. Indeed, complex dilemmas can be part of any 
scenario. The devil is in the detail, so to speak: any single dilemma can present complexity 
to the crisis team. When the relative complexity of dilemmas is taken into account (table 
4, column 6), we are able to define three coherent groups of dilemmas.
From this approach, we come to the following insights:
Least complex crisis-related dilemmas. The least complex are dilemmas 1, 2, 10 and 
13. These dilemmas embody elements of empowerment. They comprise questions such 
as whether or not a mayor accepts a request to meet a driver who caused a fatal car 
accident, if (s)he wants to visit people who suffered from a crisis, or if (s)he contacts the 
board of the hockey club in order to propose speaking at a commemorative ceremony. 
Even though all of these dilemmas include aspects of meaning making, the answers to 
these dilemmas can be kept “behind the door of the crisis center” and thus limited to 
private meetings. The dilemmas demonstrate aspects of empowerment, as in most cases 
the mayor is asked to make decisions following up on citizens’ requests. The dilemmas 
touch upon a more psychosocial role of the mayor, who supports and cares about the 
emotional well-being of his or her citizens.
More complex crisis-related dilemmas. More complex are dilemmas that demand (or 
result in) a public appearance. Dilemmas with a complexity rating between -0.25 and 0 
are predominantly those requiring presence on the public stage, and therefore increase 
visibility in the political arena or the media. 
Most complex crisis-related dilemmas. The three most complex dilemmas stand beyond 
the previous categories. According to the participants, dilemmas 7, 11 and 15 are most 
complex, with an average rating between 0.04 and 0.10. They obligate the mayor to 
deliberately take a clear and public position in a crisis situation, preventing them from 
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agreeing with all stakeholders. The answers to these dilemmas can no longer be kept 
“behind the closed doors of the crisis center”. Regardless of the initial crisis situation, 
developments necessitate a decision with broader impact. The mayor is asked to use 
his/her position and professional influence, and to demonstrate decisiveness. Such crises 
may include publicly revealing a difficult relationship with a network partner, canceling 
a football match in the aftermath of a deadly stabbing, or closing down a dangerous 
railroad crossing following a fatal incident. These dilemmas share an overall theme: the 
decisions required make it hard to be “everyone’s mayor,” as they may lead to resistance 
from (part of the) citizens or network partners. Either some of one’s own population will 
oppose the decision (cancel a football match, close a dangerous railroad crossing), or 
network partners will disagree with the mayor on public remarks. Furthermore, these 
highly complex decisions all require aspects of directive leadership, where the public 
leader uses his/her legislative and emergency powers to decide irrespective of conflicting 
interests among stakeholders.
In more general terms, the findings suggest that within a given context, new mini-
crises can be triggered. A fatal incident with a tourist family on a railroad crossing demands 
a mayor who can act as a buddy toward the next of kin and the owner of a nearby 
camping site. However, the resulting decision to close the crossing triggers a new situation 
with a larger (collective) impact on the community as a whole, therefore necessitating a 
different communicative approach. The decision to close the railroad crossing cannot be 
kept hidden behind the doors of the crisis center. The public leader must face resistance 
from those citizens who do not agree with the closure.
Anticipation
Our findings raise the question of whether mayors should anticipate a potential shift in 
arenas, as different stakeholders might appear due to developments within the crisis 
context. Under such circumstances, crisis communication is not only about communicating 
the outcome of current decisions; it is also about contextualizing the crisis through suitable 
rhetoric, and anticipating the impacts of decisions on current and future stakeholders and 
groups within the society.
An appropriate response in terms of crisis communication is largely contingent on 
personal perceptions of the public leader and the choices (s)he makes. In the results 
we noted that participants do not produce unanimous answers to even the least 
complex dilemmas. Indeed, even in situations which the participants did not consider 
particularly complex, the group was divided in terms of most appropriate response. 
Apparently, the “right answer” is not clear-cut. Disagreement among mayors does 
not necessarily result in complexity, while unanimity does not automatically imply 
that dilemmas are simple.
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Explaining unpopular decisions
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that mayors regard decisions in which the impact to 
one specific group of stakeholders is greater than to other(s) as most complex. Clearly 
explaining unpopular decisions and still earning wide stakeholder support leads us 
to believe that decision making and crisis communication are intertwined processes. 
Contrary to Helsloot and Groenendaal’s (2017) suggestion, this implies that a public leader 
cannot be successful by “just being visible” and personally stating to the public that their 
shattered world will be healed. A successful leader needs to do more. (S)he must be 
able to convince stakeholders of the logic and reasoning behind a decision, even where 
it conflicts with the latter’s interests and beliefs. Although Helsloot and Groenendaal 
(2017) do not elaborate on this point, we believe that conveying decisions and their 
impacts to stakeholders is more successful when it addresses all of those involved. Merely 
“being visible” disregards the fact that some stakeholders might not be convinced. Under 
complex situations, other forms of appropriate ‘meaning making’ are required to explain 
and solve the crisis at hand.
We agree with Seeger (2006) that the importance of crisis communication is 
underestimated when it is regarded as a straightforward and tactical discipline that solely 
communicates the decisions made. The public leader’s choice of crisis communication 
strategy has more implications than just being “visible”, when used to raise support for 
complex decisions. Crisis communication is a central part of the decision-making process, 
as consequences in terms of loss of public confidence can be severe when complexity 
increases. 
Given the results of the experiment, it is possible to conclude that the question “can 
we explain our point of view?” actually stands at the core of the decision process itself, 
defining its complexity. Closing down a railroad crossing requires a public explanation, 
as citizens must take a longer, alternative road. Not closing down the railroad crossing 
asks for a public explanation as well, as the mayor takes a deliberate risk and must have 
a response ready in case another accident occurs. At the same time, the mayor might 
be hesitant to jump to conclusions, not wanting to close down a dangerous railroad 
crossing as long as it is unclear what caused the crisis. The same applies for the dilemma 
about the football match. Canceling an important match needs to be explained to 
citizens who support the teams. If the mayor decides against canceling the match, (s)he 
risks facing riots, which also demands a public explanation when things go wrong. Given 
that these decisions come down to the legislative powers of public leadership, public 
leaders must realize that it is always harder for leaders to gain stakeholder support in 
a crisis when they are somehow held responsible for the event (James and Wooten 
2005). From major crises like hostage takings, kidnappings and bombings, we know that 
decision makers anticipate the potential for future discussion in parliament or the city 
council (Muller 1994). In parallel, the complexity of the two most complex dilemmas 
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(railroad track, football match) is not restricted to the decision itself. Rather, part of 
the complexity can be explained in anticipation of a secondary question: “Can we also 
explain when things eventually go wrong in the near future, despite the decision taken 
here and now?”
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
Our experiment shows that perceived complexity for public leaders in crisis management 
is not restricted to large crises and disasters. Indeed, complexity can be found in relatively 
small, local incidents as well, rather than only mega-crises such as airplane crashes, 
hurricanes, terrorist attacks or floods. This implies that in order to avoid complex decisions 
being uniquely associated with large-scale crises, training programs or simulations on 
crisis management should also include small-scale scenarios with different levels of 
collective impact and political responsibility. While the stages of learning and evaluation 
judge public leaders who carefully deliberate on which decisions to make in situations of 
large-scale crises (Boin, Kuipers, and Overdijk 2013), the complexity of decisions in small 
crises should not be overlooked.
With regard to crisis communication as a discipline and meaning making as a specific 
field of interest, more attention should be given to the most complex situations in which 
stakeholders do not axiomatically adopt the decisions made by a governmental crisis team. 
As our study suggests, communication is required to gain public confidence and to be 
“everyone’s mayor” under complex circumstances. Public leaders need to communicate 
with citizens, network partners, the media and other stakeholders to underscore the 
fact that the government is accountable and “fully in charge” (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, and 
Sundelius 2016; Griffin-Padgett and Allison 2010; Pinkert et al. 2007). Especially under 
crisis situations, attributes such as charisma and inspiration appear to be important (Davis 
and Gardner 2012; de Bussy and Paterson 2012; Oc 2017) in order to convincingly utilize 
the communicative aspects of public leadership.
Crisis management and crisis communication should incorporate the concept of 
procedural justice (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996; Sunshine and Tyler 2003), briefly 
defined as the perceived fairness of a process. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) have used 
procedural justice in the context of police legitimacy. Certainly, if the public judges 
that the police exercise their authority via fair procedures, it will view the police as 
legitimate even in cases when it disagrees with the outcome of the decision. However, 
if they experience unfairness in the application of authority, the results will include 
alienation, defiance, and noncooperation (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Within the context 
of crisis decision making, public leaders should not only communicate the outcome 
of the decision making process, but also explain why these measures are necessary 
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given the complexity of the particular dilemmas they are facing. Such an approach is 
congruent with that of Helsloot and Schmidt (2012), who argue that citizens are far 
more reasonable in their risk perceptions than expected, especially when asked to 
decide as a public administrator.
7. DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research might confirm whether public leaders integrate the question “can 
we explain our point of view?” in their decision-making processes during crises. 
Further research may also shed light on the usefulness of “procedural justice” as a 
practical heuristic to overcome complex decisions, by incorporating the fairness of 
procedures in public leaders’ meaning making efforts. This would involve a form of 
meaning making in which public leaders – besides explaining the rationale behind 
a decision – (a) exhibit their awareness of the emotional impact of their decisions 
(psychosocial crisis management at the strategic level); and (b) explain that they are 
aware of the possible negative implications for their citizens and network partners. 
The value of this kind of meaning making might be equally relevant in situations 
where crisis management and public policy tend to become intertwined, such as 
in the aforementioned public debates pertaining to the migration crisis in Europe 
and racial tensions in the United States. Future research should expand experiments 
with meaning making to these and other public leadership contexts. A deeper 
examination of resemblances and differences in public leadership in crisis and non-
crisis circumstances might also enrich our insights regarding the contextual complexity 
of public leadership as a whole.
8. LIMITATIONS
The main limitation of this study is that participants were not able to share their 
private perspectives of the findings. Indeed, there was no space for them to explain 
their deliberations while playing the game and before making their decisions, or to 
clarify their ratings on complexity. Greater insight into such deliberations may thus 
have enriched our study. Furthermore, even though the dilemmas can be regarded 
as “realistic” and the scenarios were based on real-life experiences, mayoral behavior 
under real crisis situations might be influenced by processes beyond the scope 
of our study. Finally, even though the sample of participants can be regarded as 
representative of Dutch mayors, further research is required to confirm the findings 
for public leaders outside the Netherlands. In this study, mayors were asked to rate 
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perceived complexity on a single three-point Likert scale. We chose this scale to 
minimize mayors’ potential burden and to optimize participation and response. 
However, further research should utilize scales with multiple terms in order to 
improve the reliability of the results. 
9. CONCLUSION
The simulation study’s findings indicate that public leaders’ perceptions of the complexity 
of decisions during and following crises vary. Even in situations where the participants 
considered a dilemma fairly simple, the participants were divided on the most appropriate 
decision. Furthermore, the study has revealed that there was no relationship between 
perceived complexity and collective impact, political responsibility, age, gender or time 
in office. The results suggest that mayoral decisions become increasingly complex when 
a mayor is no longer seen as “everyone’s mayor” and must make decisions that are not 
favorable to all citizens and network partners. 
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Appendix I - Translated scenario with 16 dilemmas
Mourner in chief (High collective emotion, low responsibility)
It is a Thursday night during winter in St. Paul. Two young people, aged eighteen and 
nineteen, are killed in a serious car accident. Two others, who were in the same car, get 
off without injuries. One of them was the driver during the fatal accident. Emergency 
responders at the scene are horrified.
The four youngsters were born and raised in your municipality. They were also active 
members of the local hockey club. There is an enormous level of grief at the hockey club.
The boy, who drove during the accident and survived, seems to have made some 
statements in the hospital. Apparently, he said that he suffered from long-standing 
psychological problems. He is currently being chased by various media who want to 
discuss these allegations. Friends and family in St. Paul are also chased by media.
He calls your secretary and asks for an appointment at town hall, no later than 
tomorrow. He wants to discuss the situation with the mayor. Your secretary presents this 
request to you.
Dilemma 1
Do you re-schedule your diary in order to meet him?
Advice:
· Crisis Management Advisor: You are everyones mayor, including the driver. You 
cannot refuse his request. (YES)
· Town Clerk: You can ask the media to keep some distance, but I do not believe it is 
necessary to meet him in person. (NO)
· Communication Advisor: The driver did not want this accident either. He plays a role 
in the story as well. It is your job to listen to everyone involved in this terrible incident. 
(YES)
· Police: The driver might not be in jail, but we still regard him as a suspect. It would 
be premature to talk to him tomorrow. (NO)
The hockey club starts organizing a major memorial service. The hockey club uses 
volunteers from their various internal committees to set up a beautiful, dignified gathering 
to mourn and remember. At this time you have not yet received a request from the board 
of the hockey club to speak at that service too.
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Dilemma 2
Do you contact the board to offer to speak?
Advice:
· Crisis Management Advisor: By offering the hockey club to speak at the service, you 
can emphasize that the impact of the accident is larger than just the hockey club. 
(YES)
· Town Clerk: Wait for their request. This memorial service is not your responsibility. 
(NO)
· Communication Advisor: The impact on our citizens is high. These are the moments 
a mayor should be there for his fellow citizens. (YES)
· Police: So far, it is still unclear what happened. I would advise to keep some distance. 
(NO)
In the meantime, the municipality supports the hockey club in organizing the memorial 
service. You agreed to conduct the service on Friday. It is the best option, because it 
won’t interfere with a very important protest against a proposed municipal redivision. 
The protest is scheduled for Saturday. 
However, the family of one of the victims contacts you and asks to reschedule the 
memorial to Saturday. Otherwise, one of the family members who lives abroad won’t be 
able to join the gathering. 
Dilemma 3
Do you stick to your plan to conduct the memorial service on Friday, in order to have the 
scheduled protest on Saturday?
Advice:
· Crisis Management Advisor: We cannot ignore this request, if we believe the wishes 
of the family members are important. It would be a slap in the face if we stick to our 
own plan. (NO)
· Town Clerk: To organize the memorial service and the demonstration on the same 
day would be rather inappropriate. The demonstration is of great importance for the 
independence of our municipality. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: We are trying to take the family into account in the memorial. 
If family members are unable to join, it is a paradox I cannot explain to the media. 
(NO)
· Police: The family must realize that they do not have the exclusive ownership to the 
memorial service. We try to accommodate them, but rescheduling the demonstration 
presents far too many practical problems. (YES)
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The memorial service becomes increasingly bigger. It is clear that the two deceased boys 
were very much loved. They were seen as talented hockey players, not only at St. Paul’s 
hockey club but also in the wider region. Hundreds of people are expected to attend the 
memorial service. The expense is increasing accordingly.Traffic controllers are hired for 
the memorial service to manage the situation on the site. Also, a professional audiovisual 
company from St. Paul will make a video of the memorial service and takes care of sound 
and lighting in a professional way. The municipality promised to contribute up to 10,000 
euros to this memorial service to cover the expenses, with the assumption that the club 
itself will contribute another 5,000 euros.
As the plan of action takes shape, it becomes clear that the necessary budget 
increases towards 22,000 euros. The chairman of the hockey club calls you. He calls for 
your confirmation that the municipality can be depended upon for the remaining 7,000 
euros.
Dilemma 4
Do you stick to the earlier proposed contribution of 10,000 euros?
Advice:
· Crisis Management Advisor: If you resist, things will escalate and you will suffer from 
a long-lasting, distorted relationship with our citizens. (NO)
· Town Clerk: The municipality already provided a generous offer. Even though it is a 
memorial service, money does not grow on trees here in St. Paul. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: Necessity knows no law. I cannot explain it if in the case of 
these beloved boys we allow money to cause an issue. (NO)
· Police: What happened is very sad. However, what is wrong with a simple cup of 
coffee and a slice of cake? Nowadays, people get crazier ideas by the day. (YES)
Buddy (low collective emotion, low responsibility)
The summer season is important to the people in St. Paul. Camping Venzicht is located 
near a lake in St. Paul, bordering the woods. The campsite can be reached in two ways. 
The most frequently used is also the shortest route and consists of a sand path connecting 
the campsite to the village. This sand path crosses a railway line with an unguarded 
level crossing. Twice an hour, a local train to and from the neighboring town passes the 
crossing.
At the beginning of the summer season, things go wrong. On the crossing, a local train 
crashes into a car with two German tourists and their three-year-old son. The son dies 
instantly. The tourists are staying at Camping Venzicht. You are shocked when you hear 
the news from the police. It is the second deadly accident in three years’ time.
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Dilemma 5
Are you going to the campsite to speak with the German parents the same afternoon?
Advice:
· Crisis Management Advisor: The tourists lost their son. They are in a horrible situation. 
The least you can do is to show some compassion by visiting. (YES)
· Town Clerk: The campsite owner has been discussing this crossing with National 
Railways for years. If you go there, you will probably be forced to take sides in the 
discussions between National Railways and the campsite owner. One thing leads to 
another. (NO)
· Communication Advisor: It fits your role to visit. You show your support to the 
campsite owner and comfort the German family. The other guests are shocked. They 
will appreciate your presence as well. (YES)
· Police: The mayor has a completely different role in Germany. They will probably 
wonder why you visit them all of the sudden. Be realistic. There is very little you can 
do to them. (NO)
During the afternoon, more and more media visit the campsite. The owner asks if you 
can keep the media at a distance. He tells you that he and his guests do not appreciate 
their attention right now. They do not want to process the terrible events in the media 
spotlights.
Dilemma 6
Do you use your legislative powers to keep the media at a distance?
Advice:
· Crisis Management Advisor: You can declare an emergency ordinance. However, I 
doubt if it is proportional for the situation at hand. I do not think you look forward 
to yet another public reprimand, issued by some Law professor. (NO)
· Town Clerk: It is not in the interest of the campsite visitors to have the media present. 
Under the pretext of ‘free press,’ they only want to record tear-jerking stories. Give 
the guests time to process the accident and declare a media ban. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: The media have their own responsibility. You can appeal to 
that responsibility. A ban is too much. (NO)
· Police: Our spokesperson is present and can speak to the media. In addition, the 
police can close off the entire campsite. (YES)
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From your conversations with the campsite owner, it becomes clear that he has a great 
interest in keeping the crossing open. The alternative to the sand path is a three-kilometer-
long paved road with a guarded level crossing. That long, safe road is “bad for business,” 
as the owner of Camping Venzicht carefully puts it. According to him, it is unattractive 
for tourists to go to the village by the alternative road. At the same time, you are aware 
that this is the second fatal accident in a short period of time.
National Railways already told you that putting a guarded crossing in place is a two-
year process which costs 700,000 euros at least.
Dilemma 7:
Do you use your mayoral powers to close the crossing immediately?
Advice:
· Crisis Management Advisor: The campsite owner knows the local situation very well. 
If it really was that dangerous, he would not want to use that crossing either. (NO)
· Town Clerk: During crises, a well-known motto is “the crisis as an opportunity.” 
Enough is enough with these two fatal accidents in a short period of time. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: The media create the image that you suffer from a “risk 
regulation reflex”, asking for immediate measures while the actual risk is low. Apart 
from the two recent accidents, there has never been a problem the last ten years. 
(NO)
· Police: Do you know what is “bad for business” in St. Paul? More fatal accidents! That 
unguarded level crossing has to go. (YES)
After you showed your compassion with the parents of the deceased child, they inform 
you that they greatly appreciate your involvement. Therefore, they invite you to the 
funeral in the south of Germany.
Dilemma 8:
Are you going to the funeral in Germany on behalf of the municipality of St. Paul?
Yes = empowerment
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: I understand that the parents would have appreciated 
it, but a nice letter in which you wish them all the best should be sufficient. (NO)
· Town Clerk: I have children of that age as well. I cannot bear to think that this happens 
to me. But with all due respect to the parents, the south of Germany is quite a 
journey. We still have many issues to deal with before the summer recess begins. 
(NO)
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· Communication Advisor: If you want to send out a strong signal in lobbying to the 
National Railways, it may help you to share their grief and join them during the 
funeral. After all, you will make the plea to do something about the crossing on their 
behalf as well. (YES)
· Police: Imagine what it is like to lose your son on vacation. It must be a very traumatic 
experience for these people. The acknowledgment you bring with your presence is 
priceless. For you, it is a relatively small effort to attend the funeral. (YES)
Advocate (low impact, high responsibility)
During winter St. Paul is hit by a major power failure. Due to a transformer explosion at 
a utility switching station, St. Paul is expected to be left without power for a number of 
days. The municipality is located at the end of the electrical grid, which means that the 
power supply cannot be repaired quickly. The failure occurs at a time when temperatures 
are close to freezing point during the day.
The country shows empathy with the people in St. Paul. The people in St. Paul try to 
make the best of it. Everything centers around ‘neighborliness’, looking after each other 
in difficult times. Tonight, for instance, the people from St. Paul organize festivities with 
candles, flashlights, games and music. It gives you a sense of pride when you hear that 
your citizens are arranging these festivities.
You plan to visit these initiatives tonight, when you receive a request from a talk 
show host to come to the studio in Amsterdam that evening. You will be asked to discuss 
the situation in St. Paul during a live interview. The journey from St. Paul to Amsterdam 
is about one and a half hours.
Dilemma 9:
Are you going to join the talk show tonight?
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: Citizens are now organizing initiatives and your presence will 
be greatly appreciated. Choose for your own citizens, not for those of Amsterdam. (NO)
· Town Clerk: To strengthen the lobby that St. Paul’s position in the national electrical 
grid is too vulnerable, it may be good to join the talk show. Otherwise, St. Paul will 
never end up on the political agenda in parliament. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: It is always good to join a national talk show. The people 
here will appreciate it when they hear that their mayor was on national TV. They will 
probably watch the interview later. (YES)
· Police: The people in St. Paul cannot see the interview anyway, so I wonder why you 
should go there. You will be in a warm studio while you leave our elderly people in 
the cold. (NO)
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It is the second day of the power failure. It has been a long day. It is late and you actually 
prefer to go home to rest. However, your advisor proposes to visit a number of farmers 
who also suffer from the power failure. According to her, they will appreciate your 
involvement and compassion. Your estimate is that the visit will take at least one and a 
half hours.
Dilemma 10:
Are you going to visit the farmers?
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: I wonder whether the farmers will appreciate your visit. 
It might distract them, while they are trying to keep their business running with much 
effort. Do not get in their way. (NO)
· Town Clerk: The commitment you can show here can have a big, positive and long-
term impact. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: You are the mayor. Even though you are tired, it is your duty 
to visit them. (YES)
· Police: Are you not overreacting? It is a difficult situation, but no one is injured or 
killed. With your visit, the situation becomes bigger than it really is. The outage is 
highly inconvenient, but it is not a national disaster. (NO)
The power failure takes longer than expected. Earlier on, the power company indicated 
during a crisis team meeting that the power would be restored this afternoon. However, 
in the evening it becomes clear that the problems will not be solved overnight. St. Paul 
will face the third, dark night without power. You are more than fed up with the situation. 
The national TV news comes by for an interview and to ask you about the situation.
Dilemma 11:
Will you show your dissatisfaction with the broken promise of the power company in the 
Evening News?
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: The power company is doing its best. It is not wise to attack 
them publicly, while they are working very hard within their own crisis team. (NO)
· Town Clerk: You can clearly share your disappointment in the power company. They 
are the experts; they are supposed to supply St. Paul with power. If they do not, you 
have the right to be angry. Citizens will appreciate that. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: For the outside world, we must keep a united front. It does 
not help the case if we already start blaming each other during the crisis. (NO)
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· Police: The people in St. Paul are completely fed up with this crisis. The first day, it was 
still fun to have a candlelit dinner, but now everyone is longing for power. It is okay for 
you to express those feelings in a harsh statement about the power company. (YES)
By now the power supply has been restored. The town council, which meets one week 
later, will review the crisis. You are preparing this meeting with the Municipal Executive. 
The strategy is being determined. The Safety and Emergency Region has been involved 
in the response to the power failure last week and proposes to evaluate the crisis. Your 
Aldermen believe such an evaluation is waste of time and money. They do not expect that 
there will be much to learn from this crisis. The Aldermen prefer to return to business as 
usual as soon as possible.
Dilemma 12: 
Do you agree with the proposed evaluation of the Safety and Emergency Region?
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: We can learn from every crisis, even a power failure. St. 
Paul is duty-bound to evaluate a crisis of this magnitude. (YES)
· Town Clerk: The municipal organization is working overtime. We need to catch up on 
the backlog. That evaluation only takes extra time, while we are also dealing with the 
aftermath of the power failure. (NO)
· Communication Advisor: It is unwise to ignore a request from the Safety and 
Emergency Region. We will need the Safety and Emergency Region again in the 
future. (YES) 
· Police: We are going to evaluate while we already know the outcome. All reviews 
and investigation report share similar and well-known lessons. As we have electricity 
again, I prefer to focus on more useful matters. (NO)
Orchestrator (high collective emotion, high responsibility)
On a Wednesday afternoon in spring, a street fight in a residential area on the outskirts 
of St. Paul escalates. A resident is walking around with a gun. It is not the first time that 
tempers rise in this socially vulnerable neighborhood. A motorcycle police officer arrives 
at the scene and is forced to shoot the resident with the gun. The thirty-year-old man from 
St. Paul is killed by this police bullet. He was known to the police. Three months earlier, 
he was released after a prison sentence for a fatal robbery in the neighboring town.
That evening the situation in St. Paul is tense. A demonstration against police violence 
is organized. According to the protesters, policemen have a short fuse and shoot whenever 
there is the slightest criticism. Some protesters come from the neighborhood, others join 
them from other parts of the country.
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The victim’s family lives elsewhere in St. Paul. Are you visiting the victim’s family the 
same day?
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: The family can play an important role in preventing the 
situation from escalating any further. They can become a bridge between us and the 
rioters. (YES)
· Town Clerk: You are being held responsible for what the police do. They won’t support 
you. With a visit, there is nothing to gain, just to lose. (NO)
· Communication Advisor: If you are always talking about being the Mayor of everyone, 
you will also have to visit this family. They have lost their son and brother. (YES)
· Police: The family is more or less cut from the same cloth as the dead son. I do not 
believe it is wise to be seen with them. (NO)
Last night’s demonstration went well, but the atmosphere in the neighborhood is 
becoming increasingly tense. After a troubled night, you receive signals that again people 
will come to St. Paul to make themselves heard.
Dilemma 14:
Do you announce a ban on gatherings in order to prevent any new riots from happening?
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: A ban on gatherings is a very rigorous restriction of 
fundamental rights. I would try a less drastic way first. (NO)
· Town Clerk: I think the town council will support you if you put an end to this scum 
on our streets. Let it be clear that the government draws a hard line here. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: With a street ban, the local residents are punished for the 
behaviour of the external rioters. A ban works the wrong way. (NO)
· Police: A ban on gatherings works preventively. We support it. (YES)
For Friday evening, a friendly match is scheduled for the St. Paul football club. The club is high 
ranked in the amateur league and wants to prepare for their cup duel. The friendly match is 
between St. Paul’s local club and a sister club from Dylanshire in England. The shot man was a 
prominent supporter of the St. Paul club and often visited the matches of the sister club. The 
English sister club will bring about four hundred supporters to the training match. For some 
months, your Safety officer has been working with the police to guide that match properly, 
taking into account all risks involved. It looks like supporters will light quite some fireworks in 
and around the stadium in order to commemorate the shot man appropriately.
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Dilemma 15:
Do you prohibit the friendly match?
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: The football match can also work as a new start. If you 
allow it, then the neighborhood residents will probably get more sympathy for their 
mayor. (NO)
· Town Clerk: You take a political risk if you do not prohibit the training match. If the 
rioting resumes, everyone will blame you for not intervening sufficiently. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: St. Paul sends out a positive signal if this match goes well 
and safely, even under these difficult circumstances. (NO)
· Police: We cannot guarantee safety if those four hundred fans come to St. Paul, while 
the situation is already somewhat explosive. (YES)
After several days of tension and vandalism in the neighborhood, a counter-movement 
is starting. The residents start a major cleanup of the neighborhood. In a newspaper 
interview, the initiator informs that there is still much anger regarding the police actions. 
However, they also want to send out a positive signal about their neighborhood which 
has recently been in the news in such a negative way.
Dilemma 16:
Do you offer to join this St. Paul Cleanup?
Advice: 
· Crisis Management Advisor: Their initiative is confusing. First, there are riots in the 
neighborhood in which some of the residents participate. Now, they are hypocritically 
going to clean up the mess. I am afraid they are playing a dirty trick on you. (NO)
· Town Clerk: You can see this as a welcome initiative from the neighborhood residents. 
If you ignore their signal, it will not be good for the fragile relationship between the 
police and the neighborhood. (YES)
· Communication Advisor: It sends out a positive signal. The neighborhood residents 
who want to do well can use a little support. It is something you can provide. (YES)
· Police: There is still a negative sentiment regarding the police in a part of the 
neighborhood. You are our representative as well. You should not forget that some of 
the neighborhood residents have also demonstrated against police violence. Please, 
do not forget. (NO)
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong
Processed on: 22-11-2019 PDF page: 188
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong
Processed on: 22-11-2019 PDF page: 189
5
Anticipating the unknown: 
Crisis communication while 
under investigation
Based on: Jong, W. (2019), Anticipating the unknown: Crisis communication while under 
investigation. Public Relations Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1177/2046147X19862343
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The cause of a crisis may have to be reidentified when, during the aftermath of the 
crisis, new insights come to light in the accident reports. The possible reassignment 
of responsibility for a crisis complicates the suitable choice of an appropriate crisis 
response strategy that is ultimately intended to optimize reputational protection. This 
article describes how this phenomenon should be taken into account, and suggests an 
“acknowledge and await” response strategy for situations in which organizations prefer to 
respond with care and not jump to conclusions before the outcomes of an investigation 
are known.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2016, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) started an 
investigation into the New Jersey Transit commuter rail crash at Hoboken station. A 
34-year-old woman, who had been standing on the platform, died in the accident and 
another 100 people were injured. In his initial response, New Jersey Transit Executive 
Director Steven Santoro said that trains entering the station were reducing their approach 
speed from 10 mph to 5 mph for added safety. Reducing the speed was regarded to be 
necessary in order to prevent future incidents. One month later, a new possible cause 
came to light, as the board suspended eleven train workers under a fatigue rules program. 
According to the new reports, the driver suffered from undiagnosed sleep apnea, which 
was an additional factor contributing to the terrible events on September 29, 2016. In 
early February 2018, the NTSB issued a Special Investigation Report and confirmed sleep 
apnea to be a contributing cause, stating:
Contributing to the accident was New Jersey Transit’s failure to follow its internal 
obstructive sleep apnea screening guidance and refer at-risk safety-sensitive personnel 
for definitive obstructive sleep apnea testing and treatment. Further contributing to 
the accident was the Federal Railroad Administration’s failure to require railroads to 
medically screen employees in safety-sensitive positions for obstructive sleep apnea 
and other sleep disorders. Also contributing to the accident was the lack of either a 
device or safety system that could have intervened to stop the train before the collision. 
(NTSB, 2018, p. 2)
Aftermaths of incidents like the one at Hoboken are not unique. Organizations such as 
New Jersey Transit are often subject to incident investigations by independent committees 
or boards. Investigations like this come with a special kind of uncertainty, which is inherent 
in any crisis and challenges the capacity of public relations practitioners to know how 
to best proceed (Liu, Bartz, & Duke, 2016). As soon as investigation committees come 
aboard, uncertainty surrounds the future verdict on the organizational responsibility for 
the cause of the crisis. 
In her study on media coverage of chemical incidents, Holladay (2010) finds 39 
out of 91 cases where the accident is still under investigation. As responsibility for 
a crisis is regarded as the starting point for communication strategies, this brings 
difficulties in deciding on the most appropriate crisis response strategy, for as long 
as the verdict is unknown. While stakeholders most likely start to use their influence 
to alter dominant perceptions of what happened and who acted decisively and 
appropriately after the incident (Kuipers & ‘t Hart, 2014), the organization under 
investigation is sailing in unchartered waters. It is supposed to anticipate the future 
outcome of an accident report, which is unknown to the organization shortly after 
the crisis. 
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In order to support organizations in anticipating an unknown outcome, the goals of 
this article are as follows: (1) to define and extend our understanding of the process of 
being under investigation in a crisis aftermath; (2) to discuss the impact of known crisis 
response strategies under such a situation, and (3) to make recommendations for when 
an organization should and should not anticipate the final report. 
First, a review is given of the literature on the characteristics of investigations after 
crises. Then, the options in terms of crisis communication responses are described. The 
distinction is made between a regular crisis aftermath, and the impact of a final report 
of an investigation committee as a potential “game changer” in perceptions. Finally, 
an outline is given for a new approach of “acknowledge and await”. Even though the 
proposed approach has elements of common sense, a theoretical light is shed on why crisis 
communication during an investigation differentiates itself from regular communication in 
the aftermath of crises. The approach supports communication practitioners who might 
otherwise underestimate the potential impact of investigation reports on existing and 
future perceptions. 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF BEING UNDER INVESTIGATION
Questions about responsibility and accountability surface as soon as reports are presented. 
According to Boin et al. (2016), these are the times when revisionist interpretations of the 
causes, the quality of the response, and the management of the wider repercussions get 
airplay in the media. Due to the reporting, the crisis returns to political and institutional 
agendas, in what is sometimes referred to as the “crisis after the crisis” (Boin & Smith, 
2006), which is full of “blame games” that potentially erode the reputation of the parties 
involved.
As Parker and Dekker (2008) note, investigation committees are interpretive 
authorities, which provide an accepted ritualized procedure for making sense of traumatic 
events. Through accountability, crises can make, break or transform political and public 
service careers, agency mandates and reputations (Kuipers & ‘t Hart, 2014). Sigurgeirsdóttir 
and Johnsen (2018) refer to the Icelandic Parliamentary Special Investigation Commission 
which conducted a ground-breaking crisis-induced investigation, delivering a report 
that was “a milestone in Iceland’s history of politics and public administration”. Such 
milestones with large public impact are not unique. Usually, reports by investigation 
committees are not “just another opinion” but are presented as an independent verdict 
on the role of the organization in a certain crisis. The committees assign responsibility, 
discuss policy matters and propose corrective solutions in a way that contributes to the 
development of meaning (Parker & Dekker, 2008). Committees are even expected to do 
so. In the case of the MS Estonia disaster (1994), the final report from the Finnish, Swedish 
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and Estonian investigation committee was criticized over the years, most likely because 
of the disappointing concluding remark that “No one was found officially responsible” 
(Radio Sweden, 2014). As such, the presentation of the final accident report is usually 
the moment the committee publicly and with authority approves or disapproves of the 
crisis management and the communication of the parties involved. 
External investigation
Organizations under investigation usually acknowledge the expertise of these external 
investigative bodies, which implies that the opinion of an investigation committee is able 
to fundamentally change public perceptions of the cause of incidents and the associated 
responsibilities. In addition to their authority, investigative bodies tend to take their time 
for research and in-depth studies. Often, it takes months or even years of investigation 
before underlying causes come to light. The investigative report into Hurricane Katrina, 
for example, was presented on February 15, 2006, which was half a year after the 
hurricane had hit the coast of Louisiana (United States House of Congress, 2006). The 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada submitted its report about the Lac-Mégantic rail 
disaster 13 months after the accident (Currie-Mueller, 2017). The US NTSB often needs 
an even longer timeframe before it publicly discloses its findings and new insights that 
were initially unknown to the organization, the public and media. During all those months, 
the investigation looks for clues in the interaction between actors. The larger and more 
severe in magnitude and negative consequences a crisis is, the greater the number of 
actors (Palttala, Boano, Lund, & Vos, 2012)—and the interactions between these actors 
will all be under investigation.
Organizational learning
Moreover, investigation committees tend to approach crises from a specific angle and 
take organizational learning as a starting point. They look beyond the obvious and ask 
themselves whether or not multiple causes have added up to an inevitable accident. 
As most crises flow from unique configurations of individual error, organizational 
failure and environmental flux (Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort, 2001), the number of 
potential causes can be tremendous. The report on the sinking of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise (1987) owned by Townsend Thoresen explains how different factors add 
up to a fatal disaster (Ek, Runefors, & Borell, 2014; Jacobsson, Ek, & Akselsson, 2011; 
Price, 2015). The capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise occurred just outside the 
Belgian port of Zeebrugge and resulted in the loss of 193 lives. The ship was a roll-on/
roll-off ferry, a design that enables rapid loading and unloading at the harbors along 
the English Channel. After arrival at Zeebrugge, the assistant bosun (a ship’s officer) 
opened the bow door and went to his cabin, where he fell asleep. It was his duty to 
close the bow doors at the time of departure from Zeebrugge, a duty he failed to carry 
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out. According to the formal investigation, the Herald of Free Enterprise capsized 
because she went to sea with her inner and outer bow doors open, whereas they 
should have been closed at departure (United Kingdom Department of Transport, 
1987). The sea immediately flooded the deck, which led to the sinking of the ferry. 
While the open bow door was the primary cause of the ferry disaster, the official 
inquiry also pointed to underlying patterns as well, and put blame on the supervisors, 
on the fact that the officer did not wake on the harbor station’s call for departure, 
and on the fact that there was no indicator on the bridge to show the current state 
of the bow doors. Moreover, with regard to the culture within Townsend Thoresen, 
time pressure was common practice. The lack of an overall safety culture contributed 
even further to the development of the situation and was an overall contributor to 
the terrible events of March 6, 1987. None of these factors came close to the initial 
statement by Townsend Thoresen, whose spokesperson conjectured that the ship 
hit the harbor wall (Clark, 2014). Even though this might be accurate according to 
his information about the situation shortly after the fatal incident, it shows that the 
underlying causes only came to light in the final report which was presented months 
later, but were not available at the time of the initial statement.
Impact of investigation committees
In summary, an investigation by an independent and external committee implies that 
(1) it potentially takes months before a report will be presented; (2) the final outcome 
will be presented with authority; (3) the final outcome can be regarded as a verdict on 
crisis responsibilities, and (4) the final outcome may contradict earlier perceptions on the 
responsibility for the crisis of the organization(s) involved.
3. CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF CRISES
The responsibility for a crisis is the cornerstone of crisis response strategies (Park & Len-
Ríos, 2010). Benoit (1995) already claimed that crises become a threat to reputations when 
an individual or organization is accused of being responsible for the offensive act. In other 
words, if there is no offensive act or no accusation of responsibility for the act, there is no 
reputational threat (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2010). In his Situational Crisis Communication 
Theory (SCCT), Coombs (2010, 2015) argues that the nature of a crisis situation shapes 
audience perceptions and attributions when it comes to crisis responsibility. He defines 
three types of crises: the victim cluster (low crisis responsibility/low reputational 
threat), accidental cluster (minimal crisis responsibility/minimal reputational threat), 
and preventable cluster (strong crisis responsibility/strong reputational threat) (Coombs 
2010: 39). 
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In the end, stakeholders value the reputation of an organization on the basis of 
perceived crisis responsibility, together with crisis history, relationship history and prior 
reputation (Coombs, 1998, 2007). These perceptions define what needs to be done and 
whether to choose a frame of being a victim (Coombs, 2007). Depending on the threat 
level, current theory proposes different response strategies. In the case of reputational 
threat, the theory emphasizes apologizing and accepting responsibility for crises as the 
primary communicative recommendation (Benoit & Pang, 2008). 
A drawback of current crisis response strategies is the presumption in the literature 
that crisis responsibilities are rather static. Even though environmental scanning is 
set up in order to look for changes and forecast changes in perceptions (Narayanan & 
Fahey, 1987), SCCT tends to be most useful as long as an organization does not change 
from one cluster to another. As crises can morph and change over time, the alternative 
for organizations under crisis is to switch between strategies. This, however, tends to 
undermine the credibility of the organization. Benoit (2018) gives the example of CEO 
Munoz of United Airlines, who felt forced to enact a make-over of his crisis response and 
thereby implicitly confirmed that the initial response was ineffectual. His new position 
was the right one, according to Benoit (2018), but it came too late to prevent further 
damage to the company. 
Similar to the example of United Airlines, response strategies can easily go wrong 
when clusters and responsibilities for the crisis were judged inappropriately before a 
committee presented its findings, even in cases where erroneous statements were not 
made intentionally. As Coombs (2010) states, the reported cause could raise a new round 
of concerns for the organization that demand a response and an organization must deliver 
all the “promised” information. However, this bears a risk when incidents turn out to be in 
a different cluster than expected. For example, when it turns out that the cause of a fatal 
accident is different from what was initially communicated, one might find oneself not in 
the “victim cluster” but in the “preventable cluster”. Initially blaming a contractor (“victim 
cluster”) when the final report shows that it was the company’s own fault (“preventable 
cluster”) is just one example of the type of communication that can have a potential 
negative impact on reputation and erode its credibility.
Adkins (2010) adds an analysis of FEMA in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
whose response initially indicated it as a response to a natural disaster, falling within the 
victim cluster of crisis types. When eventually it became clear that FEMA was accused of 
misdeeds in responding to the disaster, the tenets of SCCT became impossible to apply; 
responses that would be recommended in the disaster phase prove to be contradictory 
to those of the resultant crisis phase (Adkins, 2010).
Oftentimes, crises cannot be regarded as the sole responsibility of just one 
organization. In its report on the Lac-Mégantic runaway train and derailment, the Canadian 
Transportation Safety Board (TSB, 2014) identified 18 distinct causes and contributing 
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factors to the incident. The incident was not caused by one single person, action or 
organization; it occurred due to a combination of factors influencing one another. This 
suggests that responsibilities can be re-arranged across network partners in the aftermath 
of crises as well. When the change in responsibilities results in changing perceptions 
among stakeholders, the crisis team and stakeholders may disagree on the type of crisis 
at hand. If this is the case, the stakeholder’s frame should be adopted (Coombs, 2007). 
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina shows, however, that organizations are not always 
aware of their biases and the gap between their own and stakeholders’ perceptions 
(Martinko, 2009).
4. COMMUNICATION WHILE UNDER INVESTIGATION
A response strategy is needed that enables organizations to anticipate changing estimates 
of the initial responsibility in times of crisis. This change in perceptions is a potential 
“game-changer”, compared to regular and incremental changes in the aftermath of crises, 
when stakeholders, customers or media come up with new and additional information. 
This happens for two reasons: 1) the reports by external committees are brought with 
authority; and 2) investigation committees look beyond the obvious and examine all 
the underlying factors in a chain of events that ended in an incident. This combination 
of factors makes it hard to anticipate the conclusions of a future investigation report 
that is full of what former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously called 
“known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002). 
Even in organizations that strive to detect known risks before they become manifest and 
cause trouble, it can be rather complicated to find the causes of incidents. Even in such 
risk-aware organizations, early signals may simply be put aside, as the explosion of the 
Challenger space shuttle (1986) and the Fukushima incident (2013) demonstrated (Boin, 
Stern, & Sundelius, 2016).
Bridge current and future perceptions
Shortly after crises, stakeholders expect an early response. Crisis communication theory 
suggests the need for a quick response and urges organizations to give guidance in 
answering that seemingly simple question: “how could this have happened?” This applies 
to both corporate and public organizations. Regarding corporations, it is imperative that 
the CEO steps up to deliver a public statement to calm the situation and portray the 
organization as in control (Lucero, Tan Teng Kwang, & Pang, 2009). Regarding public 
organizations, public leaders should explain the crisis, its consequences and what is 
being done to minimize these consequences (Boin, Kuipers, & Overdijk, 2013; Coombs, 
2007; Jong, 2017). This challenge continues when the dominant frames of crisis situations 
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change with time. Whenever new information about possible causes becomes publicly 
available, the frames might shift and urge the organization to alter its crisis communication 
response. This is certainly true for crises with a political context, which cast long shadows 
that often have a long political aftermath (‘t Hart & Boin, 2001).
Existing crisis response strategies show weaknesses in their ability to bridge potential 
gaps between the perception shortly after the crisis (the initial responsibility) and future 
perceptions, based on the final report of an investigation committee (final responsibility). 
The difficulty of response strategies while an incident is still under investigation lies in 
the “unknowns”. One feels the need to respond, although one might not want to jump 
to conclusions. At the same time, organizations should not neglect evolving perceptions 
regarding their role in a crisis. One must realize that statements will backfire when these 
do not align, for example when a positive spin is followed by a harsh truth (Mullin, 2003). 
On September 28, 2014, an accident occurred during a monster truck show in 
Haaksbergen, The Netherlands: three people were killed when a monster truck ploughed 
into a crowd of onlookers. The Dutch Safety Board investigated the incident. During the 
investigation, the mayor stated that he would once again have granted the permit for 
the monster truck show. When the final investigation was presented, the mayor attacked 
some of the main conclusions in the report, thereby attacking the independent verdict 
of the Board. During the meeting of the city council where the report was discussed, 
he had to step down as the council lost confidence. The council confirmed the general 
conclusions drawn by the Dutch Safety Board. The formal response of the mayor backfired 
and was not enough to regain public confidence (Meerenburgh & van Duin, 2015).
This subsequently begs the question as to how an organization can respond to and 
anticipate in accordance with the situation, when the outcome of in-depth investigations 
is still unknown. Ideally, the response bridges the current collective and emotional impact 
of the crisis in terms of perception, while also delaying accountability for the responsibility 
until the final investigation report is published.
A more dynamic crisis response strategy is needed, which enables the organization 
under crisis to swiftly adapt to changing perceptions. In order to maintain reliability to 
stakeholders, even a drastic change in crisis response should be trustworthy. In this case 
there is a need for a crisis response strategy that keeps pace with changing perceptions, 
but does not undermine earlier statements made, nor erodes earlier reputations.
Acknowledge and await
In order to anticipate future “unknowns”, a crisis response strategy of “acknowledge and 
await” is proposed. In this strategy, the organization anticipates a future outcome that is 
unknown to both the organization and its stakeholders. Ideally, the strategy anticipates 
the potential situation that the final outcome of a report might have a fundamentally 
different perception of the responsibility for the crisis. 
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The strategy basically consists of acknowledging the crisis at hand, and taking 
responsibility for the initial cause, but also asking and thanking stakeholders for their 
patience in waiting for the future outcome of any investigation. The organization 
explains it will fully co-operate with the investigation committee in order to find 
answers to the existing, burning questions of the victims, media, stakeholders and the 
organization itself. As such, it acknowledges the questions that stakeholders have, but 
waits to answer them until the investigation report is published. In other words, the 
organization under crisis buys time. 
Below, the two components of this strategy, acknowledge and await, are described 
in more detail. 
Acknowledge
Acknowledgement is twofold. First, it enables the organization under crisis to address 
the emotional impact of the crisis among victims and stakeholders. Second, the strategy 
acknowledges the authority of the investigation committee, and shows respect for 
the committee’s final judgment, while convincing stakeholders to trust the committee 
in its future final opinion. Overall, it acknowledges that a crisis occurred and that the 
organization is doing the best it can to prevent such crises from happening again. 
Meanwhile, this acknowledgement still shows that the organization gives priority to 
emotional and psychosocial support, and that political blame games get a lower priority at 
the moment of crisis. Compared to taking full responsibility (or the opposite, full denial), 
acknowledgement is also a scalable way of taking responsibility. Feeling responsible for 
a situation can be anything between a low and high level of responsibility, while being 
responsible is either full or none. As such, acknowledgement enables the organization to 
anticipate future reports, since it can show that it feels responsible, while the exact level 
of responsibility will be determined later on. Moreover, acknowledgement paves the way 
for the public display of empathy, compassion, solidarity and reassurance, which are all 
important response categories in the accountability process (Kuipers & ‘t Hart, 2014).
Await
The await component explicitly anticipates the final conclusions of the investigation 
committee. It does not mean that the organization under crisis is silenced, but that 
it communicates with restraint. The strategy gives direction towards when and how 
more clarity on the events that led to the crisis can be expected. Restraint is needed, 
because responding to an investigation in progress might leave the impression that the 
organization is already trying to spin and frame the crisis before the conclusion of the 
investigation. On the other hand, not responding while under investigation might give the 
impression of being non-communicative, while stakeholders will not wait until the report 
is presented. An insufficient response can easily lead to what Johansen and Frandsen 
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(Johansen & Frandsen, 2007) call a double crisis, where the handling of communication 
creates a new crisis in itself (Frandsen & Johansen, 2010, 2016). To prevent a double crisis 
from happening, the concerns of the stakeholders can be addressed by taking note of 
their questions and making the promise that all of their questions will be answered as 
soon as the independent report is published.
The Enschede fireworks disaster on May 13, 2000, involved a fire in a fireworks 
factory in the city of Enschede, The Netherlands. The fire led to a catastrophic explosion 
of fireworks that killed 23 people. The incumbent mayor, Jan Mans, used a strategy of 
“acknowledge and await”. Even though he realized that the permits had allowed a fireworks 
factory to be built in a densely populated area, he managed to postpone discussions on 
his mayoral responsibilities. He made the priority his own citizens and the victims of 
the disaster. He supported them with care, and attended memorials and funerals. The 
mayor said that, regardless of the outcome of the final report, he felt responsible. “But”, 
he explicitly said, “we will not put ourselves on the rack till we have the results of the 
investigation” (Mans, 2001). Locally and nationally the mayor was seen as a hero, and in 
the aftermath of the crisis, the Dutch Association of Municipalities awarded the mayor 
the Municipal Prize for his exemplary role (Noordegraaf & Newman, 2011). When the 
final investigation report was presented, the city discussed the issue of responsibility. The 
mayor politically survived and did not have to resign. His subsequent image evolved into 
that of a “crisis mayor” (Helsloot & Groenendaal, 2017).
While organizations might be tempted to respond to alleged crisis responsibilities 
right away, one should not underestimate the potential long-term and negative effects in 
terms of reputational damage. The proposed strategy of “acknowledge and await” asks 
crisis communication practitioners to weigh short-term benefits versus long-term gains 
(Coombs and Tachkova, 2019; Claeys and Coombs, 2019). Where a rapid response in the 
short run might enable the organization to shift perceptions in the preferred direction, it 
should not make things worse when the cause of the crisis turns out to be different from 
what was initially expected.
Using “acknowledge and await” does not mean that stakeholders will be silenced. As 
Cheng (2018) argued, stakeholders may also develop their own crisis responses ranging 
from emotional support, information seeking, remediation, rectification to diverting 
attention. It implies that stakeholders might increase their pressure on the organization 
under crisis during the time it “awaits”. Also, new media are used to find information and 
to provide information to others as well (Stephens and Malone, 2009). 
“Acknowledge and await”, however, prepares the organization to respond to changing 
perceptions over time. In its effect, it can be expected that “acknowledge and await” 
shows similarities to the strategy of stealing thunder (Coombs, 2014). This crisis response 
strategy demonstrates that when it is the organization itself that first reports a crisis, it 
suffers less damage compared to situations where an outside source, such as the news 
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media, is the first to report it. As the organization which applies “acknowledge and await” 
already “acknowledges” the existence of a crisis situation, it makes itself less vulnerable. 
In the short run, the organization does not hide. In the long run, it shows that it dares to 
wait for the final outcome of the investigation, and has patience to find and implement 
all the future lessons to be learnt.
In order to shorten the time span during which the organization is silenced and 
to prevent an additional crisis in the period of awaiting, an organization can start its 
own parallel, internal investigation. An internal investigation gives the communications 
department an indication of whether or not one’s own procedures were effective and might 
give the conclusions of the final report a soft landing. The findings help the organization 
to anticipate the final outcomes of the official committee’s investigation. In this way, 
the organization can share its preliminary findings with victims, media and stakeholders 
before the final report is presented. Using the internal investigation diminishes the impact 
of the final investigation, as long as the conclusions and recommendations are presented 
as preliminary and the internal investigation looks beyond the obvious. Only then does the 
organization show that it acknowledges its stakeholders and takes care of the interests of 
all parties involved. In terms of crisis response, this is the most credible approach to show 
that the organization commits itself to learning and is ready for the process of renewal 
(Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Seeger & Sellnow 2016), anticipating the final verdict of the 
external investigation committee.
The question remains what an organization should do when the pressure builds 
up and when, during an investigation, the public asks for compensations and other 
proactive actions. Again, the answer lies in the “acknowledge”-part of the strategy. 
Acknowledgement enables the organization to show that it feels responsible, regardless 
of being responsible. Even though the organization under crisis supports compensations 
and other proactive actions because it feels a responsibility towards victims, their families 
and other stakeholders, it can stick to the policy that the exact level of responsibility will 
be determined later on.
5. FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research is suggested to explore the consequences of an “acknowledge and 
await” approach and to explore when the benefits of using this strategy are stretched to 
the limit. Are there any dangers to “acknowledge and await” in an endless cycle, as the 
presentation of some final investigation reports might take more than a year? How should 
one cope with in-depth reports by news media, which present an objective overview 
and reconstruction of the circumstances under which a crisis occurred, prior to a final 
investigation report? Does an internal investigation minimize the short-term impact of such 
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media reports? Such research builds upon the findings of Coombs and Tachkova (2019) 
and their distinction between short-term effects and long-term gains. This distinction and 
balance between short- and long-term effects in crisis communication theory would be 
a welcome topic for further research, in order to enrich our understanding of the potential 
diminishing effects of expected long-term reputational gains.
6. CONCLUSION 
Responding to a crisis with an outspoken response strategy can harm an organization 
when investigation committees find underlying causes that, even when unknown to 
the organization, are part of its sphere of influence. While Boin et al. (2016) state that 
public authorities will have to engage with the media and external stakeholders to get 
their definition of the situation across in a framing context, this should not automatically 
apply to the communication frame about responsibility. Communication on crisis-related 
responsibility should be handled with care, as long as investigation committees have 
not finished their work. In responding to a crisis, the spokesperson at the scene should 
realize that the possible outcome of a future accident report could backfire when initial 
and future statements do not align.
Current crisis response strategies make the assumption that crisis responsibilities are 
rather static, while incident reports show that perceived crisis responsibilities can change 
dramatically during the aftermath of a crisis. Perceptions can morph in the aftermath of 
crises, requiring changing responses over time. Also, organizations can find themselves in 
situations of shared responsibility, while crisis communication theory still tends to adopt 
a single responsibility point of view.
Thus far, crisis communication literature has mainly focused on a corporate setting, 
where protecting reputation and brand value is key. In their study on crisis communication 
during natural disasters, Waymer and Heath (2007) already pointed to such a “managerial 
bias” in crisis communication research. In their meta-analysis on thirty years of crisis 
communication strategy, Arendt et al. (2017) discussed 110 peer-reviewed articles 
underscoring research on apologia, crisis communication, and image repair. Their meta-
analysis confirms that current research in crisis communication seems to be highly skewed 
towards American, reputational case studies (Arendt et al., 2017), where organizations 
adopt response strategies and reframe their crisis responsibility in order to protect their 
brands. 
Taking such crisis response strategies for granted, might give practitioners the false 
impression that a prompt response on perceived responsibility is always key. The current 
study claims that in certain cases, it would be preferred for an organization under crisis 
to not rush to make things worse. As discussed, the responsibility does not always fall on 
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only one organization and can often be shared among stakeholders where single interests 
compete with the interests of the entire industry. Moreover, one can think of situations 
where governmental agencies are held responsible for crises caused by others (Jong, 
2017) as well as situations where there are other communication goals than image repair 
alone (Jong et al., 2016).
Contrary to Seeger’s (2006) suggestion, this implies that there are circumstances 
under which acknowledging uncertainty should be used as a strategy. The proposed 
response of “acknowledge and await” explores the characteristics of changing perceptions 
on crisis responsibility in the aftermath of crises. It presents an initial response strategy 
to anticipate changing responsibilities. The proposed strategy explicitly bridges the gap 
between current and future perceptions. Such a strategy is needed to cope with cause-
related uncertainty and to acknowledge the impact that a crisis has for society, while it is 
still unclear whether or not the organization can expect to receive the blame (or parts of 
blame) when the investigation report is finally presented. The response strategy prevents 
organizations from jumping to conclusions about future investigation outcomes, thereby 
safeguarding the credibility and reputation of the organization under crisis in both the 
short and the long run.
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Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 crashed in the Ukraine on 17 July 2014 with 193 Dutch 
passengers on board. The present study assessed which MH17-related activities (or 
absence of certain activities) of 54 mayors from the Netherlands were mentioned in 
(social) media and if and how they were evaluated. Analyses of newspaper articles and 
social media showed that public ‘meaning making’ and ‘remembering’ by mayors can be 
considered as a table stake or conditio sine qua non. Mayors are expected to speak at 
memorials and attend community activities. Strong appreciation was however retrieved 
from victims’ families whenever mayors visited them with a listening ear in the privacy 
of their homes, demonstrating the role mayors can fulfil as mourners-in-chief in local 
communities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A Boeing 777-200 passenger plane, operating as Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, crashed in 
the Ukraine, east of Donetsk on 17 July 2014. All 283 passengers and 15 crew members died, 
including 193 people with a Dutch nationality. The tragedy came at a time of deepening 
tensions between Moscow, and the United States and European countries, as the plane 
was shot down from an area which was controlled by Russian-backed separatists (Dutch 
Safety Board 2015). It does not seem farfetched to argue that the downing of MH17 can 
be considered to be a disaster with consequences for international political relationships 
similar to the case of the Lockerbie bombing on December 21, 1988 (Stigers, 1998). 
Besides the international political tensions, the MH17 disaster had two other 
distinctive characteristics when compared to ‘regular’ local crises. First, post-event 
activities such as the organization of the identification and (forensic) investigation into the 
actual cause of the disaster, were taken care of by either Ukraine authorities or the Dutch 
national government. Second, the bereaved or affected families were not concentrated 
in one city or area: they live in areas throughout the Netherlands. All in all, 54 mayors (or 
their deputies) were involved. They were all confronted with the impact of this disaster as 
soon as stories regarding the names of victims began to circulate in many municipalities. 
Dutch mayors are appointed in a somewhat hybrid public administrative system and not 
elected directly by citizens themselves. The King appoints the mayor after the candidate 
is being proposed by the city council. Unlike many other countries, Dutch mayors chair 
local and regional crisis teams and approve final decisions. 
After crises, Dutch mayors are usually referred to as ‘citizenfather’. Citizenfather is 
a literal translation of the Dutch word ‘burgervader’ (or citizenmother: ‘burgermoeder’ 
depending on the gender of the mayor). This label fits their symbolic role in the community, 
comparable to the public roles elected mayors like Giuliani and Nagin fulfilled in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and hurricane Katrina. At the time, they spoke directly to the citizens 
– and then to the nation – making sure that constituents understood that their leader 
was concerned about their emotional and physical well-being (Griffin-Padgett & Allison, 
2010). According to 0t Hart, the importance of such public display of compassion with 
those suffering hardship can hardly be under-estimated (0t Hart, 1993). Thus far, the 
focus of disaster research on public leaders is mostly based on individual case studies, 
which happened within municipal boundaries. An important characteristic and possible 
limitation of single case studies is that the specific elements of the disaster can hardly 
be separated from the person of the mayor or how he fulfilled his role as public leader. 
Possible conclusions about leadership, i.e., whether results can be attributed to the mayor 
and/or specific elements of the disaster, are therefore to a certain extent tentative. To be 
able to make a distinction between both, a series of single case studies that follow more 
or less identical disasters are needed. 
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In an earlier systematic review (Jong, Dückers & van der Velden, 2016b), the 
authors already called for more studies enabling comparisons of mayors in similar 
crisis situations, such as the studies on public leaders by Gallagher, Fontenot and 
Boyle, (2007), Fairhurst and Cooren, (2009) and Griffin-Padgett et al. (2010). It bridges 
a gap identified by Boin and Gralepois (2006a), who stated that in the absence of a 
systematic investigation, the search for best practices amounts to little more than a 
description of heroic leaders and happy crisis endings. 
The MH17 disaster provided a unique opportunity to conduct a comparative 
study, because the mayors were confronted with exactly the same situation, i.e., the 
same ‘distinct’ disaster that caused the death of their own citizens. It provides an 
opportunity to assess and compare how the role of tens of mayors was perceived and 
evaluated. Insight in how citizens and media perceive crisis leadership may help or 
even improve these aspects of crisis leadership of mayors in the future. To the best 
of our knowledge, no existing study has examined a crisis situation in such a way. 
In order to meet our goal, we set up a qualitative content analysis of both regular 
and social media. It was the news media, together with the regular media, the victims, 
the general public and other authorities that set the stage for the evaluation of 
the performance of the mayors (Boin & Smith, 2006b). Similarly, Littlefield and 
Quenette (2007) add that those in authority would be wise to use the media to 
identify how their words and actions are perceived by the public. Recent research on 
the Queensland floods in 2011 suggests that perceptions on social media influenced 
the news media (De Bussy & Paterson, 2012). In our analysis, we focus on reports in 
newspapers and on Twitter as exponents of the regular and social media respectively, 
regarding any MH17-related activities (or absence of activities) by mayors. The (social) 
media set the stage for the public’s evaluation of the activities and performance of 
mayors. Together, these reports should give us an indication of the perceptions of the 
general public and media themselves. Even though social media users might not fully 
represent society, we are confident their expressions contribute to the stage Boin et 
al. (2006b) refer to. As such, collecting the tweets can be regarded as an appropriate 
manner to retrieve direct feedback on the way mayors behaved in the aftermath of 
MH17. In sum, our research question is ‘Which MH17-related activities (or absence 
of certain activities) of Dutch mayors are mentioned in (social) media and if and how 
were they perceived in these media at different stages during the first year after this 
disaster?’ 
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2. METHOD 
We chose a timeframe between 17 July 2014 (day of the crash) and 31 July 2015. As such, 
we included the disaster’s first anniversary on 17 July 2015, on which the victims were 
commemorated. For convenience, the period was split up in three, somewhat arbitrary, 
separate stages. Since in this specific case, Dutch mayors had no role in the immediate 
response at the scene of disaster itself, we decided to create sub-sections based on key 
events which can be regarded as ritual landmarks in the aftermath. These were the local 
memorials and gatherings (key event 1), the national memorial (key event 2) and the first 
anniversary of the disaster (key event 3). As such, the first period (stage I) covers the first 
month, from 17 July through 17 August 2014. The second period (stage II) runs from 18 
August 2014 until 10 November 2014. On that day (November 10), a National Memorial 
Service was held. The Dutch King and Queen, ministers and other public officials from 
the Netherlands and other countries that lost citizens in the disaster, as well as mayors 
of the affected towns attended this memorial service. The third, final and longer stage 
(stage III) runs from 11 November 2014 until 31 July 2015. 
As said, with respect to the (social) media, we focused on two information sources: 
newspapers and Twitter. We used the online academic news database (LexisNexis 
Academic) to obtain full text reprints of published Dutch newspaper articles from 
electronic archives. Articles were searched for similar keywords, i.e., MH17 (or mh-17) 
AND mayor (Dutch: burgemeester) OR elderman OR deputy (Dutch: wethouder or loco). 
We assumed that newspaper articles would use the full function and surname of the 
mayor at least once in their coverage, since it is unlikely that newspapers will mention 
the name of a mayor without using the title ‘mayor’. 
In the case of newspapers, the timeframes were extended with 1 day, since the news 
was published in most newspapers 1 day after the event. We included the main Dutch 
national newspapers in our selection (NRC Handelsblad, de Volkskrant, De Telegraaf, 
Trouw, Algemeen Dagblad) as well as the top 14 regional newspapers belonging to 
publishing houses of Wegener, TMG-regiokranten and NDC. Within the publishing houses, 
articles are usually republished in sister newspapers as well. For our qualitative analysis, 
we removed these duplicate articles from the original set of 547 published articles. This 
resulted in a total set of 299 unique newspaper articles, editorials, columns and opinion 
pieces. 
Tweets were retrieved using the Coosto software (www.coosto.nl), a widely used tool 
suited for webcare and qualitative online data analysis. The software enabled us to export 
the tweets captured for using keywords in any given period. Tweets were searched and 
collected based on the following keywords, not necessarily hashtags: MH17 (or mh-17), 
references to (the name of) the mayor and/or his deputy and/or the name of the town 
where victims came from. These search terms were used to ensure that all tweets about 
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mayors were captured. For instance, and in contrast to newspaper articles, Twitter users, 
limited by a maximum of 140 characters per tweet, might only refer to the mayor by 
mentioning his or her surname and not using the word ‘mayor’ explicitly. 
One should realize the total number of tweets is also influenced by retweets. A 
retweet is similar to a tweet, but consists of a message of a person (user I), which has been 
copied and resent by another Twitter user (user II). Tweets are usually retweeted when 
users think it is worth spreading. For our analysis, we captured 1.698 tweets, including 
709 retweets. This set includes 12 tweets by mayors themselves. 
2.1. Analyses and coding procedures 
In order to assess the perceived performance and evaluations of mayors, we assigned 
three possible values to the content of newspaper articles or tweets: neutral, negative 
or positive. A label was given based on the content and overall tone-of-voice of the 
entire newspaper article or tweet. Articles and tweets that only reflected the mayors 
own opinion but without any indication of the appreciation or disapproval of journalists, 
citizens or others, were independent of the tone-of-voice, coded ‘neutral’. 
In general, an article or tweet was regarded as neutral when the appearance of a 
mayor is mentioned (by others than the mayor him or herself), without any interpretation 
or normative terminology. All tweets by mayors were coded as ‘neutral’ by default; 
retweets of these mayoral tweets however, could be coded negative, positive or neutral. 
An example of a neutral tweet is the sentence ‘a gathering was held which was attended 
by the mayor’, because it reflects a factual tone without judgment on the nature of 
the mayor’s presence or appearance. In our coding, only an additional description of 
the situation in which a mayor fulfils his role, gives it either a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ 
interpretation. Articles or tweets were coded as ‘positive’ when the role of the mayor 
was discussed as inspiring, moving and/or relevant, for example ‘the mayor read out 
a wellchosen poem during the gathering’. It was labelled ‘negative’ whenever the 
performance of a mayor was disliked, disapproved or otherwise criticized. We included 
quotes of our samples in the results section. 
Two researchers independently rated the set of news articles and tweets. The level of 
agreement between the two raters was satisfactory. Cohen’s Kappa (.80 for the newspaper 
articles and .82 for the Twitter messages) was calculated using IBM SPSS version 20. 
Kappa values between .80 and .90 are generally considered to exhibit acceptable levels 
of interrater reliability (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 2005). Given that a high level of inter-rater 
reliability had been established, the scores of the first author were used for our analysis. 
A complete list of all identified and processed newspapers articles and tweets (In Dutch), 
including the codings of the identified articles and tweets, can be obtained from the first 
author. 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1. Findings from newspaper articles 
We found a total of 138 articles for stage I, 62 articles for stage II and 99 articles for 
stage III. 
3.1.1 Articles during stage I 
Most articles published during the first stage, were labelled as ‘neutral’ (122; 88.4%). 
Newspapers covered similar gatherings as those that citizens tweeted about; i.e., where 
mayors attended memorial services, charity marches and the like. A newspaper article has 
more room to report about the mayor0s activities. For this reason, we add two examples 
of quotes from such neutral articles, without any interpretation by the journalist: 
‘I want to express my sincere and deep sympathy for the families and friends of the 
victims. It is difficult to understand how a disaster like this has destroyed so many lives. 
Behind the scenes, the municipality will provide all the support necessary.’ (Mayor Spies, 
Stichtse Vecht; Algemeen Dagblad 2014a) 
‘The municipality has arranged ‘a care-team’ to assist the bereaved families with 
practical issues that have to be arranged, but also with grieving and coping with their 
loss. (Mayor van der Laan, Amsterdam; Het Parool 2014a) 
Positive articles (10; 7.3%) quoted citizens who appear to have appreciated the way 
the mayor participated in local gatherings. These articles referred to speeches and how 
mayors were able to find words for the collective feelings of the town’s hurt. ‘The mayor 
of Bergen op Zoom articulated the feelings of the people who attended the memorial 
service’, one newspaper wrote (BN/DeStem 2014b). Another positive labelled article 
reports on the attendance of the mayor of Rotterdam during a silent march (Algemeen 
Dagblad 2014c). It was referred to as ‘impressive’. In another news article, his presence 
at a memorial gathering was referred to as ‘comforting’ (Algemeen Dagblad 2014b). It is 
similar to an article about another mayor, who was described as speaking short, powerful 
and impressive during the memorial service: 
It was very silent at the central square of Breda. Mayor Peter van der Velden gives a 
speech. Short. Powerful. Impressive. (. . .) ‘We are not going to wait until people approach 
us with their questions and problems. We will approach them ourselves. We have people 
to do that. You cannot imagine the practical challenges that the bereaved will find on 
their path. In this, we are going to support them as best as we can. We have to do this. 
They will not be left on their own. We are here for them’ (Mayor Van der Velden, Breda; 
BN/DeStem, 2014a) 
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The mayor of Kaag en Braasem discusses how she keeps in touch with families who lost 
their loved ones during an interview (Leidsch Dagblad 2014). The article covering this 
interview had a neutral tone-of-voice. 
Two examples were given where mayors presented themselves as a spokesperson 
for the victims’ family. First, the mayor of Simpelveld asked the residents of his town 
who collectively started an initiative for a memorial service, to cancel it, on behalf of the 
family (De Limburger 2014a). Second, the mayor of Dordrecht asked his citizens to show 
restraint towards the victims’ family (Algemeen Dagblad 2014d). 
Negative articles (6; 4.4%) in this period mainly focused on a remark from the 
mayor of Hilversum. During a show on national radio, he called for the 29-year-old 
daughter of Russian president Putin, who lives in the Netherlands, to be expelled. 
Another example of negative press was found in a regional newspaper, which 
commented on the absence of the mayor of Maastricht. The mayor did not return from 
holidays to join a commemoration. The organization cancelled the commemoration, 
for as long as the public discussion about the absent mayor would continue: 
‘The mayor noticed, again, that a mayor apparently cannot do it right. His innocent 
tweet, sent out with good intentions, was misinterpreted and in social media the story 
rapidly took shape: Mayor Hoes preferred the sun over the memorial ceremony.’ (De 
Limburger 2014b) 
3.1.2 Articles during stage II 
Among the articles from stage II, we coded 43 articles as ‘neutral’ (69.4%), 6 as ‘negative’ 
(9.7%) and 13 articles as ‘positive’ (21.0%). In this stage, many articles were published 
in relation to the National Memorial in November 2014 and look back upon the first few 
weeks after the disaster. An example of a neutral description of the words of a mayor at 
the end of the summer recess: 
‘A total of 14 men, women and children, cheerfully went on board of the plane on that 
sunny day in July, to find their deaths a couple of hours later in a field of sunflowers. The 
‘citizen father’ read the names of the victims aloud, and then the city council asked for one 
minute of silence. A gasp, a tear. The mayor: ‘To us bystanders, modesty is appropriate, 
because this is firstly and above all, your grief.’’ (Mayor Van Aartsen, The Hague, Algemeen 
Dagblad, 2014e) 
In a positive article, relatives speak about the mayoral support they feel (De Gooi- 
en Eemlander 2014). Two articles (De Gelderlander 2014; Eindhovens Dagblad 2014) 
interview relatives, who are both positive in relation to the involvement of their own 
mayor when he visited them for his support towards. One of these articles discussed the 
fact that even the busy mayor from Amsterdam made time to visit bereaved families, 
which was regarded as remarkable: 
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‘At first I wondered how we could obtain emotional benefit from such a man in a suit. 
But then you feel his involvement and practical issues become almost irrelevant. It was 
a precious moment‘, one relative says. Another relative: ‘He stayed with us for one hour 
and a half.’ (. . .) ‘Sincerely interested. He assured me of his support. His literal words: 
‘what might take you one-and-ahalf week of kicking bureaucratic doors, often takes one 
phonecall by me. Use this.’ He kept his word, right away.’ (De Gelderlander 2014). 
Negative articles referred to the earlier remarks about the daughter of president 
Putin by the mayor of Hilversum. However, the same mayor received positive criticism as 
well, especially about the way he supported his community in their struggle. News articles 
also refer positively to his presence at the military base in the city of Hilversum, where 
long lines of hearses, carrying the remains, arrived for forensic investigations. 
3.1.3 Articles during stage III 
The articles in stage III were mostly neutral (81; 81.8%). Two articles report on two mayors 
who fulfilled a task in the ceremonial transport of the remains of the victims of MH17. 
‘With the arrival of the last seven coffins with remains of passengers of flight MH17, 
the mission ended Saturday. (. . .) Mayor Van Gijzel, minister Ard van der Steur (Safety 
and Justice) and other dignitaries joined the ceremony at Eindhoven Airforce Base.’ 
(Eindhovens Dagblad 2015b). 
Hours later, another regional newspaper reports on the arrival of the hearses: 
‘For the ninth time, mayor Pieter Broertjes from Hilversum lays down a wreath at 
the entrance of the institute where the forensic investigations take place’ (De Gooi- en 
Eemlander 2015a). 
In an interview one year after the crash, the mayor explains how he felt under 
those circumstances. ‘I always wondered what it meant. I thought: I am the father of 
my children, but I came so close to those families and was confronted with their grief. 
They needed an arm around their shoulder, compassion, and I could provide it. This is 
how I changed from a mayor [burgemeester] into a citizenfather [burgervader].’ (mayor 
Broertjes, Hilversum, De Gooi- en Eemlander, 2015b). 
Positive articles (14; 14.1%) underlined the solidarity in towns and the central role the 
mayors played in supporting this. Relatives spoke about the visit of a mayor in a positive 
manner (Het Parool 2014b). The MH17 disaster was mentioned several times in New Year 
speeches. Two examples of positive judgments in newspaper articles: 
‘For a short moment it becomes too much for mayor . . . at the start of his New Year 
speech. Talking about last year0s MH17 disaster that took the life of a resident touched 
him deeply. ‘I am getting a bit emotional’. He said as he gazed shortly in the direction of 
victim’s father. It characterizes the mayor, who sincerely supports and cares about his 
citizens’ (about mayor Ederveen, Valkenswaard, Eindhovens Dagblad, 2015a) 
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‘The mayor delivers an impressive speech. He inspires with words like ‘together’, 
connectedness, the sharing of success and drawbacks but does not leave his concerns 
unmentioned. I see that through the years he has grown into his role as a ‘citizenfather’. 
This role fits him perfectly. He receives a well-earned and loud applause. Well done!’ 
(about mayor Meijer, Zwolle, De Weekkrant 2015). 
Again, negative articles (4; 4.0%) refer to the Putinremark and the absence of the 
mayor of Maastricht at the time people in the city expected him to join the memorials. 
One of the bereaved directed a negative reflection not so much at a mayor in particular, 
but at the inequality in the approach of MH-17 bereaved by mayors in general, in relation 
to other losses of close family members: 
‘A friend of mine lost her child in a car accident. In her situation, the mayor did not 
visit her. In her situation, not everyone was showing compassion. It would have done her 
good as well. You want to be heard.’ (NRC Handelsblad, 2014a) 
3.2. Findings from tweets 
We identified a total of 1.698 tweets. The number of tweets fluctuates during stage I 
and II and showed several peaks in the number of tweets and times with relative little 
activity on Twitter (see Figure 1). We found 811 tweets for stage I (with peaks at the day 
of the National Memorial), 312 tweets for stage II (with a peak during the arrival of the 
wreckage of MH17 at the Gilze-Rijen Airforce Base on December 12th) and 575 tweets 
for stage III (with a peak on the first anniversary on 17 July 2015). 
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3.2.1. Tweets during stage I 
During the first month, the largest amount of tweets was sent during the first week after 
the disaster. A second increase of tweets occurred around August 17th, 2014, when a 
local remembrance gathering was held in Hilversum, a town with 15 casualties among the 
passengers of MH17, the highest number in the Netherlands. During stage I, tweets were 
overwhelmingly neutral (695 tweets; 85.7%). Neutral tweets mainly referred to mayors 
who confirm that people from their municipalities were on board of the MH17 aircraft 
and expressed their feelings of shock and compassion. Later, these tweets were followed 
by announcements of mayors who interrupted their holidays to come back home, open 
or sign public condolence registries, the retrenchment of festivities and the contributions 
of mayors to local memorial services. 
Two examples of neutral tweets, which give a factual description of the situation: 
‘Minute of silence by mayor Pieter Smit during the Night of Winschoten festivities 
#MH17’ (@timothydeklerk, 18 July 2014) 
‘Mayor Van der Laan interrupts his holidays as well, due to MH17’ (@annemijnvh, 
19 July 2014)
Positive tweets (42 tweets; 5.2%) usually referred to the words the mayors chose 
during commemoration activities, their support to the next of kin and the way in which 
they fulfilled their crisis tasks in general. 
‘Impressive gathering at the #CentralSquare with compassionate and encouraging 
words from the mayor! #MH17 #Breda’ (@GB_Breda, 23 July 2014) 
Negative tweets (74 tweets; 9.1%) were dominated by remarks of the mayor who 
asked for the expulsion of Putin’s daughter. Other negative tweets discussed the decision 
of the mayor of Nijmegen, who banned the traditional flower parade at the finish line 
(the Via Gladiola) of the International Four Days Marches. 
‘Ridiculous. Mayor Bruls bans flowers. There was supposed to be some kind of 
memorial at the finish line anyway #MH17 #ViaGladiola’ (@Widtvoet, 18 July 2014)
3.2.2. Tweets during stage II 
In this stage, the amount of tweets regarding the activities of mayors in the aftermath of 
the disaster is relatively low, until November 10th, 2014. The period up to November 10th 
(Stage II) consisted of 312 tweets. Again, most tweets (286 tweets; 91.7%) were neutral, 
while positive tweets (23 tweets; 7.4%) referred to similar circumstances as the tweets 
in stage I, such as references to mayors who appeared at tributes: 
‘Beautiful and moving tribute from Mayor Van Aartsen for victims from The Hague 
MH17’ (@Esther-Habers, 18 September 2014) 
and a message directly aimed at Mayor Delissen (Peel en Maas): 
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‘@BurgDelissen True. Emotion and delight. Finally they are together again. Thank you 
for your empathy! #supportsus #MH17’ (@IngridSmets, 13 October 2014) 
Three tweets had a negative tone-of-voice (1.0%). These tweets refer to the earlier 
mentioned remarks of the mayor of Hilversum who advocated the expulsion of the 
daughter of President Putin, and his attendance at the National Memorial Service: 
‘Did the retarded mayors forget about their colleague, who criticized Putin and 
his daughter because of the Russian BUK rocket which was aimed at the #MH17?’ 
(@gRUTTEnsEU, 30 October 2014) 
3.2.3. Tweets during stage III
This stage covered 575 tweets. It reached a peak in the week of July 10-17, 2015, when 
preparations were discussed for the first anniversary of the crisis. Most tweets were 
labelled as ‘neutral’ (486 tweets; 84.5%). Two negative tweets are aimed at the mayor of 
Naarden, who joins radio show ‘Twee Dingen’ in which she explains the mayoral duties 
during MH17: 
‘Why do I feel uncomfortable when I hear the mayor of Naarden talk about victims 
of MH17? PR show for herself? #tweedingen’ (@ruitjesspinsels, 16 July 2015) 
The largest set of ‘positive’ (8.5%) and ‘negative’ tweets (7.0%) are part of a discussion, 
coined by the mayor of Noordenveld. He commented that ‘all the attention for MH17 
is getting disproportional, especially when compared to other incidents where people 
perish.’ Of all negative posts in this stage, 32 tweets refer to the mayor as ‘incapable for 
the job’: 
‘Mayor Hans v.d. Laan of #Noordenveld, believes the attention for #MH17 is getting 
disproportional. Time to resign.’ (@willemwjoo, 18 July 2015)
In total, 29 Twitter users just agree with the mayor (positive posts). 
‘Actually, I agree. Injustice. Mayor from province of Drenthe takes attention to #MH17 
‘injustice’’ (@judithinnoord, 18 July 2015) 
4. DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was ‘to assess which MH17-related activities (or absence 
of certain activities) of Dutch mayors were mentioned in the (social) media and if and 
how they were evaluated at different stages during the first year after this disaster?’ We 
focused on newspapers and Twitter as sources of information on (social) media. 
As mentioned in the introduction, from a mayoral point of view, the MH17 disaster 
happened elsewhere but nevertheless had implications ‘back home’. Whereas the public 
performance of a mayor and the process of political responsibility and accountability 
afterwards usually seem to be closely connected (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003; Gasper & Reeves, 
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2011; Lay, 2009; Resodihardjo, van Eijk & Carroll, 2012), this was not the case with the MH17. 
In the aftermath of MH17, there were no blame games, and no political accountability 
concerning evacuation orders, permits or disaster management in general (an element 
mayors are all too familiar with in the aftermath of crises within the boundaries of their 
own municipality). The downing of MH17 was a situation that occurred outside their 
sphere of influence. Political partisanship was no issue in the aftermath of MH17 either. 
The King appoints Dutch mayors independent of their political preference, though 98% is 
member of a political party (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2015). Only in 
two instances, a mayor was asked to use her political contact. Furthermore, 13 negative 
tweets referred to the political party of the mayor who initiated the discussion about 
the daughter of Putin. In two instances, the political party was mentioned in positive 
tweets about a memorial gathering. In newspaper articles, the political parties were of 
no importance either. 
Findings showed that the local society regarded the activities of mayors as neutral-
to-slightly-positive contributions: they publically announced and confirmed the names 
of the passengers who died in the tragedy, they attended and publicly spoke at memorial 
services, they were supportive to the bereaved and mourned together with the local 
communities. We did not find striking differences in the description of mayors in news 
articles compared to tweets. Apparently, both newspaper articles and tweets valued 
mayors in a similar manner. 
When the attendance of a mayor at a memorial, bringing his condolences or 
interrupting his holidays is described in a neutral manner, one should realize that it is 
apparently worth mentioning anyway. Even though a large proportion of the neutral 
tweets described these kinds of situations, we decided to code them other-than-’neutral’-
only in those cases when it explicitly had such a tone-of-voice. 
A possible explanation for the neutrality in more than 80% of news articles and 
tweets, is the absence of direct political responsibility. However, the absence of political 
responsibility for the occurrence of the disaster does not automatically indicate the 
absence of responsibility for the aftermath. A clear example is the Katrina disaster 
and its aftermath. Arceneaux and Stein (2006) found, that under crisis circumstances, 
citizens attributed blame out of a desire to maintain a sense of control. It suggests, at 
the very least, that mayors are evaluated even in situations where they have no direct 
political responsibility. Research on the crisis leadership styles on the Queensland floods 
(De Bussy et al., 2012) presented similar findings, where Queensland Premier Anna 
Bligh was perceived to be inspirational and charismatic and Australian Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard ‘s communication style was characterized as ‘robotic and rehearsed’. One 
is, therefore, not only evaluated on the basis of direct political responsibility and 
actions. The way in which a political leader presents his- or herself must be taken into 
account as well. As such, the fact that mayors had no responsibility in the downing 
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of MH17 itself, does not explain why the majority of news articles and tweets can be 
considered as ‘neutral’. Of course, the MH17 disaster did not affect local communities 
in the Netherlands the way natural disasters such as floodings would, in terms of the 
destruction of homes, infrastructures and facilities. Future research following similar 
disasters, such as the disaster with Germanwings flight 9525 in France (24 March 2015), 
may provide more data to elaborate on this particular explanation considering that the 
MH17 and Germanwings flight 9525 are similar ‘distant crises’ from the viewpoint of 
Dutch and German mayors. 
As an alternative explanation, we should realize that a ‘neutral’ and factual article 
or tweet might not necessarily reflect the underlying emotions. Particularly in the case 
of people who attend memorial gatherings, one might feel social pressure to be either 
neutral or positive. When more is known about the motivation of the sender, such a 
tweet carrying could be considered ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. This information is currently 
unavailable. 
When we look at the ‘negative tweets’ during stage I to III, we do not find any negative 
tweets by people who join the ceremonies themselves. Negative tweets are all on other 
subjects, from the remarks about the daughter of Putin to the flower ban during the 
Four Day Marches. Are memorial gatherings, in other words, circumstances in which 
it might become rather inappropriate to be outspokenly negative about a mayor? In 
that line of thought, a negative experience does not necessarily translate into a negative 
tweet. A study by Gibbs, Meese, Arnold, Nansen and Carter (2015) explains the main 
purpose of social media at funerals, in particular Instagram, as a way to signal one’s 
presence and emotional circumstances to a wider social network. A proof of ‘being there’ 
might be more relevant than the experience itself and/or the way one describes it. That 
being the case, however, should not refrain columnists in newspapers from accurately 
covering and commenting on it, unless they also feel similar social pressure. Hearsum 
(2012) analysed the detailed coverage of Amy Winehouse’s death in British press. In that 
particular situation, the press did discuss the funeral and not only commented on the 
flowers, but also on the more negative experiences with empty vodka bottles, beer cans 
and attention-seeking visitors in front of her house (Hearsum, 2012). Since newspaper 
articles did hardly express a negative tone either, this might indicate that the underlying 
experiences that were reported through articles and tweets, were perhaps similar to the 
way they were written down. We have no reason to assume that negative experiences 
with mayors in the aftermath of MH17 were covered with the cloak of charity, though 
we cannot completely rule out this possibility. But, even if this were (sometimes) the 
case, it did not appear on the public stage on which the performance of mayors and crisis 
managers will be evaluated (Boin et al., 2006b). It was outside the scope of this study to 
assess to which extent journalists and Twitter users disclose their private and personal 
opinions. 
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As described in the results section, one mayor of a larger city did not attend a 
memorial service but preferred to continue his holidays when others decided to come 
back. He attracted negative press, an indication that journalist and Twitter users apparently 
expected the mayor to join local memorial services. This interesting finding, i.e., being 
criticized on not employing an activity instead of being criticized on a completed activity, 
clearly suggests that mayors face certain expectations concerning their ‘duties’ after an 
‘a-typical’ disaster as explained above. Other mayors did attend memorial services and 
gatherings and this was noted without any specific comment. Similarly, the fact that several 
mayors discontinued their holidays and came back was taken for granted. Tweets noticed 
that mayors interrupted their holidays, but without further remarks like ‘impressive he 
comes back from holidays’ or something similar. Newspaper articles wrote about it as 
something which was taken for granted and not, as one might expect, as something 
extraordinary. This suggests that these mayors just did what they were supposed to do 
in this situation: attend and give a voice to the collective mourning. 
Public speaking after crises is regarded as ‘meaning making’, the leadership task of 
communicating the broader impacts of a crisis to citizens, media and other stakeholders 
(Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2005; Jong et al. 2016b). Often, ‘meaning making’ is a 
highly symbolic function, fulfilling the need for direction and guidance (Boin, Kuipers & 
Overdijk, 2013). Regarding the Dutch mayors in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster, the 
public perspective reflects the role of mayors in finding words to describe the collective 
impact, including their participation in social gatherings. What we identified is also 
what Kofman Bos, ‘t Hart and Ullberg (2005) refer to as ‘remembering’. According to 
them, it consists of publicly acknowledging that many crises and disasters are traumatic 
experiences for the victims, responders and the organizations and communities involved, 
as well as responsively accommodating the desire that the community should ‘never 
forget’. The local memorials, the national memorial on 10 November 2014 and the first 
anniversary are all examples of ‘remembering’ in which mayors took the lead locally, or 
joined a larger, public event. 
However, we also noticed that mayors visited the bereaved families at home and 
supported them in their material needs. It is a less visible but presumably nevertheless a 
highly appreciated role. Thus far, public leaders are warned as they often fall prey to their 
own unrealistic promises to victims (Boin et al., 2003). According to identified articles and 
tweets, there were no public remarks indicating that mayoral promises were evaluated 
as unrealistic or their involvement was purely symbolic. They supported the families with 
practical issues whenever needed, and lent a highly appreciated ‘listening ear’, as the 
articles from stage II (Eindhovens Dagblad 2014; De Gelderlander 2014) and stage III (Het 
Parool 2014b) showed. We realize that this more private perspective comes from just three 
interviews with the next of kin. On the other hand, we did not find any interview where this 
specific role of mayors was disliked. It is at least an indication of an apparent valuable and 
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valued role for mayors in the aftermath of crises. All in all, mayors appear to have functioned 
on both public and private stages as the facilitator whose task is not only to manage the 
crisis, but also to support the healing process from disaster to restoration (Griffin- Padgett 
et al., 2010). They were evaluated accordingly. Where ‘meaning making’ and ‘remembering’ 
depart from a public dimension, the ‘listening ear’ and support with practical issues are far 
more private, although interviews with family members elevate it to a public perspective 
again. Sometimes the public and private stages meet, as the example where two mayors 
presented themselves as a spokesperson on request of the victims’ family showed. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND LIMITATIONS 
The findings and conclusions of the present study are indicative for the role mayors can 
fulfil as mourners-in- chief in local communities (see also Fastenberg, 2011 on presidents 
as mourner-in-chief), but should be further validated by other studies on similar and 
dissimilar types of disaster to improve our understanding of the ‘modus operandi’ of 
mayors during and after crises. 
In addition, some study limitations should be discussed. The collection of newspaper 
articles was limited to national and regional newspapers. We are aware we missed 
newspaper clippings from local newspapers (not captured by LexisNexis Academic), 
although we assume that a fierce local debate about the activities of a mayor in the 
aftermath of this (and other) disasters, would rapidly have reached the regional 
newspapers as well (and vice versa). 
In theory, it is possible that we missed some tweets in the study period because they 
were posted and deleted by users afterwards. The present study focused on newspapers 
articles and Twitter. In the Netherlands, there currently are approximately 1 million daily 
Twitter users (Jong & Dückers, 2016a) on a population of 17 million people. As such, we 
believe it is a representative, mainstream social medium. We did not analyse other (social) 
media such as TV, radio, Facebook or Instagram. In principle, it is possible that they added 
information to the stage by which the performance of mayors will be evaluated, and that 
it would differ from the articles and tweets we identified. However, we believe that is 
highly unlikely that, for instance, negative evaluations of the performances of mayors are 
restricted or very skewed to one of the (social) media. 
The MH17-disaster was an unusual kind of crisis from a mayoral point of view since 
the downing itself happened thousands of miles away from his/her municipality. While in 
ordinary crisis situations, mayors have to combine several tasks, from chairing the crisis 
team to using their legislative powers, this crisis primarily asked for ‘meaning making’, 
‘remembering’ and, more privately, taking care of practical needs and lend a ‘listening 
ear’ to the bereaved. 
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From an academic perspective, the study suggests that the public role of mayors 
can be considered as a table stake or conditio sine qua non. One is expected to deliver 
on ‘meaning making’ and ‘remembering’, but it is hard to get this behaviour reflected as 
‘appreciation’ in news articles or on social media. Only a few mayors received appreciation 
for the words they spoke during memorial services and silent marches. That said, if one 
fails to deliver, it easily punishes a mayor with a significant disadvantage. We discussed 
three of such examples. In the case of the mayor of Noordenveld, who publically suggested 
that the coverage of MH17 was disproportional compared to other smaller incidents (see 
Helsloot, 2007; which is correct from the viewpoint that high-quality support to people 
affected by disasters should, among others, be equal: Dückers & Thormar, 2015), the 
remark let to a debate on Twitter in which people either doubted his mayoral capabilities 
and others agreed. 
Where it is hard to get appreciation for the public role, interviews report about 
the distinct appreciation the mayors received from victims’ families, whenever mayors 
visited them in the privacy of their homes to lend a ‘listening ear’, and to discuss their 
material needs. Although they are public leaders, they also bring an essential element 
of private aftercare into practice (see Hobfoll, Watson, Bell, Bryant, Brymer & Friedman, 
2007). Apparently, one does neglect the importance of direct contact between a mayor 
and the next of kin, when mayors are only evaluated through public lenses and the 
focus is exclusively put on the collective impact. We learnt that the mayor of Hilversum, 
even though he was generally criticized on his remarks on Putin’s daughter, was highly 
appreciated for the relationship he maintained with the families. 
Further study on the appreciation of victims’ families themselves, other than through 
interviews in newspapers, might deepen our understanding of the interaction between 
the collective and more private aspects of mayors’ involvement as a ‘citizen father’. This 
also counts for the more indirect influence they might have on the recovery of the families, 
through public acknowledgements in terms of ‘meaning making’ and ‘remembering’. 
Of course, mayors might have their own goals as well. After all, crises can be 
opportunities for communities, organizations and individual actors to both strengthen 
resilience and increase their reputation and legitimacy (Olsson, 2014). Mayors may want to 
use their public or private role in order to reach those kinds of crisis communication goals. 
Further research on the perceived purpose of public ‘meaning making’, ‘remembering’, 
the more private aspects of the ‘citizen father’ and the interaction between both aspects 
is welcomed, not in the last place among mayors themselves. It might provide specific 
guidance for crisis situations where people expect the mayor to appear, whether it is a 
large disaster or a smaller, emotional incident. 
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The perspective of the affected: 
what people confronted with disasters expect 
from government officials and public leaders
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confronted with disasters expect from government officials and public leaders. Risk, Hazards 
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Despite available knowledge on appropriate psychosocial support for people confronted 
with death, loss and severe stress in the context of major crises and disasters, it is crucial 
to understand what people affected expect from government officials and public leaders 
in the aftermath of an extreme event. Eight interviews with affected adult residents were 
conducted to explore their expectations and experiences in relation to government. 
This was done against the background of Park’s (2016) model on meaning making. 
Findings revealed that interviewees expected the government to help them in a fair, 
compassionate, equal and reliable manner. They also expected support in fulfilling event-
related practical needs, and assumed that the government would use its capacity to align 
network partners and break down bureaucratic barriers. The affected individuals’ global 
beliefs and situational meaning may differ from the perceptions of the public leader who 
provides support. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In times of collective crisis, public leaders are supposed to give meaning to crises, often 
with the help of symbolism and public displays of compassion (Boin et al. 2005, 2016; 
Dückers, Yzermans et al. 2017). The leadership task of meaning making, or communicating 
the broader impacts of a crisis to citizens, media and other stakeholders, is regarded 
as one of the crucial tasks in crisis management (Boin et al. 2005, 2016). Their public 
acknowledgement might contribute to a collective sense of connectedness and hope 
(Griffin-Padget and Alisson 2010; Jong, Dückers et al. 2016a; Dückers, Yzermans et al. 
2017). 
This collective meaning making can also have a positive effect on the individual´s 
resilience and recovery from stressful events on a personal level (Park 2016). One might 
feel supported by a society that shows understanding for the unique and difficult position 
of the affected (Maercker and Müller 2004). Finding personal meaning in what happened 
may help to reduce people’s feelings of vulnerability and fosters adjustment by restoring 
people’s fundamental belief in a world that is benevolent, predictable, and meaningful 
(Updegraff, Silver et al. 2008). 
Of course, everyone experiences a crisis situation differently. The particular setting 
of private, personal and public life influences the way in which people experience the 
impact of their crisis and the meaning they assign to the event. Hobfoll’s “theory of 
the conservation of resources” suggests that people strive to retain, project, and build 
resources (e.g. a stable family life, a home, financial security, self-esteem) and people 
might be drawn into a downward spiral when they face the loss of such resources (Hobfoll 
1998), while finding meaning helps to retain such resources. The meaning they assign to 
an event is not a stand-alone process, but is influenced by the meaning making of public 
leaders and others. 
Even though the bereaved are important stakeholders for government, little is known 
about their expectations and the interactions with government when confronted with 
major crises or disasters. Research on psychosocial support tends to focus on the support 
that survivors and next of kin receive from family members, friends, neighbors, and co-
workers - in other words, those who are in existing and close relationships with the 
recipients (Nurullah 2012), or on the support provided by professional care providers like 
general practitioners, mental health professionals and social workers (Bisson, Tavakoly et 
al. 2010; Suzuki and Kim 2012). Others focus on the practicalities in relation to efforts to 
rebuild after crisis and the like (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2010). In their study, Maercker 
and Müller (2004) consider the support given by public figures (e.g. mayor, priest) as a 
building block in a construct for social acknowledgement on an individual level, but they 
do not specify the necessary depth and appearances of such support. 
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Studies on the aftermath of the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 give some 
insight into such public and social acknowledgement (Torenvlied, Giebels et al. 2015; Jong, 
Dückers et al. 2016b), showing that individual support by representatives of government 
was appreciated. In this particular case, public leaders visited bereaved families at home 
and supported them in their material needs (Jong, Dückers et al. 2016b). In this case, public 
leaders got into direct contact with people affected after the crises and can be regarded as 
the providers of psychosocial support. Still, little is known about the preferred nature of this 
support and what type of behavior by government officials the people confronted with loss 
and the stressful impact of major crises and disasters, would consider optimal. 
The importance of getting more insight into the role of representatives of government’s 
specific role as providers of psychosocial support is grounded in the positive or negative 
influence they might have on the potential distress among affected people in a given 
crisis situation (Park 2013, 2016). People confronted interpret the event within a larger 
global context that is part of their personal belief system. A mismatch between global 
meaning (people’s global beliefs of the world, fundamental beliefs about themselves and 
their place in the world) and assigned situational meaning of a major crisis or disaster by 
the individual leads to distress (Park 2016). For example, when someone expressed that 
the government should be supportive to people in need (global belief), but experienced 
a lack of support when she was hit by a disaster herself (situational meaning), this might 
create a source of stress.
The influence of meaning making by government on the situational meaning has a 
public and a more private route. First, when a crisis hits a community, public leaders attend 
public gatherings and give a public voice to the collective mourning, usually reflected in 
media coverage. They give meaning to a situation by providing hope and helping victims 
to make sense of what happened (Griffin-Padget and Alisson 2010). Second, public leaders 
tend to visit bereaved families at home and support them in their material and practical 
needs directly (Torenvlied, Giebels et al. 2015; Jong, Dückers et al. 2016b). This is the 
more private route.
When Park’s framework (2016) is applied to this specific role of government in the 
meaning making of people in a disaster setting, we come to three categories that play a 
crucial role in the process of individual meaning making: 1) global meaning, 2) situational 
meaning based on governmental support on collective level, 3) situational meaning based 
on governmental support on individual level.
An analysis of expectations is a relevant route to explore in order to assess how meaning 
making by representatives of government contributes to the assigned meaning by the 
people confronted with crises. In this line of thought, living up to the expectations might 
prevent a potential and additional source of stress. Vice versa, when the expectations of 
the support by government in the case of the affected differ from the support offered, 
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this might potentially lead to an increased level of stress and disappointment. Also, the 
insights into the expectations of people who were confronted with crises might help us to 
bring psychosocial support by government officials and public leaders forward. According 
to Hobfoll, Watson et al. (2007), there are five empirically supported intervention 
principles that should be used to guide and inform intervention. These are reflected 
in the extent to which one promotes a sense of safety, calmness, self- and community 
efficacy, connectedness to others, and hope. Benedek and Fullerton (2007) pledge to 
incorporate these principles into policy and practice, which requires acknowledgement, 
acceptance, and incorporation into the efforts of community leaders and others (Benedek 
and Fullerton 2007). Implementation of the principles enables government officials and 
public leaders to serve as a necessary “vehicle” for the provision of social acknowledgment 
towards affected people, and contribute to bringing the principles into practice (Benedek 
and Fullerton 2007; Dückers, Yzermans et al. 2017). 
FIGURE. 1. Park’s Meaning Making Model (2016) applied to context of governmental support
Objective
The objective of this study is of an explorative nature. What do people confronted 
with major crises or disasters, expect from their government in general and public 
leaders in particular? Answering this research question might tell us how government 
representatives (civil servants) and public leaders can use their position and influence in 
Global 
meaning
(based on Park 2016)
Situational 
meaning
(based on Park 2016)
Global meaning based on fundamental 
values to guide government 
(transparency, reliability, equality etc.)
Situational meaning based on 
governmental support on collective level 
(e.g. in public gatherings and media)
Situational meaning based on 
governmental support on individual level 
(e.g. in one-on-one contacts or home visits)
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order to live up to expectations, align their meaning making and lower distress, frustration 
and disappointment among the bereaved. It is an indispensable first step in order to 
optimize the potential functioning of public leaders as a psychosocial support “vehicle” 
to remove such sources of distress. 
2. METHOD
Design
For this study we used an exploratory qualitative method with semi-structured interviews. 
It consists of an analysis of eight interviews with people who experienced a major crisis 
or disaster, or its aftermath. 
Since we focus on the meaning making aspects of the interaction between citizens 
who experienced a major crisis or disaster and civil servants or public leaders, this 
interaction is the main topic on which the sample of interviews is based. It is clear that 
every individual has his or her personal experiences during and in the aftermath of crises. 
Even within groups of affected individuals such experiences might differ. But to be able 
to analyze a broad scope of interactions between government and individuals, we chose 
to also vary in the role of government (local government vs. national government). As a 
result, only those interviewees were selected who had had a personal experience with 
one of the top ten crisis or disasters which hit The Netherlands over the last 25 years and 
had, in some way or another, been in contact with officials from different levels within 
government (e.g. mayors, civil servants, ministers, members of Royal Family). 
Interviews were carried out according to QOREQ guidelines of qualitative studies 
(Tong, Sainsbury et al. 2007).
Research team
The 2008-interviews [1-7] were all conducted by the first author (male) and a fellow-
researcher (female). Both were experienced in conducting depth interviews. Prior to the 
interviews, subjects were unknown to the interviewers. Interviewees were approached 
by a letter on behalf of Impact - the Dutch national knowledge center for post-disaster 
psychosocial support - in which the goal of the study and the background of the 
researchers were explained. After two weeks, the researchers contacted the subjects 
and arranged for the interviews. All subjects approached were motivated to participate. 
Interview [8] was solely conducted by the first author. The interviewee was approached 
after she had given a presentation on her experiences with Dutch government officials 
in the aftermath of an air crash.
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Setting and Participants
To obtain a heterogeneous sample, Dutch affected residents of different crises were 
selected (see table I). The sole criterion for inclusion was the personal experience of 
Dutch nationals with civil servants or public leaders during one of the top ten major crises 
or disasters, which hit The Netherlands over the last 25 years. As such, we were able to 
analyze a wide variety in crisis experiences. Participants were selected on the basis of 
a desk research, as parts of their stories had been covered in the media. All interviews 
were conducted at the home of the participants, except for interview [7] which was 
conducted at work. 
One participant [3] was a farmer whose farm suffered from foot-and-mouth disease. 
This participant was included, based on his personal experiences with governmental 
regulation on preventing the spread of the disease. He lost his farm and went bankrupt 
as a result of the outbreak. He had strong opinions on the impact of the outbreak 
management procedures on his own cattle, which he perceived to be a “governmental 
case of animal abuse”. 
Interviewees [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7] were directly involved in a major crisis or disaster 
themselves, or lost family members. Interviewee [8] lost her brother, sister-in-law and 
nephew, and became guardian of another nephew, who was the sole survivor of an 
airplane crash. In some cases, other family members joined the interview as well. All 
participants were aware that the aim of the interviews was their publication. In one 
case, parents told the researchers that they were hesitant in sharing their experiences, 
but that the aim of the study convinced them to cooperate, as it might help government 
to further improve its support in similar cases. All participants had the Dutch nationality. 
Table I gives an overview of the interviews together with a short event description.
The single interviews were conducted in 2008 and 2017 and lasted on average two hours. 
Participants were specifically asked to describe their experiences in the aftermath of the 
major crisis or disaster. The interview protocol included a series of broad interview questions 
based on prior desk research about the crisis or disaster at hand. For convenience, the 
interviewees were asked to describe their situation in a chronological order. 
Also, they were asked to share their observations on the role of government in 
general as well as their personal expectations and experiences in relation to governmental 
actors. The interviews were analyzed using a grounded theory method (Charmaz and 
Belgrave 2012).
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The transcripts of the interviews were 
supplemented with field notes and then edited. After a factual check by the interviewees, 
the interviews were published online and used for publication (Jong and van der Post 
2008). The interview about the Tripoli air crash [8] was published by the Dutch Association 
of Mayors (Jong 2017a).
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1. Tsunami Phuket, Thailand 2004
(Interview with parents who lost their 9-months old daughter. In total, 
approximately 230,000–280,000 people died.)
2. Bombing in Bali, Indonesia in 2002
(Interview with parents who lost their son in de Paddy’s Pub bombing. In total, 
202 people died.)
3. Foot and mouth disease outbreak in Barneveld, The Netherlands, 2001
(Interview with farmer whose animals were killed in an attempt to stop the 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease)
4. Pub fire in Volendam, The Netherlands, 2001 
(Interview with parents who lost their daughter in a pub fire. In total, 14 
youngsters died.) 
5. Explosion of fireworks factory in Enschede, The Netherlands, 2000
(Interview with parents who lost their son in the explosion. In total, 22 people 
died.)
6. Outbreak of legionellosis (veterans’ disease) at flower exhibition in Bovenkarspel, 
The Netherlands, 1999 
(Interview with son who lost his father. In total, 32 people died).
7. Crash of El Al Boeing in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1992 
(Interview with mother who lost her son and his girlfriend. In total, 43 people 
died).
8. Crash of air plane in Tripoli, Libya, 2010
(Interview with guardian of the only survivor of airplane crash in Tripoli, who lost 
his parents and his brother. Most of the passengers were Dutch citizens returning 
from holiday in South Africa. In total, 103 people died, among 70 with the Dutch 
nationality).
* For a complete transcript of interviews 1-7 see Jong & Van der Post (2008). Interview 8 is 
published elsewhere (Jong 2017a)
Data Analysis
Both authors coded the narratives and compared their findings based on the model 
shown in figure 1.
The data were analyzed using the following three questions, based on the main 
research question of the study: (1) what were global beliefs of people affected 
concerning the values that should guide government as an institute (e.g. individuals’ 
global beliefs can refer to a fair world, where the government is always neutral, 
supportive and transparent)?; (2) what were their experiences with government as 
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a representative body in the collective domain (e.g. how did individuals experience 
public remembrances and memorials)?; and (3) what were their personal experiences 
with civil servants or public leaders (e.g. how did individuals experience the one-on-
one interactions with representatives)? 
Whether or not the expectations of individuals were influenced by other affected 
people was not part of the study. In our explorative analysis, we use the part shown in 
figure 1 (instead of Park’s complete model) as a conceptual framework to categorize 
our findings on the relationship between the affected and the government. Information 
from the interviews was structured along these themes and can be found in the next 
paragraph. Numbers refer to the label of the interview. A summary of findings is provided 
at the end of the next paragraph. Detailed information from each interview is included 
in the Appendix.
3.RESULTS
3.1. Global Meaning: Expectation of Government on an Institutional Level
Protect and Offer Help
The respondents reflected on their experiences on an overarching level. They expressed 
strong expectations of government in general, where government has an obligation to 
protect people [1,8] and should help people under difficult circumstances [2,3,8] in an 
equal, reliable and fair manner [3,4,6]. Assisting citizens in times of crisis is regarded 
as government’s first obligation and also as something completely normal [1,2,5,8]. 
Government is perceived as an actor that should always offer solutions in times of crises, 
also when problem-solving by other actors fails [3]. 
Be Heard and Understand the Suffering
The bereaved expressed the desirability of being heard. It was important to them to 
share their side of the story with politicians, investigation committees and media. “The 
Investigation Committee did their work properly, but (…) the victims and their families 
had no voice in the report. You cannot find anything about how we were treated by 
the government.” [1,2,3,4]. Generally speaking, they expected governments - including 
members of the Royal Family [3] - to understand their suffering [4,5].
Stick to Promises
In their relationship with people who experienced crises, government is supposed 
to show commitment. Whenever government made a promise, people affected 
expected government to stick to promises made [1,2]. They also expected clear and 
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transparent communications in order to align their expectations and perceptions and 
enable themselves to anticipate upon future steps [3]. Trust declined rapidly whenever 
government failed to offer what people affected expected [1,2,3,4,5,6].
Act Non-Politically
Political games, based on the crisis at hand, were not appreciated, particularly in those 
cases where people were blamed for exaggeration. “Minister of Agriculture Brinkhorst 
blamed the farmers of crying crocodile tears. He had no idea of the impact in our sector” 
(…) According to the Minister of Agriculture, we were only interested in money and 
compensation. On TV, he said that farmers got compensated. According to him, there 
was no reason to moan. [3]. In another instance, people felt they were used as pawns 
in a blame game when a Member of Parliament tweeted negatively about an embassy 
involved. According to the respondent, the tweet was used to fuel political blame games 
without knowing the details. “It wasn’t fair” [8].
3.2. Situational Meaning: Expectations of Government on a Collective Level
Collective Acknowledgement in Mourning and Remembrance
Often, the local community was involved in setting up remembrances [6,7,8] and 
sometimes in funding a memorial [6]. “The press was allowed in during the first few 
moments of the remembrance gathering and recorded the speech by our mayor. 
Afterwards, the more intimate ceremony began. It was all very balanced” [8]. The mayor is 
regarded as a representative towards the media and the community and sometimes asked 
media not to chase survivors or next of kin. It helped people to stay in relative anonymity 
[8]. Sometimes, mayors or aldermen even spoke at funerals but always on behalf of the 
municipality [5,8]. In cases where they attend public remembrances, an important reason 
for joining was the expectation that they would meet other survivors [1].
Inform and Involve in a Representative Role
Family members expected to be informed when ministers attended wreath-laying 
ceremonies that were related to their own crisis [2]. When attending remembrances abroad, 
they also expect to be informed since they believed the minister attended the ceremony 
on their behalf as well [2]. When governmental representatives attended other memorials, 
people affected compared the attention for a certain crisis with their own tragedy [2].
Find Causes of the Incident
Respondents differed in their appreciation of governmental investigation reports. On the one 
hand, they expected to get answers to burning questions on the cause of a crisis [4], but on the 
other hand, the bereaved knew or realized that it would never bring back the loved ones [7].
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Responsibility and Accountability
In three cases [4,5,6], the government carried a responsibility for the cause of the crisis. 
In one case [4], the government was fully responsible for the outbreak management after 
the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Only in this latter case, the interviewee was fully 
disappointed with the way in which the government handled the crisis [4]. In the other cases, 
there was a certain understanding for the situation. “The municipality was overwhelmed by 
this crisis. They did what they could” [6]. In one case, where the local municipality was held 
responsible, an alderman even spoke at the funeral [5]. In the situation of the pub fire, which 
was caused by a negligence of fire regulations and a lack of control by the local municipality, 
the disappointment of the parents focused on the role of the national government in the 
aftermath, not on the role of the local government in the cause of the fire [4].
3.3. Situational Meaning: Expectations of Government on an Individual Level
First Things First
Right after crises happened, respondents are not very much interested in visits from 
government representatives [1, 5], unless they offer practical support [5,7,8]. In other 
words, their first priority lies with solving the problems at hand. Afterwards, (personal) 
meetings with consuls, ambassadors, ministers and members of the Royal Family were 
generally appreciated and regarded as social, warm and kind [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8]: “Queen 
Beatrix and princess Máxima were at the remembrance. They talked emotionally. They 
truly understood what had happened to us. That was a beautiful moment.” [1]
Breakdown Bureaucratic Barriers
Respondents provided examples of the harsh truth encountered when bureaucracy turns 
government into an impersonal organization, which sticks to existing regulations. They 
expected government to manage the exceptional situation they are in. After losing his child 
in the Thailand tsunami, a father was fined by the municipality because he lost his driving 
license [1]. Other parents were fined, because they forgot to apply for an exemption [2]. 
According to Dutch law, they should have buried the body of their son within six working days. 
That was practically impossible because the body was unidentified and still in Indonesia [2]. 
In another interview, parents discussed the regulation with regard to a fundraising campaign. 
“After a fund-raising campaign, taxes had to be paid. In another fire, the tax authorities made 
an exception. I cannot explain why.” [4]. Similar regulatory burdens are met when parents want 
to enter a disaster zone. “We were not allowed to lay flowers at the spot where Nick died. We 
were not allowed to get back into the disaster zone, while the Queen visited the same zone” 
[5]. As crises usually overwhelm and impress the respondents, they found it hard to act against 
governmental decisions [2,4]. “We were too kind. If we would have had a bigger mouth, our 
daughter might possibly have survived”, two parents concluded [4].
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Psychosocial support: Acknowledgement and Listening Ear
Respondents confronted with major crises or disasters hardly ever looked for financial 
support; only the farmer whose farm suffered from foot-and-mouth disease asked 
for financial compensation, which he did not receive [3]. Saddened, he came to the 
conclusion that he can “only trust animals, not government” [3]. More than anything else, 
interviewees confronted with personal loss expect a listening ear, an understanding for 
their situation and support [1,2,3,4,5] partly because they usually did not know what the 
aftermath of crises would bring [8]. When government did not provide adequate social 
acknowledgement, they felt like they easily became the “victims of a forgotten disaster” 
[4, 6]. In crises where acknowledgement was provided, government became a “tower of 
strength” [8]. “In a symbolic sense, the support by the mayor gave us an enormous sense 
of safety”, one respondent said [8].
Sometimes, when people affected were disappointed in the relationship with 
government, they looked for alternatives. “We received more support from our priest, 
pastor Berkhout, who set up sessions for the parents who lost their child in the fire. That 
relation still exists.” [4]
Practical Support: Media Management and Practical Issues
Respondents trusted the government officials who supported them practically [1, 2, 8]. 
“As a relative, you do not know what you need and what the future will bring. Support 
by someone who is professionally involved gives you the support you need. It helps you 
to even rise above yourself. Even though the mayor does not know everything himself, 
he has the network and knowledge to help you” [8]. Practically speaking, support by 
communications professionals to help them manage the media, was appreciated as 
well [8]. As such, they did not have clear expectations, but feel supported whenever the 
government anticipated on the pressure from media and helped them with practical 
issues.
The main findings are summarized in table II. 
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TABLE II. Main findings based on interviews with people affected by crises and disasters
Category Main findings based on the interviews
Global meaning: 
Government as an 
institute
· Government is obligated to protect people [1, 8]
· Government should help under difficult circumstances [2,3,8]
· Government should enable people to be heard [1,2,3,4]
· Government should understand the suffering of affected 
people [4,5]
· The Royal Family is supposed to show commitment to those 
who suffer [3]
· Government should be reliable and stick to promises 
[1,2,3,4,5,6]







· The central role of public leaders (mayors) during crises 
is important as a representative towards the media and 
community and helps the affected to stay in relative 
anonymity [8]. 
· When governmental representatives act on behalf of affected 
people, they want to be taken into account and notified [2]
· When governmental representatives attend other memorials, 
affected people might compare this with their own tragedy [2]
· Representatives are sometimes invited to speak at funerals [5]
· Enabling to meet others is an important purpose of attending 
public remembrances [1] 
· Investigation reports may be useful when it helps to 
understand what happened [1,7]
· Responsibility and accountability of government in the cause 






· When survivors and bereaved are still in the heat of a 
crisis, their priority does not lie with meeting government 
representatives [1,5]
· Personal meetings with representatives of the Royal Family 
are usually highly appreciated [1,4]
· Governmental help with organizing remembrance gatherings 
is appreciated [1, 5,6,7,8]
· Whenever representatives start to talk about bureaucratic 
procedures, affected people do not regard it as “their” 
problem [1,2,4]
· Personal meetings with mayors are appreciated and regarded 
as social, warm and kind [1,2,5,8] 
· The affected appreciate practical support [8]
· Governmental spokespersons can support the family in media 
management [8]
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In the previous section, we explored the experiences and expectations of people 
confronted with major crises or disasters. Based on this study we conclude that a 
convincing “caring government” approach depends on expectations raised before a crisis 
hits a community - these expectations are embedded in long-term global beliefs of citizens 
about what governments should do when disaster strikes. The interviews shed a light 
on many expectations in terms of global and situational meaning. Ideally, taking care 
of such expectations should be the driver in a governmental philosophy of the “caring 
government”.
One could argue that the themes that were mentioned by the interviewees are 
universal themes and cover more generally governmental support. In particular, the 
findings on the level of global meaning, such as ‘provide support’ and ‘be transparent’, 
do not seem to be exclusively related to the domain of crisis management. That said, the 
interviewees shared moments of disappointment and stress. Apparently, government is 
not always capable to live up to the expectations of the bereaved. 
Those who felt support got the confidence to cope with the situation. A next of kin 
of the Tripoli air crash [8] said that the support gave her the feeling that she was capable 
of rising above herself. Others were disappointed for various reasons, from bureaucratic 
burdens [1, 2, 4], to their neglected role in public remembrances [1,2].
A possible explanation why not all expectations were met, might lie in the focus of 
government and its institutions in the aftermath of crises. Public leaders have, of course, 
more and other interests than the sole interests of the people who are directly confronted 
with the impact of major crises and disasters. While individuals are not always interested 
in the political and collective dimensions, media and politics are examples of stages on 
which public leaders and government are evaluated (Boin & Smith 2006). Those are 
stages with a focus on the collective dimensions of public leadership. Moreover, leaders 
are evaluated on how they solved the crisis at hand, while the role that followers play, 
is generally overlooked (Oc 2017). As such, actors in government might focus on their 
contribution on (situational) meaning making on a collective level. Unless the bereaved 
are in direct contact with their leaders or raise their voices in the media, their expectations 
won’t be heard in the collective domain.
Another explanation can be found in existing bureaucracy within government. The 
bereaved possibly underestimate its bureaucratic burdens. Their expectations of the 
discretion public leaders possess for shaping their situational behavior (Lipsky 1980) 
might be too high. The bereaved might underestimate the importance of procedures 
and regulations. Even though the outcome of bureaucracy might be unintended, such 
procedures also facilitate democratic control of far-reaching crisis management policies 
(Rosenthal, ‘t Hart et al. 1991).
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Sometimes, the bereaved have unrealistic expectations that cannot be met by 
government. Such mechanisms are known from risk management, where people seem 
to be able to distinguish between their own risk perception and what risks should be 
accepted once they are asked to reason from an administrator’s point of view (Helsloot 
& Schmidt, 2012). 
Individual dimension
In line with Hobfoll et al.’s (2007) five elements of interventions following crises and 
disasters, expectations and needs of the interviewees were broader than immediate safety. 
As soon as the crisis hits, the affected expect their government to be reliable at all times 
and take care of them in a compassionate manner. The analysis of the interviews shows 
that people clearly expect support in a reliable, transparent and equal manner. Affected 
people expect government not to differentiate between people and events. They expect 
to be treated on the basis of clear and fundamental values that are in line with their own 
personal, global beliefs. They expect a listening ear and experience great disappointment 
whenever government does not offer sufficient help or is contradictory in its support.
The interviews show that people also expect a government to use its available network 
and to lower bureaucratic barriers and lift regulations when appropriate. Where the 
general public expects intense collaboration and coordination of the necessary institutes 
during and after catastrophic crises (Kapucu and Van Wart 2006), people affected have 
similar expectations. They want to actually use whatever elements are available in the 
network. In order to rely on self- and community efficacy, government has to use all 
resources.
People affected by major crises and disasters expect help and acknowledgement, 
and want to be heard. Potential stressors arise, when public leaders ignore the people 
affected, do not adhere to their promises, are unable to take away bureaucratic burdens 
and get involved in political blame games. 
Public leaders are expected to reach out to these people, address their practical and 
non-practical needs and explicitly discuss expectations. 
Collective dimension
The interviews indicate that people affected by major crises and disasters tend to 
understand the collective dimension of crises. They are aware of the larger, societal 
impact of a crisis. As one of the interviews showed [8], the municipality sometimes helps 
families to organize a remembrance gathering where the press is allowed, before a more 
intimate ceremony begins from which the press is then excluded. Affected people also 
want to be informed whenever the leaders take up a representative role. Relatives usually 
feel offended whenever they find out that government officials acted publicly without 
their knowledge.
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Regarding the aftermath of crises, the role of investigative reports on the cause of 
crises, depends largely on the situation. In terms of acknowledgement and listening ear, 
some might want to get the opportunity to discuss the overall findings of an investigative 
report in a more private setting. Findings also show that other bereaved are not interested 
in such reports at all. Aftercare requires personalized tailoring where public leaders and 
government representatives should balance the needs on a societal level on the one hand, 
and the expectations of the next of kin on the other.
Political dimension
After a crisis politicians, media and the affected want to determine how this crisis could 
have happened (Boin and Smith 2006). The interviews indicate that respondents differ in 
their need for investigation committees; yet, they do share an antipathy towards blame 
games and political spin, especially when people affected are used as an argument 
in the political debates. A heated political debate in the aftermath of crises is one 
example, which possibly undermines a sense of calmness and slowly but steadily erodes 
psychosocial support. Being (partly) responsible for the cause of a crisis does not seem 
an obstacle to connect with the bereaved as such, even though we know that it does 
change the role in the collective domain (Jong, 2017b). Ultimately, the way in which the 
government manages the aftermath is crucial for the stability of the relationship that 
develops between government and the affected.
In the aftermath of crises, public leaders and government representatives should also 
update and explain the political mechanisms to the next of kin, in order to help them cope 
with all types of processes in the aftermath of the crisis (e.g. legal and forensic enquiries, 
issues of entitlement and liability, evaluation of causes and quality of disaster response).
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
The interviews provide a deeper understanding of “caring government”. As a first step in 
this process, we align the expectations from the interviews with psychosocial principles 
to the five so-called “essential elements” which are beneficial for the well-being of the 
affected: the promotion of a sense of safety, calmness, self- and community efficacy, 
connectedness to others, and hope (Hobfoll, Watson et al. 2007). 
Table III summarizes a couple of recommendations for government officials and public 
leaders, following from this explorative study. The lessons are clustered according to the 
five principles in order to guide governments in becoming a “vehicle” in the provision of 
psychosocial support. 
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TABLE III. Recommendations for the provision of psychosocial support by government under crises
Category Recommendations for the provision of psychosocial support: what 
people affected by disaster expect
Sense of safety · Acknowledge global beliefs 
· Provide equal treatment based on clear and fundamental values
· Be supportive, transparent, fair and reliable 
· Do not differentiate between individuals and events
Calmness · Respect priorities per time phase shortly after the crisis and during the 
aftermath
· Stick to promises
· Inform and involve





· Offer solutions that promote self- and community efficacy
· Utilize available (governmental) networks and (institutional) connections
· Act pragmatic and remove bureaucratic barriers 
Connectedness to 
others
· Facilitate and attend remembrances to (i) acknowledge what happened, 
and (ii) to enable affected people to meet other survivors and bereaved 
and support mutual contact and exchange
· When acting on behalf of those affected, notify and involve them in the 
proceedings 
· Align collective gatherings and the more personal ceremonies of 
bereaved families
Hope · People affected expect a listening ear when they meet government 
officials
· High-ranking acknowledgment (e.g. by members of the Royal Family) 
emphasizes the feeling among the affected that their experience matters 
· Personal meetings are appreciated, especially when mayors or other 
governmental representatives assist people in a pragmatic way
6. DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The findings in this exploratory study indicate that government officials and public leaders 
are an important influencer of individual levels of distress that exist in the aftermath of 
crises and disasters. Little is known about their personal role in psychosocial support 
in situational meaning making on an individual level. Do public leaders deliberately set 
different priorities and focus on collective stages, or are they just unaware of individual 
psychosocial needs? Is it, said differently, a matter of lack of knowledge of psychosocial 
principles, or do public leaders just not feel solely responsible for preventing stressors 
and facilitating survivors and bereaved families in their psychosocial needs? 
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The existence of possible tension between collective and individual interests definitely 
deserves more attention from researchers as well. After all, government officials, and 
public leaders in particular, can end up in situations where they are challenged to unify 
two different interests. Based on the interviews it seems unlikely that the collective and 
individual interests are always unified adequately. Even though the responsibility for a 
crisis appears not to be an issue from the point of view of the affected, it might raise 
additional dilemmas, as it complicates the political aftermath when topics of accountability 
arise. Finally, a topic worthwhile for further examination is the degree of discretion public 
leaders possess for shaping their situational behavior (Lipsky 1980). It might give us more 
insights in the possible options to pragmatically serve people in need. The interviewees 
seem to imply that when they assign a negative collective and individual meaning to the 
behavior of a government official or institution, there actually was an alternative. 
7. LIMITATIONS
This explorative qualitative study is based on interviews with eight people. Although the 
amount of interviews is limited, we notice that many expectations were mentioned by 
more than one interviewee. As the majority of the interviews lasted up to two hours, the 
interviews gave exhaustive details on three different themes (in one case no information 
was provided on global meaning beyond the notion that the respondent did not have 
particular expectations). Moreover, the interviews covered a broad range of crises with 
large impact from the Netherlands and abroad. As such, the interviews address calls 
to conduct comparative crisis-related studies (Jong et al., 2016a). It is not guaranteed 
that additional interviews would have given contrasting insights into the expectations of 
affected people and the themes inspired by Park´s meaning-making model.
Since all cases relate to a Dutch setting, this might provide a biased view on the 
importance of individual values over collective value. A study among affected multi-ethnic 
groups after the 9/11 events showed that participants in Mandarin-speaking focus groups 
placed more value on the welfare of the collective over that of the individual, which is 
consistent with the Asian collectivistic worldview (Johnson, North et al. 2017). When 
compared with situations elsewhere, the relative weight of collective meaning making 
might have been less prominent in our study, given the Dutch cultural profile which is 
relatively individualistic. 
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8. CONCLUSION
The exploratory study´s findings indicate that people who experienced a major crisis or 
disaster have clear expectations of their government. When government does not live up 
to the expectations, potential sources of stress are created. The people affected expect 
global values to be incorporated in public leaders’ behavior. Regarding the aftermath of 
crises, they are likely to look for their public leaders for support during stressful periods 
and for help in anticipating on what will come, at least when it comes to bureaucratic 
processes and public appearances. The people interviewed seem to trust the intentions, 
knowledge, and network of their public leaders, as long as these leaders approach them 
with empathy. They do not only expect practical and emotional support, but also guidance 
to balance the public interests and the interests of the next of kin.
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To date, the emphasis of social support research has been on victims and their families, 
as well as how they perceive the reception of such support. This study examines the 
provision of support, based on a survey among 231 Dutch mayors. As expected, mayors 
viewed the provision of social support as being part of their public leadership role in 
times of crises. Mayors are willing to get in contact with the affected and acknowledge 
them in their suffering on behalf of the government. An analysis of 150 mayors who had 
been involved in crises in recent years demonstrates that home visits are more likely in 
situations where one or more citizens had died. Contrary to hypotheses, a higher level 
of political responsibility for a given crisis situation does not render mayors less likely to 
approach the affected. Mayors’ age, sex, size of municipality and years of experience are 
not related to their self-perceived provision of social support or willingness to reach out 
to citizens confronted with a crisis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after Prince Friso was caught in an avalanche in 2012, the Dutch royal family 
issued a statement saying “The Royal Family is very grateful and deeply touched by all 
expressions of support and sympathy after the ski accident of His Royal Highness Prince 
Friso. It was a great support for them during this difficult time” (Koninklijk Huis, 2012). 
The prince eventually died in 2013, after being in a coma for more than a year. Four years 
later, Dutch King Willem-Alexander talked about his life, the death of his brother Friso and 
the impact of the MH17 disaster (2014) on Dutch society in a televised interview at public 
news broadcasting station NOS (NOS, 2017). Among the victims were 196 Dutch nationals. 
According to the King, the sorrow of losing Prince Friso helped him to understand the 
anguish of the relatives of those killed in the MH17 disaster. “Of course, you understand”, 
the King said. “Their world collapses. And it happened to us as well. People told me: you 
also lost your brother in an accident. You know what it means.”
While most media reports and empirical studies focus on how people affected by 
collective crises perceive the social support they receive and these events’ relationships 
with their mental health (cf. Birkeland, Nielsen, Hansen, Knardahl, & Heir, 2017; Kaniasty, 
2012, 2019; Platt, Lowe, Galea, Norris, & Koenen, 2015; Shahar, 2009), the revelations 
of the King introduce another important aspect: attention toward the providers of social 
support. To date, empirical studies among providers of such support – including family 
members, friends, neighbors, and colleagues – as opposed to the receivers of social 
support, are almost absent. To the best of our knowledge, there are no peer-reviewed 
studies following a collective crisis that assess how the providers of social support listed 
above perceive the support they offered.
However, although family members, friends, neighbors, and colleagues are all important 
providers of support for the affected, representing their informal network, support can 
also be provided by actors outside this network. Given the needs of the affected, the 
support provided by mayors during and in the aftermath of collective crises is of special 
interest. A study following the MH17 disaster found that mayors, as a sub-category of 
public leaders, fulfilled a similar supporting role for victims and their families, visiting 
bereaved families at home and assisting them in their emotional and material needs (Jong, 
Dückers, & Van der Velden, 2016). A qualitative study among the victims of several crises 
has shown that they expect governmental support to help them in a fair, compassionate, 
equitable, and reliable manner, including fulfilling event-related practical needs (Jong & 
Dückers, 2019). Likewise, potential stressors arise when the affected feel ignored, when 
the government does not adhere to its promises, or when officials become embroiled in 
political spin and blame games in the public aftermath of crises (Jong & Dückers, 2019).
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, to date no empirical study has been conducted among 
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mayors focusing on the social support they provide to people affected by a collective 
crisis. Such an insight is important, as it might enable providers to optimize their support 
and thus promote the well-being of the affected. To fill this research gap, the present 
empirical study examines the role of mayors during and following a collective crisis, that 
is, a crisis with a public impact, as opposed to a crisis with a more private impact such as 
a death due to fatal disease or other natural cause (Hayes, Waddell, & Smudde, 2017). 
Collective crises are deemed disruptive and catastrophic events that cause physical 
or psychosociological trauma for individuals, communities, organizations, and social 
support networks, regardless of whether they are directly or indirectly impacted by the 
circumstances (adapted from Doka, 2003; Gamino, 2003). They tend to be large in scope 
and enable many to identify with the victims or their circumstances (Hawdon & Ryan, 
2011; Hayes et al., 2017; Kropf & Jones, 2014).
Based on the existing literature (Jong & Dückers, 2019; Jong et al., 2016), the following 
hypotheses were formulated and tested. The first two hypotheses were aimed at the social 
support mayors provide to affected residents. As part of the public leadership role they 
fulfill, mayors are supposed to hold a clear perspective as to their contributions toward the 
affected, even though the latter are not always capable of formulating what they want and 
need (Jong & Dückers, 2019). In addition, the intended provision of social support toward 
the affected “comes with the job,” and we therefore expected that it would not be related 
to the mayor’s biographical traits. Consequently, we tested the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Mayors provide support to the affected, such as by offering a listening 
ear as well as practical help, support in media management and mitigation of bureaucratic 
barriers when necessary. Mayors also keep an eye on the balance between the interests 
of the general public, who might ask for public ceremonies and remembrances, and the 
directly affected.
Hypothesis 2: The support provided to the affected in general is not related to the 
age, sex, size of municipality or years in office of the public leader. 
The following series of hypotheses focused on the actual social support mayors 
demonstrated in a recent crisis that they had to negotiate, such as paying home visits to 
the affected. Several factors may determine mayors’ likelihood to pay home visits after 
a crisis, besides age, sex, days in office and number of inhabitants. It is plausible that 
mayors who provide generally higher levels of social support more often pay home visits 
than do colleagues who provide less social support toward the affected. In addition, the 
more the social system (such as a neighborhood or community) is emotionally affected 
by an event, the higher the collective impact of that event (Barton, 1969; Jong, 2017). We 
therefore expected that mayors more often paid home visits when they evaluated the 
crisis situation as being a relatively high collective impact event, considering the social 
support mayors provide in general. 
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Similarly, political tensions after a crisis may increase when public leaders perceive 
themselves (politically) responsible for the cause of a crisis. The concept of “crisis 
responsibility” is a representation of the amount of responsibility for a crisis that 
stakeholders attribute to the organization (Coombs, 1995, 2007, 2015; Jong, 2017). Higher 
perceived political responsibilities may therefore negatively influence home visits, over 
and above the extent to which mayors provide social support in general and the perceived 
collective impact of a crisis. 
In addition, included within collective crises are events in which residents died 
because of a particular event. We assumed that these circumstances contributed to a 
higher frequency of home visits, over and above the previous factors.
Finally, the collective impact of the crisis and the political responsibility of the 
mayor are important characteristics of a crisis. Another feature of a crisis that may have 
influenced mayors’ home visits is the scale of the event. An event’s scale (such as number 
of deaths) and collective impact are not the same, as relatively small events, such as child 
abuse, can have a large impact. The MH17 disaster, causing the death of 195 people of 
Dutch origin, provided a unique opportunity to assess this aspect, as no other crisis in 
the Netherlands in the past five years was as large, given the national and international 
circumstances. 
This brought us to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Home visits are not associated with age, sex, days in office, and number 
of residents. 
Hypothesis 4: Home visits after a collective crisis are positively associated with the 
social support mayors provide in general after a crisis, when the factors of Hypothesis 3 
are taken into account. 
Hypothesis 5: The lower a mayor’s perceived collective impact and the higher a 
mayor’s perceived political responsibility for a crisis, the lower their likelihood of paying 
home visits to the affected residents, when the factors of Hypothesis 4 are taken into 
account. 
Hypothesis 6: Mayors more often pay home visits to the affected in a crisis situation 
where residents died because of the event, when the factors of Hypothesis 5 are taken 
into account. 
Hypothesis 7: After the MH17 disaster, mayors more often paid home visits than 
following another crisis, when the factors of Hypothesis 6 are taken into account. 
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A cross-sectional study was conducted among Dutch mayors in 2018. All 400 current 
and recent former mayors are members of the Dutch Association of Mayors. They were 
invited to participate in the present study between June 19 and July 20, 2018, and the 
invitation was accompanied by a letter in which the study was explained. A web-based 
electronic questionnaire was administered and 266 mayors participated and gave their 
written informed consent. 
Instruments
The administered questionnaire was developed for our study among mayors. The items 
used in the present study are described below in detail.
Experiences with crisis. Questions regarding one’s experiences with crisis, relevant to the 
Dutch situation, were introduced as follows: “The following questions focus on a crisis 
you were involved in. With respect to the type of crisis, you can consider (deadly) shooting 
incidents, the closing of an illegal drug lab, car accidents killing one or more residents, sex 
offenses, nuisance youngsters, earthquakes, outbreaks of animal diseases, and disasters 
such as MH17.” The instruction was followed by the question “How many of these crises 
in which residents were involved have you experienced in the past five years as mayor?” 
(1=none, 2=1, 3=2-5, 4=6-10, 5=11-20, 6= more than 20). 
Provision of support. To assess the provision of social support by mayors, we used and 
modified the Social Support Survey (SSS) by Sherbourne and Stewart (1991). The additions 
made can be found in the appendix. This instrument asks respondents about received 
support, but for the present study the items were “mirrored” into items concerning 
provided support. We did not mirror the items of the subscale affectionate support 
of the SSS because this type of support does not necessarily fit in the mayor-affected 
relationship. We asked mayors who had been confronted with at least one crisis the 
following: “The next questions are about your role with respect to the people (victims, 
bereaved) affected by a crisis. Can you rate how often you provide the following toward 
these victims?” The mirrored SSS consisted of items such as “I provide a listening ear” 
and “I am available for their personal problems.” Similarly to the SSS, all items presented 
five-point answer categories (1=never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4=mostly, 5=always). We 
also added four additional questions aimed at the interaction between the governmental 
background of a public leader and his/her role in public display, such as commemorations 
and gatherings in the aftermath of crises. For an overview of the full SSS and mirrored 
SSSI, including the additional items, refer to Appendix 1. 
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An exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 20 items of the questionnaire 
to verify the underlying structure of the data. The factor analysis, based on the 
complete data of 231 mayors, enabled the 20 items to be divided into two constructs 
with an eigenvalue higher than 1. All but two items – “I distinguish among the support 
I provide toward the affected” and “I need to conquer bureaucratic challenges in order 
to provide support” – loaded higher than .4 on the first construct. One item loaded 
.45 on the second construct, and the rest lower than .4. For this reason, we decided 
to undertake the subsequent analyses with one construct based on 18 items with an 
internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of .84 (Cronbach’s alpha for the 20-
item scale was .82). 
Specific crisis. Several subsequent questions (questions below) were aimed at a specific 
crisis that the mayors experienced. This was introduced as follows: “For the next questions 
we would like to ask you to take one recent crisis that took place in your current or 
previous city in the period 2014–2018) in mind. Can you describe this event briefly?” The 
description of the crisis enabled us to reconstruct, based on public data, whether people 
were killed due to it. Where mayors were involved in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster, 
they were asked to answer the following questions with this event in mind. This question 
was also added for future research aimed at MH17.
Perception impact and responsibility. Implicated mayors were asked to consider this crisis 
in order to rate their answer to the question “How large was the collective impact of this 
crisis on the village, neighborhood or city during the first day and weeks after the crisis” on 
a 10-point scale (0=no impact, 10=very much impact). In addition, they were asked to rate 
their answer to the question “How large was your political/administrative responsibility 
for this crisis in the village, neighborhood or city during the first day and weeks after the 
crisis” in a similar manner. 
Home visits. Respondents were asked “Did you meet the affected or their families at their 
homes?” with four answer categories (1=not one affected or family visited, 2= all directly 
affected or affected families visited, 3=part of the directly affected or affected families 
visited, 4=other). For the present study we made a distinction between home visits yes 
(2,3) or no (1,4).
Biographical details. Finally, information was collected about the age and sex of the 
mayors, as well as their number of days in office and the size of their current municipality. 
Regarding days in office, one’s entire career as a mayor was taken into account, including 
service in previous municipalities.
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The first hypothesis was assessed using the scores on the separate items of the mirrored 
SSS. To test the second hypothesis, linear regression analyses were conducted with the 
Social Support Provision sum score as the dependent variable and mayors’ age, sex, days 
in office, and size of municipality as predictors. 
Multivariate logistic regression analyses were conducted to test Hypotheses 3 to 7, 
with home visits after the selected crisis as the dependent variable. As described in the 
hypotheses, in model 1 age, sex, days in office, and number of residents were entered as 
predictors. In model 2, social support was added. In model 3, 
collective impact and political responsibility were added to the list of predictors. In 
model 4, the variable “residents died because of the event” was added. Finally, in model 
5 the variable MH17 (yes/no) was added. 
A deviance test was used to compare each model with its predecessor; deviance can 
be regarded as a measure of lack of fit between the model and the data, with the greater 
the deviance (-2 loglikelihood; IGLS), the poorer the fit to the data. It is a tool that can 
be used to assess whether each subsequent model leads to a substantial reduction in 
deviance. 
All analyses were performed using Stata version 13 (StataCorp LP).
3. RESULTS
Participants
In total, 231 of the participating mayors completed the social support questions 
(response=57.8%). The average age of participants was 57.1 years (SD = 7.69, n = 229), 
compared to 57 years for Dutch mayors in general, while 22% of participants (n = 208) 
were female, compared to 27% in general. The average time respondents had served as 
mayor was 9.1 years (SD = 6.09, n=198). The average number of inhabitants in the mayors’ 
municipalities was 39,349 (SD = 37,594.94, n=229).
Social support provided by mayors
On average, the mayors rated the separate social support items between 3 (“some of 
the time”) and 5 (“all of the time”; Mean = 3.79, Range = 2.61-4.78, SD 0.42). The three 
items with the highest scores were “I provide a listening ear,” “I make time for personal 
contact,” and “I discuss the impact on themselves.” The lowest average scores were “I 
connect the affected with other people who were involved in the incident,” “I need to 
conquer bureaucratic challenges in order to provide support,” and “I mobilize people 
(friends, neighbors) around the affected in order to support them.” These findings confirm 
Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 1. Public acknowledgement scores per item (n = 231)
Items Mean SD Min Max
I provide a listening ear 4.56 0.54 3 5
I clarify the circumstances in which they find themselves 3.89 0.73 2 5
I support them to understand the crisis situation 4.03 0.69 2 5
I discuss the impact on themselves 4.49 0.60 3 5
I offer them support and advice 3.67 0.81 1 5
I present myself as an anchor for care and support 3.68 0.83 1 5
I am always ready and prepared to support them 3.87 1.00 1 5
I am available for their personal problems 3.96 0.83 1 5
I do understand their personal problems 4.09 0.58 2 5
I am always clear as to what people can expect from me (as a 
mayor) 
4.45 0.63 2 5
I offer the assistance of public servants to help them with 
financial matters
3.20 1.01 1 5
I offer the assistance of public servants to help them with media 
pressure
3.49 1.01 1 5
I make time for personal contact 4.56 0.60 2 5
After a year, I contact the affected again 3.03 0.89 1 5
I mobilize people (friends, neighbors) around the affected in 
order to support them
2.88 0.91 1 5
I connect the affected with other people who were involved in 
the incident
2.76 0.84 1 5
I distinguish among the support I provide toward the affected 3.13 0.97 1 5
I make my professional network available to the affected 3.66 0.80 1 5
I need to conquer bureaucratic challenges in order to provide 
support
2.84 0.88 1 5
I discuss public ceremonies and remembrances with the affected 
and their families.
4.02 1.18 1 5
Predictors of the provision of social support
The results of the linear regression analysis (Hypothesis 2, n = 196) showed that age, 
sex, days in office and number of inhabitants were not significantly associated with the 
social support mayors provided (data not shown). These findings confirm Hypothesis 2.
Prediction of home visits
Mayors were asked to describe a recent crisis (which did not happen before 2012) in which 
they had been involved. Of all 164 mayors who provided information on home visits in their 
crises, the great majority reported that they paid home visits to the affected (N = 139, 84.7%). 
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The results of the logistic regression analyses are presented in Table 2. Due to missing 
values, the analyses were conducted among 150 mayors (the results of the factor analysis 
were the same as in the sample with 231 cases: one construct based on 18 items with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .84; the results of the linear regression on the social support provided 
by mayors were not different from the sample with 196 cases: no predictor variable yielded 
a significant effect). These participants were not strikingly different from the broader sample 
of 231 mayors. The average age of participants was 56.6 years (SD = 7.95, n = 150), compared 
to 57.1 years for the earlier sample, while 22.67% of participants were female. The average 
time respondents had served as mayor was 8.1 years (SD = 5.69, n=150). The average 
number of inhabitants in the mayors’ municipalities was 38,771 (SD = 38,405, n=150).
Model 1 again demonstrates that age, sex, days in office and number of inhabitants 
were not associated with home visits. The same pattern was found for all other variables 
except the variable “high collective impact” in model 3 and “residents died because of 
the event” in models 4 and 5. According to models 4 and 5 (Hypothesis 6), mayors more 
often paid home visits when residents had died because of the event. The likeliness of a 
home visit was slightly lower in model 5, which excluced the MH17 cases due to a lack 
of variation:I in all MH17 cases a home visit was made. In other words, after the MH17 
disaster mayors were more tempted to make home visits compared to other crises where 
citizens died (Hypothesis 7); with the MH17 cases included in the analysis the odds ratio of 
Table 2. Summary of logistic regression analyses for variables predicting home visits (n = 150)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Adj. OR (CI 95) Adj. OR (CI 95)
Average (intercept) 2.79 (0.06-127.53) 5.15 (0.03-1049.33)
Age 0.99 (0.93-1.06) 0.99 (0.93-1.06)
Sex (women vs. men) 2.13 (0.57-7.99) 2.17 (0.58-8.20)
Days in office 1.04 (0.93-1.15) 1.04 (0.93-1.15)
Residents 1.02 (0.68-1.52) 1.01 (0.67-1.52)
Social support - 0.84 (0.28-2.46)
High (vs. low) impact -
High (vs. low) responsibility - -
People killed (yes vs. no) - -
MH17 (yes vs. no) - -
Log likelihood -59.9171 -59.8643
Deviance test Reference p = 0.745
ADJ. OR = Odds ratio adjusted for other variables in model. CI 95 = 95% confidence interval of OR.
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001. 
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Model 3 Model 4 Model 4
Adj. OR (CI 95) Adj. OR (CI 95) Adj. OR (CI 95)
1.12 (0.00-290.20) 1.35 (0.00-529.22) 1.69 (0.00-710.83)
1.01 (0.94-1.08) 1.00 (0.93-1.07) 1.00 (0.93-1.08)
1.59 (0.40-6.24) 1.83 (0.44-7.67) 1.57 (0.36-6.90)
1.01 (0.91-1.13) 1.01 (0.90-1.13) 0.99 (0.88-1.12)
0.95 (0.63-1.45) 0.99 (0.64-1.52) 0.97 (0.63-1.50)
0.91 (0.30-2.79) 0.78 (0.24-2.54) 0.77 (0.24-2.50)
1.24 (1.00-1.53)* 1.15 (0.92-1.45) 1.18 (0.93-1.49)
0.95 (0.77-1.17) 1.04 (0.84-1.29) 1.02 (0.82-1.27)
- 4.50 (1.44-14.06)** 3.31 (1.03-10.63)*
- - (omitted)
-57.9389 -54.1647 -52.8297
p = 0.146 p = 0.006 NA (n = 131)
a home visit in case of deceased citizens was 4.5, without MH17 cases it dropped to 3.3). 
Model 4 exhibited a significantly better fit than the previous models (p = 0.006). In sum, 
we found no evidence to confirm Hypothesis 4 and the political responsibility element 
in Hypothesis 5. The (small) collective impact effect in model 3 was sustained when the 
MH17 cases are removed from the sample (OR = 1.25; p < 0.05; N = 131). 
4. DISCUSSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study focused on mayors regarding 
the social support they claim to provide to residents affected by various crises in the past 
five years. Almost 60% of the Dutch mayors invited participated in our study. Of the 231 
mayors who completed the social support questions, 219 were involved in one or more 
crisis. For several questions in our study, mayors were asked to take a recent crisis in mind 
when answering about household visits. All cases described happened in the past five 
years. In addition, we assessed the factors that are most closely associated with home 
visits to the affected residents. Of the seven hypotheses in our study, five hypotheses 
were entirely (H1, H2, H3, H6 and H7) and one was partially (H5) confirmed, while we 
found no evidence to confirm hypothesis H4. 
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The findings confirmed the first hypothesis, indicating that in general mayors provide 
social support to affected residents. Indeed, the mean of the mirrored Social Support 
Survey sum-score was 3.79, which is on the far end of the brackets between some of 
the time and most of the time. The scores on the separate items showed that there 
were no items of the mirrored SSS that were not endorsed by all mayors. Overall and 
in general, they provided support such as a listening ear and practical help and support 
in media management. The items with the absolute lowest mean scores (scores < 3, 
never or seldom) were “I need to conquer bureaucratic challenges in order to provide 
support” and “I mobilize people (friends, neighbors) around the affected in order to 
support them.” Apparently, then, the mayors did not perceive themselves as being faced 
with bureaucratic challenges in the aftermath of crises. Moreover, they manifested a 
professional distinction, hesitating from interfering with existing relationships between 
the affected and their family, friends, and neighbors. Two questions that were added to 
the mirrored SSS sought to ascertain the interaction between the mayors’ more public 
role and the direct support they provided to the affected in the aftermath of crises. The 
findings showed that the mayors did make their professional networks available to the 
affected (M=3.66) and discussed public ceremonies and remembrances with the affected 
and their families (M=4.02). 
The second hypothesis was confirmed, indicating that mayors’ age, sex, days in office 
and size of municipality were not significantly associated with the social support they 
provided in general. 
Of the other hypotheses, three were confirmed, and one partially. As expected home 
visits were not associated with mayors’ age, sex, days in office, and number of residents 
(Hypothesis 3). Mayors more often paid home visits when residents died because of the 
event (Hypothesis 6), which were events with a larger collective impact (Hypothesis 5 
partially; political responsibility had no effect), and were especially likely to pay a home 
visit in the case of the MH17 disaster (Hypothesis 7). Thus, even in cases of low collective 
impact, the mayors were not less inclined to pay home visits than in crises with high 
collective impact where no people died. These findings suggest that mayors distinguished 
the outside world from the world where they meet the affected in the privacy of their 
own homes. In addition, the mayors clearly did not need to be triggered by collective 
impact in order to contact the affected. This can be deemed akin to the role of a mayor as 
a “buddy” (Jong, 2017), where he or she contacts the affected and discusses preferences 
and an appropriate level of governmental support. This may explain why home visits were 
not associated with the social support mayors provided in general to affected residents.
Regarding the MH17 disaster, all mayors in our sample had been in direct contact with 
the next of kin and paid home visits. We can conclude that in terms of the social support 
provided, the mayors paid home visits in the aftermath of MH17 (Hypothesis 5), slightly 
more often compared to other crisis situations in which citizens died. Most likely, they 
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supported them in tangible and intangible matters, as indicated in their social support 
scores, although this was not further specified in the survey. Nevertheless, an earlier 
study (Jong et al., 2016) has already confirmed that mayors provided both tangible and 
intangible support in the aftermath of MH17.
Implications
These findings are consistent with earlier findings following the MH17 disaster (Jong et al., 
2016), where mayors were criticized for not undertaking a specific action rather than for 
a completed activity, clearly suggesting that mayors face certain expectations concerning 
their professional duties. 
Although we found no associations between impact and responsibility on the one 
hand and home visit on the other, public expectations might result in a degree of pressure 
to contact the affected, as mayors realize that they may find themselves in troubled 
waters should they fail to demonstrate their commitment and social support. However, 
it is possible in principle that home visits are primarily conducted for political reasons, as 
part of the typical rituals undertaken in the aftermath of crises (’t Hart, 1993; Helsloot & 
Groenendaal, 2017), and exercised in order to avoid negative attention from the media 
and the public (’t Hart, 1993), i.e., mayors paid home visits despite a lack of intrinsic 
motivation to support the affected. We have no data to reject or confirm this possibility, 
but we assume that given that political responsibility and impact were not related to home 
visits, their willingness to support the affected was more strongly associated with a sense 
of community (McMillan & Chavis, 1986) among mayors. Such a sense of community can 
be defined as a feeling that citizens matter to one another and people have a sense of 
belonging to the local community. 
Future research is necessary to confirm (or reject) the notion that the provision of 
social support and home visits is positively associated with a sense of community among 
mayors. Interestingly, an earlier study by Broekema, Porth, Steen, and Torenvlied (2019) 
showed that Dutch mayors scored highly in terms of public service motivation, suggesting 
that they may also score highly on sense of community. 
5. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
In contrast to the majority of studies on social support, which focus on received support, 
this is one of very few studies assessing the providers of social support and the assistance 
they offer to people affected by a collective crisis. Moreover, this is the first empirical 
study to examine the provision of support by mayors. In this study, we focused on the 
support mayors provide in general, and home visits in particular as a special form of 
social acknowledgement. We have no further information about the frequency of these 
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home visits or the affected family members who were visited. We were therefore unable 
to examine the extent to which factors such as collective impact and responsibility were 
associated with home visits. Moreover, we did not ask participants about how they 
dealt with situations of broken families, with affected people living in other cities (e.g., 
where the deceased were residents of their city, whereas their relatives lived in another 
city), and how this influenced home visits. Given the sample size, we were not able to 
statistically examine possible changes in the role of mayors during the past five years. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that about five years ago, mayors acted differently because 
the public held other expectations as to their role in supporting the affected and their 
families, which may have affected our results. Finally, given that all of the cases pertained 
to a Dutch setting, a biased view on the role of government officials might have resulted. 
Therefore, generalizations to crises in countries where mayors have alternative roles in 
local government must be made with care. In other words, there is a need to replicate 
our study in other countries using the same study design. 
6. CONCLUSION
This study has discussed how mayors provided rather than received social support in the 
aftermath of crises and public tragedies. To this end, we set up a survey among Dutch 
mayors to assess their self-perceived role toward victims and their families, as well as their 
actual behavior in the aftermath of real crises. The findings have revealed that the level 
of support provided to people affected by crises as perceived by mayors is independent 
of age, sex, experience as a mayor, and/or the size of the municipality. 
The findings have also demonstrated that mayors are most likely to visit the affected 
at home in situations where one or more citizens died. Such home visits when citizens 
died cannot be seen entirely separate from the collective impact of a situation, but are 
unrelated to the perceived (political) responsibility of the mayor involved. 
More empirical follow-up studies would help us build on our currently scant 
academic knowledge of the provision of social support, as well as assist in the provision 
of psychosocial support for the affected, who are faced with a crisis that continues to 
affect their daily lives. 
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APPENDIX. 
Original questions by Sherbourne & Stewart (1991) versus mirrored questions from this study
Items original RAND questionnaire Items mirrored questionnaire (used in 
current study)
Emotional/informational support Emotional/informational support
Someone you can count on to listen to you 
when you need to talk
I provide a listening ear
Someone to give you information to help you 
understand a situation
I clarify the circumstances in which they find 
themselves
Someone to give you good advice about a 
crisis
I support them to understand the crisis 
situation
Someone to confide in or talk to about 
yourself or your problems
I discuss the impact on themselves
Someone whose advice you really want I offer them support and advice
Someone to share your most private worries 
and fears with
I present myself as an anchor for care and 
support
Someone to turn to for suggestions about 
how to deal with a personal problem
I am always ready and prepared to support 
them 
Someone who understands your problems I am available for their personal problems
I do understand their personal problems
Tangible support Tangible support
Questions about the support in getting to bed, 
getting meals ready, support in doing some 
shopping.
I am always clear in what people can expect 
from me (as a mayor) 
I offer the help of public servants to help 
them with financial matters
I offer the help of public servants to help 
them with media pressure
Affectionate support Affectionate support
Questions about hugging, love and affection None
Positive social interaction Positive social interaction
Questions about hanging out with someone 
and how enjoyable this support is 
I make time for personal contact
After a year, I contact the affected again
I mobilize people (friends, neighbors) around 
the affected in order to support them
I connect the affected with other people who 
were involved in the incident
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong




Items original RAND questionnaire Items mirrored questionnaire (used in 
current study)
Additional item Additional items
Someone to do things with to help you get 
your mind off things
I distinguish among the support I provide 
towards the affected
I make my professional network available to 
the affected
I need to conquer bureaucratic challenges in 
order to provide support
I discuss public ceremonies and 
remembrances with the affected and their 
families.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Crises can be unexpected events, with public and individual consequences. In addition, 
crises come with complexity for public leaders in charge. As the study from Chapter 4 
showed, complexity in crisis management is not bound to large scale crises, but can be 
found in small, local incidents as well. While crisis management tends to focus on mega-
crises such as airplane crashes, hurricanes, terrorist attacks, or floods, this study zooms 
into crises of a smaller scale. Despite the scale of the incident, mayors can be regarded as 
a local focal point to manage crisis-related emotions, sometimes referred to as collective 
stress (Barton, 1969; Boin et al., 2005; Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003; Gillespie et al., 1974). Even 
though collective stress cannot be regarded as stress in the sense of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), it is a phrase that is commonly used in 
public administrative literature. Collective stress occurs when a social system is confronted 
with a (perceived) unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of citizens 
and generates emotions such as anger, anxiety, or grief. Under such circumstances, citizens 
have specific expectations of their public leaders. Among other things, they expect their 
public leader to communicate about the crisis at hand and to provide well-chosen words 
in order to enable them to make sense of the situation and move on. Boin et al. (2005) 
refer to this task as meaning making. In fulfilling this task, public leaders must realize that 
they do not have a monopoly on framing the crisis (‘t Hart, 1993). As was highlighted in 
Chapter 7, the way in which this meaning making is interpreted by citizens can be different 
from one person to another. In the end, individuals build their own interpretation, based 
on their own global beliefs (e.g. the fairness, benevolence and predictability of the world) 
and the situation as it is (Park, 2016).
The studies presented in the previous chapters all contribute to our understanding 
of the role of mayors and their meaning-making behavior in times of crisis. The rationale 
for these studies came from an urge to deepen our understanding how Dutch mayors 
can effectively adopt the concept of meaning making in the aftermath of crises in a local 
setting. The aim was to assess how their role aligns with their citizens´ expectations, 
how their behavior could support the affected in their psychosocial recovery, and how 
this interferes with a simultaneous process of political accountability in the aftermath 
of crises. 
In order to approach the topic from different perspectives, a mixed method and 
interdisciplinary approach was used. Methods in previous chapters included a literature 
review, interviews with almost a hundred mayors, a simulation study with 135 mayors, 
media content analysis of mayoral behavior in the aftermath of a national disaster, 
and a survey with more than 200 participants. In our literature study (Chapter 2) we 
called for more studies that enable a comparison of mayors in similar crisis situations, 
as demonstrated by Gallagher et al. (2007), Fairhurst and Cooren (2009) and Griffin-
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong
Processed on: 22-11-2019 PDF page: 274
274
Chapter 9
Padgett and Allison (2010). Chapter 3 presented such a comparative study, based on 
94 case studies from The Netherlands. Even though the crises themselves differed, the 
comparison inspired us to develop a meaning making model to analyze the behavior of 
mayors. The comparative study on the MH17 disaster (Chapter 6) was based on another 
type of comparative methodology. As 54 Dutch mayors were involved in exactly the same 
crisis situation, it provided a unique opportunity to assess and compare how the role 
of tens of mayors was perceived and evaluated. All in all, the dissertation was broken 
down in seven sub-studies. In each sub-study, sub-research questions were answered and 
discussed. The present chapter provides a summary of the main findings, and answers the 
research questions as outlined in the introductory chapter. This chapter concludes with 
an overview of methodological considerations, strengths, and weaknesses, a reflection 
on the findings, practical implications, and recommendations for further research.
2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND ANSWER TO SUB-QUESTIONS 
Seven research questions were presented in the introduction. This section answers these 
questions, based on the findings in the previous chapters.
What is regarded as effective leadership when mayors from across the world act as 
public leaders in times of crisis?
Chapter 2 started with a review of academic literature on public leadership in times 
of crisis. The aim of the article was to assess international peer-reviewed articles on 
leadership tasks and effectiveness. The material turned out to be dominated by Western 
studies, mostly situated in the United States. The review enriches our thinking on public 
leadership, but it remains rather unclear why certain kinds of leadership appear to be 
effective where others fail. Moreover, the articles do not use a consistent definition of 
what is considered to be “effective leadership.” The effectiveness of the behavior of 
mayors and governors during crises and disasters are mostly based on interpretations of 
(social) media, voting results, and accountability processes in the aftermath of crises. This, 
however, does not tell us much about the effectiveness of leadership, as long as it remains 
unclear whether or not the apparent success was intended or in fact coincidental, and 
effectivity of public leadership in times of crises is not defined. As such, current literature 
offers little by way of guidance, general or otherwise, on how to effectively operationalize 
public leadership tasks. 
Even though a clear and general definition of effectiveness of crisis leadership is 
missing, this study does help to identify certain gaps. Some of these gaps are due to a lack 
of comparative studies within the field of crisis management. Also, the study shows that 
the field of crisis management has little interaction with other academic fields. Among 
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others, the study showed that public administrative studies lack insights into psychosocial 
processes among their citizens, including the role of public leaders in the prevention of 
psychosocial stress factors among the affected in the aftermath of crises. 
From a more positive angle, the study shows that the concepts of sense making, 
decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning are apparently important 
enough to generate continuous academic interest from crisis management researchers 
for more than 25 years. Half of the articles from the review, for example, discuss meaning 
making as a leadership task. The task is defined as communicating the broader impacts 
of a crisis to citizens, media and other stakeholders (Boin et al., 2005). The purpose 
of meaning making tends to be explained in two ways. On the one hand, its purpose 
is to show that government is ‘fully in charge’ (Boin, 2009; Pinkert et al., 2007) and to 
show leadership in difficult times (Fairhurst and Cooren, 2009). In this case, meaning 
making is often part of the political game where public leaders anticipate the stage to 
where they are held accountable (Harris, 2011; Koven, 2010) and try to minimize political 
turmoil in the aftermath. To others, on the other hand, the task of meaning making has 
a more public-oriented goal, which is to strengthen society, provide hope (Noordegraaf 
et al., 2011; Pennebaker and Lay, 2002), and call upon resilience and pride (De Bussy and 
Paterson, 2012). 
Overall, the findings from Chapter 2 show that much remains to be clarified in terms 
of how actual crisis leadership tasks are managed and balanced.
What is the visible “modus operandi” of Dutch mayors in times of crisis, and do they 
act in the same way in all crisis situations?
In Chapter 3, the meaning-making behavior of mayors was further specified, as it does 
not seem a far-fetched assumption that meaning making in times of crisis is not a 
one-size-fits-all concept. Depending on circumstances, one might expect that mayors 
differentiate in their meaning making. In order to distinguish between circumstances, the 
level of responsibility and collective impact of a situation were used. The review already 
highlighted that the political responsibility and accountability for crises are an important 
driver for behavior. The choice to use the level of collective impact of a situation as a 
second driver was based on the presumption that the societal impact of a crisis is not 
necessarily bound to the number of fatalities or the damage done, but that it depends 
on circumstances as well. 
Based on interviews with Dutch mayors in 94 case studies, a Public Meaning 
Making Model was presented in Chapter 3. The findings show that the modus 
operandi in terms of meaning making changes, depending on the collective impact 
of a crisis and the related (political) responsibility of the mayor. Depending on the 
characteristics of a crisis situation, four different roles were presented: mourner-in-
chief, buddy, advocate, and orchestrator. 
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What are the potential bottlenecks and difficult issues for Dutch mayors when dealing 
with different types of crises? 
Chapter 4 shows the outcome of a computerized serious game simulation. Scenarios 
were based on the four roles which were defined in Chapter 3: mourner-in-chief, 
buddy, advocate, and orchestrator. The hypotheses in this study supposed that 
complexity increases in situations where mayors are faced with higher collective 
impact and/or higher political responsibility. The hypotheses were rejected, as the 
data led to the insight that one role is not necessarily more complex than another. 
Another important insight of this simulation study was the finding that the complexity 
of crisis-related decisions was independent of age, gender, size of the municipality, 
or time in office of the mayor involved. Together, the findings show that complexity 
tends to be bound to the particular circumstances of a crisis. The overall results 
suggest that mayoral decisions become increasingly complicated when a mayor can 
no longer be seen as “everyone’s mayor,” and is required to make decisions that are 
not favorable to all citizens and network partners.
This finding can be illustrated by interview 12 of the framework-study from Chapter 3 
(see: appendix study 3), where the Mayor of Barneveld explained his role in the aftermath 
of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. He was regarded as the national government’s 
long arm by the farmers in his own municipality: “Since the national government urged to 
kill the animals and the mayor was regarded as part of the same governmental structure, 
the role of the citizen father was a complex one. The focus of the national government 
was on the containment of the disease, not on the social impact and consequences.” In 
interview 87 from the same study (see: appendix study 3), the Mayor of Midden-Drenthe 
discusses his role in the aftermath of an outbreak of q-fever. Even though circumstances 
are more or less comparable, the perceived level of complexity appears to be different: “I 
was a farmer myself. As a mayor, however, I also had to comply with the guidelines from 
the national government. The farmers accepted my difficult position.”
The simulation study from Chapter 4 shows that the complexity of decisions 
depends on the context and is not necessarily bound to themes with high collective 
impact. Even in cases of low collective impact and/or low political responsibility, 
mayors can still feel the heat of complex decision making. In general, it stresses 
the importance of explaining mayoral behavior under all circumstances, whether 
it is collective or in one-on-one meetings with citizens, as the mayor from Midden-
Drenthe conducted. The findings suggest that mayors should be aware of potential 
differences in perceptions among their stakeholders. Regarding their meaning-making 
behavior, mayors should take notice of such differences in order to retain public 
confidence among all stakeholders. 
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What are the implications, in terms of trustworthiness and reliability, when accountability 
becomes more prominent on the mayoral radar? 
Chapter 5 discusses the specific situation in which the cause of a crisis is subject 
to an investigation. In this chapter, the attributed responsibility for a crisis was 
discussed, resembling the horizontal axis of the Public Meaning Making Framework 
from Chapter 3. This conceptual paper argues that the attributed responsibility can 
change over time, especially when investigation bodies present new insights on 
the cause of a crisis. In order to anticipate upon such changes in responsibility, the 
strategy of “acknowledge and await” is proposed: in order to maintain reliability 
to stakeholders, this crisis response strategy keeps pace with changing perceptions 
but does not undermine earlier statements made; neither does it erode earlier 
reputations. The relevance of this conceptual study lies in the insight that the level 
of political responsibility might not be fixed under all circumstances. Anticipating 
changing levels of political responsibility, the proposed strategy of “acknowledge 
and await” might decrease public turmoil. By means of consistent communication 
throughout the aftermath, the strategy supports the trustworthiness and reliability 
of government and bridges the interests of the public with the interests of political 
fora. Jumping to conclusions before the outcomes of an investigation are known, on 
the other hand, increases the risk of political blame games.
What is the visible “modus operandi” of Dutch mayors when there is an apparent and 
simultaneous need for action on the societal impact of a crisis and requests for support 
to those directly affected? 
The literature review in Chapter 2 concluded with the observation that current crisis 
management research lacks comparative studies. Without comparative studies, the true 
effectiveness of crisis management performance remains vague, as it remains unclear 
whether the apparent effective behavior of Mayor Giuliani, Governor Schwarzenegger, 
and others was intended, or coincidentally perceived as successful due to specific crisis-
related circumstances. This chapter, therefore, presents such a badly needed comparative 
study. For this study, we used a unique study design, which enabled us to compare the 
leadership performance of several mayors and compare their effectiveness as it was 
perceived by media. The study was based on a Dutch (social) media analysis of 299 
newspaper clippings and 1,698 tweets in the year after the MH17 disaster. With regard 
to the role of Dutch mayors, the disaster can be described as a situation where high 
collective impact was combined with a low level of political responsibility. As such, the 
findings in this chapter are indicative of the role mayors can fulfill as mourners-in-chief 
in local communities.
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Scientifically speaking, the circumstances of the MH17 disaster provided a unique 
opportunity. Passengers were residents from multiple Dutch municipalities. As such, 
the meaning-making behavior of 54 mayors could be compared. All these mayors were 
confronted with the impact of the same disaster. To the best of our knowledge, no existing 
study has examined a crisis situation in such a way before. Mayors were faced with clear 
expectations from their communities. A mayor who decided not to interrupt his holidays 
was criticized, clearly suggesting that society has clear expectations concerning mayoral 
“duties” after a disaster with a large public and social impact like MH17. Mayors who 
attended memorial services and gatherings were taken for granted. 
Findings suggests that successful Dutch mayors just did what they were supposed 
to do in this situation: attend and give a voice to the collective mourning. An analysis 
of interviews with family members of the passengers who died in the MH17 disaster 
also revealed a distinct appreciation from victims’ families for mayors who visited them 
in the privacy of their homes to lend a “listening ear,” and to discuss their material 
needs. This part of public leadership was not yet found in the review mentioned in 
Chapter 2. All in all, the (social) media analysis from this study suggests that mayors 
have a role on both public and private stages. Sometimes the public and private stages 
meet, as in the example from the chapter where two mayors presented themselves as 
a spokesperson on request of the victims’ family. Being close to the affected seems to 
have been an essential part of the role of Dutch mayors in the aftermath of MH17. This 
is a new insight, which did not come to surface in the earlier, international literature 
study (Chapter 2). Moreover, this adds a new angle from which mayoral behavior can 
be judged as more or less effective.
What do those affected by a crisis, generally speaking, expect from their public leaders?
Where Chapter 6 came up with insights based on media clippings and tweets, the 
study from Chapter 7 takes our findings one step further. Eight people who personally 
experienced a crisis or disaster were interviewed. The interviewees discussed their 
expectations and experiences in relation to government. This was done against the 
background of Park’s (2016) model on meaning making. People affected by other major 
crises and disasters expect help and acknowledgment and want to be heard. They 
assume that the government uses its capacity to align network partners and break 
down bureaucratic barriers. Potential stressors arise when public leaders ignore the 
people affected, do not adhere to their promises, are unable to take away bureaucratic 
burdens, and get involved in political spin and blame games. In contrast, public leaders 
are expected to reach out to the affected, address their practical and non-practical 
needs, and explicitly discuss expectations. In its combination, the studies from Chapter 
6 (Media coverage of mayoral performance after the MH17 disaster) and Chapter 7 
(Expectations of the affected) provide us more insights into the behavior that mayors 
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong
Processed on: 22-11-2019 PDF page: 279
 279
Retrospect and final discussion
9
show and are expected to show in their contacts with the affected in the aftermath of 
crises. Additionally, Chapter 7 broadened the crisis circumstances to situations where 
mayors and/or other government officials were held accountable, while the MH17 
study (Chapter 6) did not involve mayoral accountability for the downing of the MH17 
as such. Chapter 7 generated the new insight that the affected are still willing to get 
into contact with government officials, even in cases where government has a full or 
partial responsibility for the cause of the crisis. 
How do Dutch mayors relate their own perceptions to the expectations of those affected 
by a crisis and what is the resulting behavior they show in times of crisis? 
Thus far, social support research has focused on the receiving end of the channel. The 
emphasis has been on the way in which the affected received social support from their 
family, neighbors, colleagues, and their loved ones. This chapter discusses how mayors 
provided, and did not receive, social support. For that purpose, we set up a survey among 
231 Dutch public leaders to assess their role toward victims and their families. In line with 
the hypotheses, the findings suggest that the level of provision of support is independent 
of age, gender, experience as a mayor, and/or the size of the (current) municipality. As the 
interviewees from Chapter 7 requested, mayors are willing to lend a listening ear to their 
citizens in need. Home visits tend to be related to a specific aspect of the crisis at hand; 
whenever people die in an incident, mayors are more likely to contact the family and pay a 
home visit. All mayors who were faced with the local impact of the MH17 disaster (n=27) 
had been in direct contact with the affected. As such, findings from the media study from 
Chapter 6, where just three mentions of such home visits were retrieved from the (social) 
media analysis, can be generalized through this survey.
3. DISCUSSION: TOWARD AN INTEGRATION OF FINDINGS
In a young and fragmented field of research, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the strength of 
the crisis-related studies presented in this book lies in their interdisciplinary nature. All 
studies here have tried to bridge existing gaps in current crisis management research 
and combine insights from public administration, crisis communication, and psychosocial 
research. Nevertheless, the previous chapters raised several new topics that are worth 
exploring. Among others, Chapter 3 asked for further study on the consequences of a 
public apology on the well-being of victims and their families, while Chapter 5 proposed 
more research on the distinction between short-term and long-term communication 
strategies. Despite the importance of such and other crisis-related topics, this discussion 
goes forward with the overall theme of meaning making toward their citizens, when 
mayors are confronted with local crises in their communities.
536553-L-sub01-bw-Jong
Processed on: 22-11-2019 PDF page: 280
280
Chapter 9
In our literature review (Chapter 2), rather instrumental approaches of meaning 
making were presented, with a strong focus on the reputation of leadership. According 
to Boin and ‘t Hart (2003), people look to their “true leaders” in stressful situations, 
where successful performance in times of collective stress turns leaders into statesmen 
and restores confidence. Other authors discussed meaning making in a broader context, 
concluding that not reputational image restoration, but regaining public confidence 
should be the main goal of public leaders (Griffin-Padgett and Allison, 2010). The research 
findings discussed in the previous chapters follow this path. Meaning making by public 
leaders is not solely reputational-driven, but is meant to explain and live up to the 
expectations of citizens in times of local crises. 
This section discusses the implications of the research findings for effective meaning 
making by mayors toward their main audiences, within a political, psychosocial, and crisis 
communicative context. First, the interdependency between the mayor and his or her 
society in crisis is discussed in detail. Second, the interdependency between the mayor 
and the directly affected as a specific group of stakeholders is discussed. Afterwards, 
the implications for meaning-making efforts are discussed, in order to balance potential 
conflicting interests among citizens and prevent political and societal turmoil in the 
aftermath of crises.
In other words, in the previous chapters the findings of the conducted studies were 
discussed in detail. This last section consists of a more general discussion of the study 
findings, and specifically focuses on meaning making toward a society that is faced with a 
crisis on one hand, and meaning-making efforts toward the affected on the other. Before 
elaborating on these issues, a number of methodological considerations, strengths, and 
weaknesses are discussed. 
4. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS, 
STRENGTHS, AND WEAKNESSES 
Even though limitations of the individual studies in this dissertation were discussed in 
the previous chapters, a number of overall limitations need to be addressed. Generally 
speaking, the studies were primarily based on a Dutch setting when assessing the role 
Dutch mayors fulfill in times of crises. This was done through the lenses of the media, the 
affected, or the mayors themselves. As such, one should be careful to claim a generalization 
of these findings to mayors in general. The Dutch setting might result in a biased view of 
the role of public leaders, although the literature review (Chapter 2) gave no indication 
to assume that other Western-oriented societies have strikingly different expectations 
toward their public leaders in the aftermath of crises. For instance, interview 82 (see: 
appendix Chapter 3) highlighted the experiences of Mayor Eenhoorn after a fatal shooting 
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in a shopping center in Alphen aan den Rijn. He referred to his communication strategy 
of “we care, we act and we provide perspective,” which resembles earlier-mentioned 
themes of hope, pride, resilience, and trust, which were retrieved from the studies in the 
literature review of Chapter 2 (e.g. De Bussy and Paterson, 2012; Fairhurst and Cooren, 
2009; Gasper et al., 2011; Noordegraaf and Newman, 2011; Pennebaker and Lay, 2002). 
As all articles from the literature review (Chapter 2) discussed crises in the Western world, 
no conclusions can be drawn about mayors in societies in other parts of the world.
Another potential limitation is related to the nature of disciplines when it comes 
to researching public leadership of mayors in times of crises. Crisis management tends 
to be rather fragmented, where studies are published in journals from the fields of 
public administration, crisis communication, and psychosocial support. Each of these 
academic areas tends to approach the role of public leaders through their own frame. The 
framework that was presented in Chapter 3 and which was published in Public Relations 
Review, for instance, takes the communicative approach. The focus of that chapter is on 
the public role of mayors in times of crises, but it pays less attention to the specific role of 
the affected. Likewise, Chapter 8 highlights the provision of social support, but pays less 
attention to the political aftermath of crises. One has to realize that separate publications 
within either the public administration, crisis communication, or psychosocial support 
fields all have a specific perspective, as they approach the topic of crisis leadership 
from their own, monodisciplinary point of view. Only by integrating the findings in an 
interdisciplinary way can a more comprehensive picture on the role of mayors in times 
of crises be generated. 
Another potential vulnerability of the studies presented concerns the difficulty in 
replicating crisis research. Crises are unique events that cannot be repeated in a laboratory 
setting. Interviews among mayors and affected or surveys about their perceptions and 
experiences might have resulted in a self-presentation bias that involves a hindsight effect. 
One should be aware that divergent perceptions, interpretations, and interests may cause 
serious trouble in crisis management (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997). Nonetheless, by 
conducting a multimethod study that includes areas outside public administration, the 
findings from the individual studies were cross-checked in a sufficient manner. As an 
example, the interviews with the affected (Chapter 7) showed that the responsibility for 
the cause of a crisis does not seem to be an obstacle for them to get into contact with 
public leaders. Following this study, this finding was checked and confirmed as part of the 
social support survey among mayors (Chapter 8). The importance of accountability and 
(political) responsibility, which came to surface in the literature study of Chapter 2, was 
further explored in a crisis communication setting in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. In a similar way, 
Chapters 6 (the MH17 study), 7 (interviews with the affected), and 8 (provision of social 
support by mayors) assessed the importance of public administrative meaning making 
in a psychosocial setting.
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Overall, the strength of the conducted studies lies in the fact that several aspects 
of public leadership in times of crisis were analyzed that had not been assessed using 
empirical study-designs. First, the framework that was set up in Chapter 3 provided more 
substance to the task of meaning making. While the literature review from Chapter 2 
suggested that meaning making was regarded as a general task (Boin et al., 2005), the 
framework from Chapter 3 enabled us to further specify this task. Mayoral meaning-
making behavior turned out to depend on the collective impact of a crisis situation and 
the political responsibility that was assigned to the public leader in charge. Second, the 
simulation study (Chapter 4) provided more depth to the concept of decision making in 
times of crises and potential deliberations of public leaders in terms of meaning making. In 
the limitations section of Chapter 4, it was already noted that that the level of complexity 
was rated on a single three-point Likert-scale. Despite this limitation in measurement, 
the study made clear that not all crisis-related decisions are regarded as equally complex. 
Moreover, the study showed that public leaders who are older and/or spent more time in 
office, did not perceive their decisions as less complex compared to their counterparts, 
as was proposed in one of the hypotheses. The study gave more depth to the underlying 
decisions that need to be taken in the light of meaning making. Third, the MH17 case 
study (Chapter 6) explored the behavior of 54 Dutch mayors in the aftermath of the crisis. 
To the best of our knowledge, this was the first study to examine the behavior of tens 
of public leaders who were faced with exactly the same disaster. The study showed that 
mayors do not only have tasks in the public domain, but that they are expected to visit 
the affected with a listening ear in the privacy of their homes. Fourth, the survey on social 
support (Chapter 8) enriched our understanding of the provision of social support, as it 
was the first time mayors were surveyed about their interaction with the affected in the 
aftermath of crises. As discussed in Chapter 8, most research focuses on the receiving 
end of social support, while this was the first study to examine the perspective of mayors 
who provided support. Last but not least, the conceptual study from Chapter 5 provided 
a plausible explanation for why current crisis response strategies make an inadequate 
assumption that crisis responsibilities are rather static. The study came up with a new 
approach of “acknowledge and await,” in order to respond with care and to not jump to 
conclusions, as long as the cause of a crisis is still unknown.
Meaning making toward a society during a crisis with a local impact
Over the past 25 years, the relevance of public appearances to a society in crisis received 
most attention in the areas of crisis management and public administration. Or, as 
Ansell et al. (2014) described, the challenge to “communicate an unprecedented and 
threatening event politically while taking into account the politically charged issue of 
causation, responsibility, and accountability.” In other words, the dominant focus of public 
administration was on society as a whole and not so much on the individual citizen who 
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suffered psychosocially from the crisis at hand. When it comes to the communication 
efforts of public leaders, most attention is spent on restoring public confidence as a 
purpose of meaning making (Boin et al., 2005). Overall, the behavior of public leaders like 
Giuliani (9/11), Schwarzenegger (forest fires California), and Bligh (Queensland flooding) 
is regarded as successful (De Bussy and Paterson, 2012; Fairhurst and Cooren, 2009; 
Pennebaker and Lay, 2002). Moreover, such communication in times of crisis is potentially 
powerful. As Back et al. (2010) describe, Mayor Giuliani’s words had a direct impact on 
the feelings of his fellow New Yorkers shortly after the events of 9/11. At 2:49 pm, he 
refused to speculate about body count; he communicated that the number of casualties 
would be “more than any of us can bear.” According to Back et al. (2010), sadness and 
anger rose and anxiety declined immediately afterwards. Apparently, the words a mayor 
chooses have a direct influence on the feelings of the people in a society.
The literature review from Chapter 2 showed that research on effective leadership 
behavior in times of crisis was mostly based on interpretations of (social) media, voting 
results, and accountability processes in the aftermath of crises. Public leaders were 
regarded as effective leaders as long as they were re-elected or received positive press (De 
Bussy and Paterson, 2012; Fairhurst and Cooren, 2009; McBride and Parker, 2008; Mullin, 
2010). This, however, suggests a biased observation from hindsight; because public leaders 
were re-elected or received positive press, they must have been effective leaders. At the 
same time, the studies did not teach us much about how actual leadership tasks should be 
undertaken and balanced in the heat of the moment or the aftermath of crises. Helsloot 
and Groenendaal (2017) suggested that a public leader can be successful by “just being 
visible” and personally stating to the public that their shattered world will be healed. This 
suggests that the art of meaning making is a straightforward process and merely being 
visible creates a perception of effectiveness. In the literature review (Chapter 2), an earlier 
case study of Fairhurst and Cooren (2009) was described, comparing public leadership 
after Hurricane Katrina and California wildfires. They noted that effective leadership is 
not only defined by the person of the leader, but also on the context in which he or she 
operates. In Chapter 3, the Public Meaning Making Model was presented, which indeed 
showed the importance of context to the leadership roles in terms of meaning making. 
In addition, the simulation study in Chapter 4 showed that crisis communication 
efforts often require more than “just being there.” Crises can sometimes be regarded as 
rather complex situations, where pros and cons must be weighed and successful leaders 
need to make more effort. (S)he must be able to convince stakeholders of the logic and 
reasoning behind a complex decision, even where it conflicts with the leader’s interests 
and beliefs. Even within the general public, there might be conflicting interests which 
need to be addressed with words that count. The simulation study in Chapter 4 led to the 
insight that pressure on the public leader is built up in terms of complexity, when he or she 
feels that a side must be chosen, and he or she can no longer present him- or herself as 
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“everyone’s mayor.” This particular study used the example of a football match. Canceling 
an important match needs to be explained and communicated to citizens who support 
the team. If the mayor decides against canceling the match, (s)he risks facing riots, which 
also demands a public explanation when things go wrong. Altogether, being a public 
leader in times of crisis requires bridging potentially conflicting interests of the political 
arena and the general public. To some extent, this is in line with findings by Karsten 
(2013), who analyzed authority-related issues after controversial decisions with large 
public visibility. However, the simulation study from Chapter 4 deepens our understanding 
of the need to explain controversial decisions, even in situations with less public visibility. 
Moreover, the simulation study showed that even decisions made in a context of low 
collective impact can still be regarded as rather complex. The study showed that the 
communication efforts of mayors sometimes require more of them than merely being 
visible. Complex situations require explanations (a particular type of meaning making), 
in order to overcome differences in perceptions among stakeholders. 
Based on the studies presented in the previous chapters, an effective adaptation of the 
“meaning making” role of mayors was regarded as their ability to bridge communicative 
interests of stakeholder groups among their citizens, while not neglecting the political 
interests and accountability phase in the aftermath of crises. The bumpy road of a political 
aftermath was the main topic of Chapter 5. In that chapter, the response strategy of 
“acknowledge and await” was proposed as a potential solution in order to align upcoming 
political interests with objectives in non-political arenas. While political accountability is 
postponed until further notice, the crisis response strategy proposes to acknowledge the 
crisis at hand to all stakeholders.
Meaning making toward the directly affected
The more private interests of the directly affected were discussed in detail in the (social) 
media study on the MH17 disaster (Chapter 6). This study suggested that the directly 
affected have their own, distinctive expectations of mayoral behavior. This was confirmed 
in the interviews with affected from other crises (Chapter 7), where it was found that 
the modus operandi of public leaders is likely to create sources of stress, and it becomes 
less effective when they solely focus on their public role and neglect the more personal 
interests of the affected. 
While the level of collective impact might be relevant to society as a whole, 
interestingly enough, the affected are most likely looking for acknowledgment from 
society. Based on Maercker and Müller (2004), such acknowledgment relates to how the 
affected experience the positive reactions from a society that shows understanding of his 
or her unique position, and which acknowledges the victim’s current difficult situation. 
Social acknowledgment appears to be supportive to mental well-being (Maercker and 
Müller, 2004; Park, 2016), resilience, and recovery after stressful and disastrous events 
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(Park, 2016), although the longitudinal interplay between PTSD symptoms and social 
recognition of the affected is complex (Van der Velden et al., 2019). The combination 
of studies in this dissertation generates the insight that collective impact and social 
acknowledgment are not interchangeable concepts. It is not unthinkable that people 
feel left out, even though a community tries to do its utmost, as the example in the 
introduction to this dissertation showed. There, a widow told us how impressed she 
was by the number of people who joined a commemoration, but also left with a feeling 
that there was no place for the personal mourning of her family. This implies that, even 
when a crisis is perceived as a shock to society and the collective impact is regarded as 
“high,” it does not necessarily result in feelings of social acknowledgment and support 
by the directly affected. In other words, the concepts of collective impact and public 
acknowledgment should not be confused. 
The issue of (political) responsibility, which turned out to be another relevant factor in 
meaning making toward the public as a whole, is valued differently by the directly affected 
as well. Even in crisis situations where perceived political responsibility is “high,” the 
affected show a certain understanding of the situation in which government finds itself. 
In other words, responsibility should not discourage a mayor from getting in contact with 
the affected. “The municipality was overwhelmed by this crisis. They did what they could,” 
as one of the interviewees in Chapter 7 said. In another case study from that chapter, 
an alderman spoke at the funeral, despite the fact that the local government was held 
responsible. It suggests that even in cases where the government is held responsible, the 
affected are still willing to receive support from government. As such, despite the political 
responsibility, a mayor can still fulfill his or her task of providing a listening ear for the 
affected. The results from the questionnaire in Chapter 8 showed that perceived political 
responsibility seems of no influence on the willingness of mayors to provide support 
toward the affected. Even in cases where mayors put themselves in the higher segments 
of political responsibility, they decided to contact the affected and pay a home visit. This 
willingness coincides with recent findings by Van der Velden et al. (2019), who stress 
the need to promptly recognize and acknowledge victims’ traumatic experiences and 
difficulties. Of course, the personal recovery after crisis situations does not solely depend 
on the interaction between mayors and the affected. But, regardless of the circumstances, 
early acknowledgment and recognition seem beneficial to all affected in the aftermath 
of crises. 
While responsibility is of less relevance to the affected, the study in Chapter 7 
presented us a new insight on another relevant factor. The interview study of Chapter 
7 suggested that living up to expectations prevents a potential and additional source 
of stress. Vice versa, when the expectations of the support by government differ from 
the actual support offered, this potentially results in an increased level of stress and 
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disappointment. In summary, mayors are expected to live up to expectations (Chapter 
7), such as lending a listening ear (Chapters 6 and 7), fulfilling event-related practical 
needs, or breaking down bureaucratic barriers (Chapter 7) when needed. In Chapter 
7, a modified framework, inspired by the Meaning Making Model by Park (2016), was 
presented (Ch 7, Figure 1). It explained how the meaning making process of people in a 
disaster setting is based on three different categories that play a crucial role in the process 
of individual meaning making. First, people have their own global beliefs, which are based 
on their fundamental values and expectations toward government. Second, they have 
their own situational meaning based on governmental support on the collective level (e.g. 
in public gatherings and media). Third, they develop their situational meaning based on 
governmental support on an individual level (e.g. in one-on-one contacts or home visits). 
Altogether, the affected have certain expectations of their public leader, whose meaning-
making behavior might support or weaken perceived support.
5. TOWARD A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL SUPPORT BY MAYORS
The combination of findings brings us to the overall conclusion that meaning making 
toward a society that is faced with a crisis in a local setting is characterized by:
· Collective impact
· Political responsibility
Findings show, however, that collective impact and political responsibility do not define 
potential roles for mayors toward the directly affected. To the affected, meaning making 
is characterized by:
· Perceived social support and acknowledgment
· Personal expectations one has about his/her public leader
This implies that the Public Meaning Making Model does not yet give enough guidance 
to mayors for their duties toward the directly affected as a specific group of citizens. 
The findings urge for a new, complementary heuristic framework for meaning making 
toward the directly affected. An example of such a framework, inspired by the Meaning 
Making Model by Park (2016), is presented in Figure 1. This framework consists of the two 
dimensions introduced above. On the vertical axis, the (perceived) level of social support 
and acknowledgment (high or low) is presented. This is based on the perceived support 
that is provided by actors from within the local community. In case a community is fully 
supportive and provides social support and acknowledgment to the directly affected, the 
level can be regarded as “high.” In case the affected are left on their own, or the collective 
impact does not result in feelings of support, this is regarded as “low.” 
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The horizontal axis presents the expectations the affected have about their public 
leaders (high or low). The expectations are “low” when the affected are rather self-
supportive and do not expect a deep involvement of their mayor. Likewise, expectations 
are “high” when the affected expect a large involvement of their mayor. Examples of 
questions which help to indicate the required level of support are: “Are the affected self-
supporting, supported by their own social network, or do they expect their mayor to step 
in as a personal buddy on behalf of government?”
The combination of the two dimensions enables us to conceptually distinguish and assess 
the different roles mayors can use to live up to the expectations and, as a result, lower 
(potential) stress levels among the affected. 
FIGURE 1. Roles in meaning making towards the affected in times of crisis
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEANING-MAKING BEHAVIOR OF MAYORS 
The overall effectiveness of the meaning-making behavior of mayors implies that it should 
be effective to the general public in addition to the people personally affected by a crisis. As 
such, effectiveness must be found in taking care of the expectations of the general public, 
which is based on the Public Meaning Making Model from Chapter 3, and living up to the 
expectations of the directly affected, the role for which was presented in Figure 1. When 
the effectiveness of public leadership and meaning making is solely based on positive media 
Mayor as a public moderator
Mayor aligns initiatives 
within the local community 
and bridges them 
with the more 
private preferences 
of the affected. 
Mayor as a safety net
Affected are fully supported by 
their local community. Role of 
mayor is additional to all initiatives 
taken by local community. 
Community and affected are 
rather self-supporting.
Mayor as a personal assistant
The affected do not 
perceive support 




Mayor as a spokesperson
In a perceived disconnection 
between collective preferences 
and private needs, the mayor 
publicly speaks on behalf 
of the affected and gives 
them a voice.
High expectations 
(towards their mayor 
in terms of support) 
by the affected
Low expectations 
(towards their mayor 
in terms of support) 
by the affected
High level of perceived social support and acknowledgement 
(provided by other actors in local community to the affected)
Low level of perceived social support and acknowledgement 
(provided by other actors in local community to the affected)
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clippings and re-elections, which is commonplace in current crisis management studies 
(Chapter 2), one neglects the interests of those directly affected, who are not always able 
to raise their voice in media, or who are too low in number to have direct political impact.
Of course, one can argue whether or not it is up to mayors to guard this balance 
between the general public and the directly affected. First, and rather instrumental and 
reputational-driven, a disbalance between the two potentially leads to a political turmoil 
and (social) media storm. This will certainly be the case when the affected are able to share 
their negative feelings on (social) media. Second, and more fundamental, mayors have 
an ethical duty to prevent their behavior from becoming an additional source of stress 
for the affected. As such, it can be regarded as their duty to guard and prevent potential 
disturbances between collective interests and keep an eye on the interests of the directly 
affected. The studies in the previous chapters showed that mayors are among the few 
representatives of government who are actually in the position to influence public meaning. 
As they are one of few governmental representatives who are in direct contact and who 
visit the affected at home as well, they are in a unique position to guard such a balance.
When mayors are supposed to guard the interests of the directly affected, the 
prevention of additional sources of stress should be incorporated in their meaning-making 
behavior as well. This implies that the meaning-making behavior toward the general 
public needs to be aligned with the situational meaning of the directly affected. A 
mismatch in this balance potentially leads to distress, as the interviews of Chapter 7 
showed. Some of the affected who were interviewed in that Chapter felt they were 
neglected by government. One of the striking examples was given by the farmer 
whose cattle suffered from foot-and-mouth-disease. In his disappointment, he 
concluded: “I can only trust animals, not government.” Similarly, the affected of the 
pub-fire and the outbreak of legionellosis felt as if they were “victims of a forgotten 
disaster.” Their private perspective did not align with the collective perspective. In 
their view, the personal impact of the crisis was neglected by society, while the public 
meaning making was dominated by a heated political debate in the aftermath of 
the fire. In those cases, government did not live up to the personal expectations of 
the directly affected. These interviewees were left with distress, due to a mismatch 
between the public and individual meaning making. To them, their personal mourning 
was overshadowed by political games.
As long as the affected feel supported by the general public, the two perspectives 
are already aligned. However, when the two perspectives differ, the mayor is required 
to bridge the expectations on public meaning making with the expectations and 
preferences of the directly affected. The MH17-study (Chapter 6) already gave the 
example of two mayors who each presented themselves as a spokesperson for 
the victims’ families, in order to bridge such differences. While the community of 
Simpelveld was willing to organize a memorial service, Mayor De Boer of Simpelveld 
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asked the residents of his town to cancel it, on behalf of the family. Similarly, Mayor 
Brok of Dordrecht asked his citizens to show restraint toward the family of residents 
who died in MH17. 
Aligning meaning making between the general public and the affected goes both 
ways. Toward the affected, they will need to explain the situation they are in and the 
meaning they give to the specific crisis situation. In their meaning making toward 
the general public, mayors will need to check whether or not there is a need to 
incorporate the position of the directly affected in the words they choose. In times 
of collective stress, they should not only focus on broad themes like hope, resilience, 
and pride, which are the themes that resulted from the literature review in Chapter 
2. Instead, there is a need for a more humanistic communication that includes the 
special position of the affected within the broader storyline, which is congruent with 
the findings of Griffin-Padgett and Allison (2010) in their comparison of Nagin’s and 
Giuliani’s speeches in the aftermaths of Hurricane Katrina and 9/11. In language and 
deeds, mayors can publicly show that they care about the well-being of all of their 
citizens and explain to society how they can support the affected in their psychosocial 
recovery. 
7. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Mayors are expected to get in contact the directly affected, as Mayor Hoekema shared 
in his interview about a fatal car accident in Wassenaar (see: interview 75, appendix 
Chapter 3): “I visited the parents at home. They were in shock. There is no manual for these 
circumstances. You show sympathy and share the bewilderment. It is an essential part of 
our job. You just have to be there as a citizen father. … You should not make mourning too 
collective, and bypass the individuals.” In that setting, mayors can discuss the expectations 
one has about the role of the mayor as a representative of government. This should 
enable mayors to fine-tune their behavior to the global and situational meaning of the 
affected. 
The findings from Chapter 4 (simulation study) imply that mayors believe that it is easier 
to be a neutral, “everyone’s” mayor, than to choose sides. In order to be able to act like 
“everyone’s mayor,” they need to understand all different perspectives on the matter. It 
requires that mayors take care of all the different perspectives and interests, be a listening 
ear, and ask for unexpressed expectations among their stakeholders in order to be able 
to bridge the interests of all of his or her citizens, including the victims, bereaved, and 
next of kin. As all stakeholders have explicit and implicit expectations of their public 
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leader, one can only live up to the expectations when these are known. This is a necessary 
step in order to signal potential mismatches in the interests of the affected, citizens and 
politics, including different perceptions among the affected themselves. Oftentimes, these 
expectations might be unexpressed. However, only when global beliefs and expectations 
become known to the mayor can he or she bridge potential differences in the perceptions 
among the affected and the general public. That said, it is not an easy task, as earlier 
findings showed that the public sometimes has a different perception of their action than 
governors and mayors (Martinko et al., 2009). It goes without saying that when mayors 
are involved, it is a potential pitfall in their crisis communication as well.
The studies from the previous chapters also stress the importance of explaining mayoral 
behavior under all circumstances and to all audiences, whether it is collective, in one-on-
one meetings with citizens, or in the political arena. As discussed in Chapter 5, explaining 
dilemmas makes use of the methodology of procedural justice, and makes it more likely 
that mayors will be able to get an understanding for and bridge potential differences in 
perceptions among their stakeholders, including the affected.
In Chapter 8, an important finding resulted from a rejected hypothesis. Unlike the 
initial hypothesis, political responsibility for a crisis situation does not obstruct meaning-
making efforts by mayors. As Chapter 8 taught us, mayors are willing to visit the affected 
at home, even in situations where they are held responsible for a crisis situation. The 
conceptual study presented in Chapter 5 showed that the political aftermath can be 
intense and enduring, and it might take up to a year before a final verdict is given on 
the crisis responsibility. Under such circumstances, an early adoption of the strategy of 
“acknowledgment and await” seems key in order to regain trust among stakeholders 
and do not wait until the final verdict on crisis responsibility is issued. Moreover, it 
appears supportive for the well-being of the affected as well, in their quest for early 
acknowledgment. Chapter 7 stressed the importance of such acknowledgment. Without 
acknowledgment, some of the interviewees felt forgotten, while in crises where 
acknowledgment was provided, government became a “tower of strength.” 
Lastly, from a psychosocial support perspective, meaning making requires more than 
“just being there,” as Helsloot and Groenendaal (2017) proposed. In its essence, it is 
true that mayors should be visible when the public requires them to do so. But how 
they should adopt their meaning-making behavior in order to be effective in a given 
crisis can be a rather difficult task. First, it requires getting to know the expectations 
among all stakeholders. Second, it requires balancing between the expectations of the 
general public and the directly affected, while, thirdly, it also requires anticipating new 
complexities—as already argued in Chapter 5, perceptions among stakeholders can be 
rather dynamic over time. 
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8. DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
All in all, the studies in this dissertation show that the field of crisis management is 
not only fragmented (Chapter 2), but it also lacks empirical data. Several hypotheses 
were, in contrast to our expectations, rejected in the simulation study (Chapter 4) and 
survey (Chapter 8). Age, sex, size of municipality, or time in office appeared to be not 
associated with the complexity of decisions (Chapter 4) or the social support mayors 
provide (Chapter 8). Also, in situations where participants considered a dilemma to 
be fairly simple, they were divided on the most appropriate decision (Chapter 4). This 
suggests that mayors show more of a personal touch in the public domain, while they 
are rather homogenous as a group while practicing home visits. More research on the 
potential room for personal preferences in a world of distinct expectations on public 
leadership should be welcomed. 
Four other promising avenues are proposed, building upon the findings from the 
studies presented in this dissertation. First, in line with the discussion in Chapter 2, 
more comparative research is welcomed, as it enables crisis management communities 
to explore frameworks such as the ones as presented in this book, e.g. the leadership 
framework by Boin et al. (2005), the Public Meaning Making Model and the complementary 
social support framework presented in Figure 1. Altogether, comparative research will 
further enrich our insights in the effectiveness of public leadership in times of crises, 
both in the public domain as in contact with the affected. This includes case studies on 
a smaller scale than Hurricane Katrina or the events of 9/11, as Chapter 3 showed that 
small crises can enrich our academic insights as well. 
Second, any communicative intervention that strengthens victims and the affected 
and supports them in their coping behavior, sense making, and recovery, should be 
welcomed and encouraged. This study shows that there is still room for improvement on 
the intersections of meaning making, crisis communication, and psychosocial support. 
More insights in how to include psychosocial principles in their meaning-making efforts 
are likely to enable crisis communication practitioners to offer strength to the affected. 
In their commentary, Fisher Liu and Fraustino (2014) raised the fundamental question, 
“what is the goal of our (crisis communication) scholarship?” Psychosocial support 
toward victims and the affected is one of such fundamental, ethical tasks within the 
domain of crisis communication. As previously argued in Chapter 5, the existing crisis 
communication theory is still dominated by American and corporate case studies, with 
a focus on image repair. To make a shift from image repair to a type of communication 
that is truly beneficial to the mental well-being of victims and the affected, insights from 
psychosocial literature should be incorporated in crisis communication strategies. While 
image restoration strategies might be helpful to other audiences (e.g. network partners, 
shareholders, customers), such reputational strategies might be counterproductive when 
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targeted to the affected as a specific group of stakeholders. Additional research should 
focus on the specific psychosocial needs of the affected, their role within the broader 
discourse of crisis communication and how to further align them with the interests of 
(governmental) stakeholders under crisis. The research area of crisis communication 
would benefit from systematic analyses of crisis response strategies and how these are 
perceived by the directly affected. Hopefully, it identifies patterns and enables crisis 
communication practitioners to make crisis communication more inclusive and sincerely 
compassionate toward the affected.
Third, empirical research on the interaction between public leaders and the affected 
is warranted: to date there is no empirical study that follows a crisis in which both mayors 
and affected residents, along with their interactions are assessed longitudinally. In this 
study, the focus of Chapter 8 was on the direct support that was provided by mayors in 
their interaction with the affected, in the privacy of their home. In their evaluation of the 
national coordination of the MH17 crisis, Torenvlied et al. (2015, 243) concluded that, 
broadly speaking, the affected felt supported by their mayors. More insights into the 
potential of mayors to align collective impact with feelings of acknowledgment by the 
local society are welcomed. International replication research following similar “distant” 
crises as MH17, such as the disaster with Germanwings flight 9525 in France (24 March 
2015), the disappearance of MH370 (8 March 2014), the Bad Aibling rail accident in 
Germany (9 February 2016) or the terrorist attack on Brussels Airport (22 March 2016) 
may provide more data to elaborate and broaden findings to an international context. 
Such replication studies enrich our insights on possible cultural differences in crisis 
leadership issues around the world. Also, more studies that replicate the behavior of 
mayors on the provision of social support over time, are welcomed, as Chapter 8 showed 
that this area is largely neglected in current social support research.
Finally, the formal MH17 evaluation (Torenvlied et al., 2017) discusses the political 
aftermath, where Members of Parliament pretended to speak on behalf of the affected, 
leaving them with a feeling of being abused for political purposes. More empirical studies 
are welcomed, in order to deepen our understanding of the impact of such political 
aftermaths on the well-being of victims and their families. The public administrative and 
crisis communication insights on accountability and responsibility in the field of social 
acknowledgment and social support, might offer a novel and promising avenue to further 
encourage the well-being of victims, the affected, and their families. 
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In recent years, numerous studies have been published on public leadership in times of 
crises. The focus of these studies tends to be on the national and international level. This 
dissertation focuses on the role of mayors, as a special category of public leaders, within 
the context of crises in a local setting. A crisis in a local setting can be described as the 
perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectations of citizens, 
generates negative outcomes for a social system, and calls for local public leadership.
The dissertation draws upon prior academic research on public leadership in times 
of crises and adds new empirical studies among Dutch mayors in their role as local 
communicators and vehicles for psychosocial intervention. The aim of the study was to 
further increase our scientific knowledge regarding several aspects of this role, varying 
from effective leadership to the expectations of affected residents regarding the role of 
their mayor. Findings were obtained through a literature review, a series of interviews with 
mayors and those affected by crises, a questionnaire, a simulation study, and a media review. 
The literature review revealed that current literature offers little in terms of guidance, 
general or otherwise, on how to operationalize public leadership tasks in effective ways. 
The literature review also revealed that the field of crisis management has little interaction 
with other academic fields. Among others, the study showed that public administrative 
studies lack insight in the psychosocial processes among citizens, including the role of 
public leaders in the prevention of psychosocial stress factors among the affected in the 
aftermath of crises. 
Empirical insights were used in order to create a new framework on meaning making, 
the leadership task of communicating the broader impacts of a crisis to citizens, media, 
and other stakeholders. Based on interviews with Dutch mayors in 94 case studies, a 
Public Meaning Making Model was presented. This model explains, in detail, the modus 
operandi of mayors when they connect to their citizens in times of crises. The public 
leadership role of meaning making appeared to be influenced by the collective impact 
of a crisis and the related (political) responsibility of the mayor. Depending on the 
characteristics of a crisis situation, four different roles were presented: mourner-in-chief, 
buddy, advocate, and orchestrator. 
A simulation study was set up to research the complexity of decisions in the context 
of these four roles. The data demonstrated that even in cases of low collective impact 
and/or low political responsibility, mayors can still feel the heat of complex decision 
making. In general, it stresses the importance of explaining mayoral behavior under all 
circumstances, whether it is collective or in one-on-one meetings with citizens. Overall, 
the findings suggest that mayors should be aware of potential differences in perceptions 
among their stakeholders. Regarding their meaning making behavior, mayors should take 
notice of such differences to retain public confidence among all stakeholders.
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In a more conceptual contribution, the attributed responsibility for a crisis was discussed, 
representing the horizontal axis of the Public Meaning Making Model. The proposition was 
made that attributed responsibility can change over time, especially when investigative bodies 
present new insights on the cause of a crisis. The relevance of this study lies in the insight that 
the level of political responsibility might not be fixed under all circumstances. Anticipating 
on changing levels of political responsibility, the proposed strategy of “acknowledge and 
await” might decrease public turmoil. By means of consistent communication throughout 
the aftermath, the strategy supports the trustworthiness and reliability of government and 
bridges the interests of the public with the interests of the political fora. 
As current crisis management studies lack comparable data, a study on the aftermath 
of the MH17 disaster was set up. The study was based on a Dutch (social) media analysis of 
299 newspaper clippings and 1,698 tweets in the year after the MH17 disaster. Scientifically 
speaking, the circumstances of the MH17 disaster provided a unique opportunity. Passengers 
were residents from multiple Dutch municipalities. As such, the meaning making behavior 
of 54 mayors could be compared. The study showed that mayors were faced with clear 
expectations from their communities. A mayor who decided not to interrupt his holidays 
was criticized, clearly suggesting that society has clear expectations concerning mayoral 
‘duties’ after a disaster with a large public and social impact like MH17. 
Findings suggests that successful Dutch mayors just did what they were supposed 
to do in this situation: attend and give a voice to the collective mourning. An analysis of 
interviews with family members of the passengers who died in the MH17 disaster also 
revealed a distinct appreciation from victims’ families for mayors who visited them in 
the privacy of their homes to lend a “listening ear” and to discuss their material needs. 
The findings on MH17 were broadened by insights from interviews with eight people 
who personally experienced a crisis or disaster. People affected by major crises and 
disasters expect help and acknowledgement and want to be heard. They assume that 
the government uses its capacity to align network partners and break down bureaucratic 
barriers. Potential stressors arise when public leaders ignore the people affected, do 
not adhere to their promises, are unable to take away bureaucratic burdens, and get 
involved in political spin and blame games. In contrast, public leaders are expected to 
reach out to the affected, address their practical and non-practical needs, and explicitly 
discuss expectations. The affected also show that they are still willing to get in contact 
with government officials, even in cases where the government has a full or partial 
responsibility for the cause of the crisis. 
The final study was based on a survey among Dutch mayors who shared their 
perceptions and experiences with the affected. The uniqueness lies in the approach, as it 
looked at the provision of social support. Usually, social support research tends to focus on 
the receiving end of the channel, with a focus on the social support the affected receives 
from their family, neighbors, colleagues, and loved ones. Contradicting the hypotheses, the 
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findings suggested that the level of provision of social support by mayors is independent of 
their age, gender, the experience as a mayor, and/or the size of their (current) municipality. 
Mayors are also rather willing to lend a listening ear to their citizens in need. Home visits 
tend to be related to a specific aspect of the crisis at hand; whenever people die in an 
incident, mayors are more likely to contact the family and pay a home visit.
The combination of studies show that in times of crisis, citizens expect their public 
leader to give meaning to a situation, make sense of the crisis, address feelings of hope 
and resilience on a community level. While previous studies had a focus on the national 
and international level, this dissertation argues that similar patterns can be found 
when faced with crises with a local impact. Based on the studies in this dissertation, 
an important and additional aspect is revealed. The conclusion is drawn that needs and 
expectations of the victims, bereaved, and next of kin should be incorporated in meaning 
making efforts of mayors. 
The main findings of this dissertation are as follows:
a. While academic research focuses on the interaction of public leaders and the general 
public, mayors also have a meaning making role towards the affected in times of 
crises, by being a “listening ear” and providing practical and emotional support. 
b. Meaning making by mayors in times of crises appears not to be a one-size-fits-all 
concept. Meaning making towards the general public depends on the (perceived) 
responsibility of public leaders on the one hand, and their perceptions of the collective 
impact on society on the other. The context describes the appropriate role, whether 
it is “mourner in chief”, “buddy”, “advocate”, or “orchestrator”. 
c. Meaning making towards the general public must be distinguished from meaning 
making towards the directly affected. The appropriate level of meaning making 
towards the affected is most likely defined by their personal expectations and the 
level of social acknowledgement they receive from their local community.
d. Mayors are supposed to guard the interests of the directly affected and incorporate 
the (psychosocial) interests of the affected in their meaning making behavior towards 
the general public as well.
e. Decisions in the context of meaning making are regarded as complex, particularly 
whenever mayors have the impression that they can no longer pretend to be 
“everyone’s mayor”. Under such circumstances, they are required to explain their 
position to people or to stakeholders who disagree and adopt the concept of 
procedural justice.
f. The complexity of crisis related decisions that need to be taken in the context of 
meaning making is independent of the collective impact and/or the (perceived) 
responsibility. Moreover, the complexity is not defined by age, gender, experience 
as a mayor, and/or the size of their municipality.
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The findings indicate that, in their meaning making towards the general public, mayors 
will need to check whether there is a need to incorporate the position of the directly 
affected in the words they choose. In times of crises with a local impact, they should not 
only focus on broad themes like hope, resilience, and pride which are regular themes in 
meaning making by public leaders. In language and deeds, mayors can publicly show that 
they care about the well-being of all their citizens and explain to society how they can 
support the affected in their psychosocial recovery. 
The findings stress the importance of being able to explain mayoral behavior under 
all circumstances and to all audiences, whether it is collective, in one-on-one meetings 
with citizens, or in the political arena. Their communicative efforts require more than 
“just being there”. In its essence, it is true that mayors should be visible when the public 
requires them to be so; however, in a given crisis mayors probably will be challenged to 
synchronize the interests of both public and the directly affected whilst shaping their 
meaning making behavior.
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Het dankwoord. Onder promotiestudenten gaat de running gag dat dit vaak het meest 
gelezen deel van een promotiestudie is. Het is hoe dan ook een belangrijke plek om mijn 
dankbaarheid te delen, voor de betrokkenheid die ik heb ervaren gedurende dit onderzoek. 
Promoveren is soms eenzaam, maar gelukkig voelde ik ook dat ik op veel momenten werd 
bijgestaan. Van de eerste schetsen tot het polijsten van hetgeen er nu ligt.
Een aantal mensen heb ik al bedankt in de respectievelijke hoofdstukken. Veel dank 
gaat uit naar mijn co-auteurs, maar ook naar de anonieme reviewers, die mij de afgelopen 
jaren behoedden voor stretching the data en er keer op keer voor zorgden dat ingediende 
artikelen steeds een tandje scherper werden. De leden van de beoordelingscommissie 
en verdedigingscommissie wil ik bedanken voor de tijd en energie die zij belangeloos 
beschikbaar stellen om mijn bijdrage aan de wetenschap te beoordelen. Ook veel dank aan 
Erwin Seydel en Jan Gutteling, die mij destijds bij de Universiteit Twente overhaalden om 
dit project te starten. Het bleek te vroeg en met een jong gezin ietwat te ambitieus, waarna 
in 2012 een herstart volgde aan de universiteit in Tilburg. Dat laat onverlet dat ik dankbaar 
ben voor het zaadje dat jullie destijds hebben geplant.
Een woord van dank gaat uit naar alle respondenten die hebben meegewerkt aan 
dit onderzoek. Maar ook aan de getroffenen, burgemeesters en professionals die in de 
afgelopen jaren op andere momenten hun ervaringen hebben gedeeld en mij in staat 
stelden om mijn ontluikende gedachten aan te scherpen. Op burgemeesterskamers in het 
land. Aan de bar in ´t Hof van Gelre in Lochem, aan keukentafels of op andere plaatsen. Al 
die ervaringen uit eerste hand waren cruciaal voor dit onderzoek. In het bijzonder wil ik oud-
burgemeester Jan Mans bedanken, die in 2005 met zijn Bestuurlijk Netwerk Crisisbeheersing 
een beweging in gang zette die nu, jaren later, resulteert in mijn verdediging in de aula van 
de Universiteit van Tilburg.
Peter van der Velden, mijn eerste begeleider. Ik heb genoten van de gezamenlijke 
zoektocht in de wondere wereld der bestuurskunde. De metaforen waarmee je elk gesprek 
wist te doorspekken. De verbazing van een psycholoog die in andere vakgebieden kijkt. 
De snelle manier waarop je mij de mores leerde van het wetenschappelijke handwerk. 
Als je mij na een enthousiaste bewering weer met beide voeten op de grond zette: “Het 
klinkt plausibel, maar dat volgt niet uit de data”. Mede door jouw enthousiasme ben ik 
door de wetenschap gegrepen en zal ik blijven publiceren. Ook het enthousiasme van 
Michel Dückers, mijn copromotor, werkte aanstekelijk. Wat een geluk dat jij van meet af 
aan betrokken was in dit project. Jouw combinatie van focus en creativiteit is goud waard. 
Ik heb vanaf de eerste studie ervaren hoe we elkaar naadloos aanvulden. Een hoge Cohen-
Kappa kenmerkt onze vriendschap, waarin geen moment onbenut bleef om te sparren over 
het vak. Op weg naar een Pearl Jam concert werd nog een snelle notitie gemaakt, zodat 
we de laatste brainwave niet zouden vergeten. Soms waren we twee nerds, die met twee 
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laptops en een scherm hun analyses draaiden in een kelder in Den Bosch. Ik kijk nu al uit 
naar Dückers & Jong (2020) of Jong & Dückers (2021) en al wat verder nog komen gaat. Het 
is een genoegen om op een parallel spoor jouw eigen wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling van 
nabij te kunnen volgen. Edith, jij ook veel dank voor de enorme gastvrijheid die ik voelde 
als ik weer eens een avond bij jou en Michel over de vloer kwam.
Mijn werkgever, het Nederlands Genootschap van Burgemeesters, ben ik erkentelijk 
voor de ondersteuning van dit project. Al jaren mag ik de Nassaulaan in Den Haag mijn 
thuishaven noemen. Weliswaar gebeurde het merendeel van het onderzoek in de avonduren, 
het NGB stelde mij in staat om diverse onderzoeken te doen onder de zittende Nederlandse 
burgemeesters. Zonder die studies was dit proefschrift onmogelijk geweest. Ik ben blij met 
mijn directe collega’s Anouck Haverhoek en Reineke Ponsioen, die gedurende de afgelopen 
jaren hun interesse in mijn onderzoeken toonden. 
Mijn dank gaat ook uit naar Impact, waar de samenwerking door de jaren heen altijd 
collegiaal voelde. Het gedachtegoed van Impact, kenniscentrum voor getroffenen na rampen 
en crises, is van onschatbare waarde voor mij geweest. Marieke van der Post, het was een 
waar genoegen om met jou aan “Wereld van Verschil” te werken en samen op zoek te gaan 
naar de ware impact van rampen en crises. Door de puurheid van de verhalen die we daar 
wisten bloot te leggen, is onze gezamenlijke interviewbundel nog altijd mijn meest dierbare 
project. 
Ook mijn nieuwe werkkring bij het Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) aan de 
Universiteit Leiden voelt van meet af aan als een warm bad. Sanneke Kuipers wil ik specifiek 
bedanken voor de mogelijkheid om binnen ISGA het bijvak Crisis Communication op te 
zetten. Het stelt mij niet alleen in staat om mijn enthousiasme op een nieuwe generatie 
studenten over te brengen, maar zorgt er ook voor dat ik mijzelf kan blijven ontwikkelen 
naast mijn baan bij het NGB. Ik kijk uit naar het vervolg van de samenwerking binnen de 
vakgroep Governance of Crises, waar de gezelligheid wordt gecombineerd met een uniek 
crisisnerd-gehalte.
Ik voel mij gezegend met een grote professionele vriendenkring, mensen die vanuit 
verschillende invalshoeken een bijdrage leveren aan mijn ontwikkeling, het crisisvak 
vormgeven en waarmee ik mijn gedachten kan laten rijpen. René Hagen mag in dat kader niet 
onvermeld blijven, die mij na onze geslaagde test met brandende bankstellen introduceerde 
in de fascinerende wereld van crisisbeheersing en rampenbestrijding. Ira Helsloot, jij gaf mij 
de ruimte om mee op te lopen en over jouw schouder mee te kijken als jonge onderzoeker 
bij NIBRA en COT. In jouw kielzog heb ik ontzettend veel van je geleerd en is de ambitie om 
onderzoek te doen zeker getriggerd.
Een bijzondere plaats in dit traject heeft Ina Strating. Jij bent er vanaf de start bij geweest. 
Onze eindeloze telefoongesprekken, terwijl ik op weg was naar deze of gene pasbenoemde 
burgemeester, waren een verrijking voor onszelf, maar ook voor het vak. Ik genoot en 
geniet ervan hoe we elkaar scherp houden, als twee eenpitters die samen de wereld van 
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de crisisbeheersing analyseren. Sinds “De Punt” hebben we veel geleerd op de hobbelige 
weg die ons van de ene crisis naar de andere crisis bracht. Met bewondering zie ik hoe jouw 
niet-aflatende aandacht voor de plek van getroffenen in het grotere geheel ervoor heeft 
gezorgd dat getroffenen tegenwoordig de aandacht krijgen die zij verdienen. Roy Johannink, 
ook jij was betrokken vanaf het eerste uur. Ik zie ons nog zitten op een oude kerkbank in de 
woonkamer van oud-burgemeester Tin Plomp, om zijn ervaringen met de brommerrellen in 
Genemuiden op te tekenen. Het was bijzonder om samen op ontdekkingstocht te gaan en 
dat later vorm te geven bij het NGB. De crises waar we hebben meegedacht zijn ontelbaar. 
Van potentiële calamiteiten tijdens de beddenrace in Noord-Scharwoude tot de impact van 
MH17. Hans Bleijerveld heeft mij geïnspireerd om altijd op zoek te gaan naar de menselijke 
maat binnen protocollen en structuren. Ik ben onder de indruk van de discretie waarmee 
jij te werk gaat bij ingrijpende gebeurtenissen. Menno van Duin en Vina Wijkhuijs, met 
wie ik al jarenlang optrek in het kader van de Crises en mini-crises-bundels, ook van onze 
gedeelde inzichten heb ik veel geleerd. Dank ook aan Jelle Groenendaal, met wie ik kon 
sparren tijdens koffiesessies bij Vroeg, toen ik net in de wetenschap was gestart. Wout 
Broekema van ISGA, dank ook voor de reflecties toen ik verder op streek was, inclusief de 
soms gedeelde smart over revisions en rejections. De Manillabende van Nicolette Stoel, 
Lodewijk van Wendel de Joode en Maike Delfgaauw, na onze Sugong Bagani conferentie 
zal nucleair terrorisme nooit meer hetzelfde zijn. Het prettige gezelschap van Anne-Marie 
van het Erve, Frank Vergeer en Cyriel Hamstra, met wie het crisiscommunicatiecongres in 
Florida toch nèt even een andere beleving werd. Frank Regtvoort, dank voor het sparren 
tijdens gesprekken, waar de stevige rook op jouw studeerkamer figuurlijk optrok als jij de 
ontwikkelingen in het crisisvak in een grotere communicatietraditie duidde. Michiel Roesink 
en Sylvian Noeken, het was een genoegen om met jullie mee te doen in het actuele dossier 
van “de bevings”. Het gaf mij de gelegenheid om samen met jullie te ontdekken waar de 
huidige grenzen van crisismanagement en crisiscommunicatie liggen. Hugo Marynissen en 
Stijn Pieters wil ik bedanken voor jullie kennis en de niet-aflatende ambitie om academische 
inzichten te vertalen naar de crisispraktijk in Vlaanderen en daarbuiten. Peter Bos, jou wil ik 
bedanken voor je inzichten en reflecties op crisis leiderschap, die nog meer diepgang gaven 
aan onze projecten voor VNG International en mij in staat stelden om ook als trainer én 
onderzoeker te blijven leren. Ritzo ten Cate, van wie ik rond ProjectX Haren veel heb geleerd 
over onderstromen en sentimenten die cruciaal zijn om crises te doorgronden. Maar zeker 
ook Arnout de Vries, met je verpletterende kennis ben ik blij dat je me af en toe een [critical 
update] geeft om de ontwikkelingen bij te kunnen houden in de online kanten van het vak.
Josine van de Ven en Remko Smit, ik vind het prachtig dat jullie mijn paranimfen willen 
zijn. Richting Josine spreek ik daarmee de dankbaarheid uit voor de gezamenlijke reis die 
we met de Burgemeestersgame hebben afgelegd. De inzichten die we gaandeweg hebben 
opgedaan, de voorbeelden die door de game uit eerste hand ter sprake zijn gekomen en 
de les dat juist kleine crises met grote dilemma´s gepaard kunnen gaan, zijn en blijven 
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onbetaalbaar. Remko ben ik dankbaar voor de vriendschap die startte op onze middelbare 
school in Delfzijl en een vervolg kreeg tijdens de latere studie in Groningen. Wij lopen al die 
jaren samen op en delen ons privé en professionele leven. Ik dank jou en Sharan voor de 
warmte en betrokkenheid als ik met Inge van tijd tot tijd in Maidenhead kom aanwaaien.
Ingrid van Assouw, ik vind het een voorrecht dat je “mijn burgemeesters” en “mijn 
studenten” meeneemt in jouw eigen crisiservaring. Ik waardeer je openheid over je eigen 
ervaringen enorm. Dat je ook een plek hebt gekregen met jouw ontwerp van de kaft, maakt 
deze studie extra bijzonder. Mike Reed from Reedwords.co.uk, I am thrilled that you gave 
me the opportunity to use your brand design from the World Trade Center construction site. 
I am sure that I am one of many who were impressed reading those words while visiting 
New York. 
Mijn zus Maerle wil ik bedanken voor het tegenlezen van diverse artikelen en de vele 
Whatsapp gesprekken naar de andere kant van de Atlantische Oceaan, die ertoe leidden 
dat je gaandeweg ook steeds meer zicht kreeg op het werk van je broer. Ik waardeer je 
betrokkenheid bij mijn reis door de wereld van de wetenschap altijd enorm. Mijn ouders 
wil ik bedanken voor de basis die zij hebben gelegd, waarin een kritische blik op de wereld 
doorlopend heeft geleid tot nieuwe vragen die een antwoord nopen. Mam, jouw niet-
aflatende interesse in mijn wel en wee, zelfs in de recente periode dat je dapper met je 
eigen strubbelingen om moest gaan, is een grote steun geweest. Ik hoop dezelfde mate van 
steun over te kunnen brengen op Myrthe en Taus. Lieverds, gaandeweg kregen jullie ook 
steeds meer zicht op wat het schrijven van een studie als deze nu werkelijk behelst. Ik wil me 
verontschuldigen voor alle keren dat mijn gedachten afdwaalden, omdat ik met mijn hoofd 
weer bij een nieuw onderzoek zat. Ik neem mij voor om met iets meer focus met jullie te 
Risken en jullie toegewijd te begeleiden bij alle dingen die de komende jaren nog op jullie 
pad komen. Stiekem hoop ik dat jullie ooit zelf zullen ervaren hoe waardevol het is om jezelf 
van tijd tot tijd in een onderwerp te kunnen verliezen.
Tot slot, lieve Inge, ben ik de grootste dank aan jou verschuldigd. Ook jij werd soms 
geconfronteerd met afdwalende gedachten. Maar gelukkig deelde je in de vreugd als er weer 
een doorbraak of “accepted” was. Of wanneer er met Michel en Edith iets te vieren was in 
Altembrouck. Je begrip was oneindig. Ook toen ik tijdens de jaarlijkse vakantie op Vlieland 
om 4 uur opstond uit bed, om een aantekening te maken die uiteindelijk tot het framework 
uit hoofdstuk 3 leidde. Aan het begin van het traject kreeg ik van jou de spreuk “Nait soezen 
mor doun”. Ik besef dat het niet altijd makkelijk zal zijn om te leven met deze Groninger in 
Den Haag. Zeker niet als hij een “rejected” terugkrijgt van een editor. Ik voel me gelukkig 
bij en met jou, je humor, je scherpte, je intelligentie, je steun op lastige momenten en je 
kritische blik. Je eigen doorzettingsvermogen is om jaloers van te worden. Jouw vertrouwen 
heeft geholpen op de momenten dat ik mij afvroeg waar ik in hemelsnaam aan begonnen 
was. Jij zorgt ervoor dat qua crisis werk en privé gescheiden blijven. Ik vind het een heerlijk 
vooruitzicht om het afronden van deze studie met jou, Myrthe en Taus te kunnen vieren.
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Wouter Jong (1972) is a full time crisis consultant for the Dutch Association of Mayors. 
He advises mayors during and in the aftermath of crises in The Netherlands. From small 
incidents up to larger crises, such as a Project X-birthday party invitation, which went viral 
on Facebook and ended in riots (2012). His daily work focuses on crisis communication 
strategies, taking into account the legislative powers of mayors and the public perceptions 
and impact of incidents, crises and disasters. 
He began his career in 1997 as a public affairs associate for international PR-agency 
Burson-Marsteller. Ever since, his professional life has had a focus on issue management, 
crisis and disaster management, and crisis communication. After working as a researcher 
at NIBRA (Netherlands Institute of Fire Service Disasters Management; now IFV), he 
worked for COT Institute for Safety and Security Management in The Hague (2003-2007). 
He is a lecturer in Crisis Communication at the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs 
at Leiden University since 2018.
He studied Business Economics at the University of Groningen and studied Law 
at the Open University in Heerlen. His final thesis on liability issues in a governmental 
context received an award (2007) from Leiden University´s Albeda Leerstoel. Later on, 
Wouter was recognized with the Top Student Paper Award of the International Crisis & 
Risk Communication Conference at the University of Central Florida for his paper “Self-
correcting mechanisms and Echo-effects in Social Media: An analysis of the ‘Gunman in 
the Newswroom’ Crisis” (with Michel Dückers as co-author), in 2016. In 2017 his article 
“Meaning making by public leaders in times of crisis: An assessment” was also awarded 
with the International Top Student Paper Award at the Florida conference.
His work has been published in international academic journals, professional 
magazines, publications from the Dutch Association of Mayors and online weblogs. He has 
been training mayors and public leaders in crisis management and crisis communication 
through projects at VNG International in Jordan, Lebanon and Sint Maarten, where he 
contributes to disaster management related projects in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma 
(2017). He has presented his work at national and international conferences.
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